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authorIvan Kanakarakis <ivan.kanak@gmail.com>2021-01-09 00:31:13 +0200
committerIvan Kanakarakis <ivan.kanak@gmail.com>2021-01-15 16:09:06 +0200
commit3b707723dcf1bf60677b424aac398c0c3557641d (patch)
tree32be8bf3732a60e3f0697ba9d024cac6d6929374 /tests/test_xsw.py
parentb76ea403e3107bbae73b653215985b9e1f27c5d4 (diff)
downloadpysaml2-3b707723dcf1bf60677b424aac398c0c3557641d.tar.gz
Fix CVE-2021-21238 - SAML XML Signature wrapping
All users of pysaml2 that use the default `CryptoBackendXmlSec1` backend and need to verify signed SAML documents are impacted. `pysaml2 <= 6.4.1` does not validate the SAML document against an XML schema. This allows invalid XML documents to trick the verification process, by presenting elements with a valid signature inside elements whose content has been malformed. The verification is offloaded to `xmlsec1` and `xmlsec1` will not validate every signature in the given document, but only the first it finds in the given scope. Credits for the report: - Victor Schönfelder Garcia (isits AG International School of IT Security) - Juraj Somorovsky (Paderborn University) - Vladislav Mladenov (Ruhr University Bochum) Signed-off-by: Ivan Kanakarakis <ivan.kanak@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'tests/test_xsw.py')
-rw-r--r--tests/test_xsw.py41
1 files changed, 41 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tests/test_xsw.py b/tests/test_xsw.py
index cb756f76..0e92a5bd 100644
--- a/tests/test_xsw.py
+++ b/tests/test_xsw.py
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ SIGNED_XSW_ASSERTION_WRAPPER = full_path("xsw/signed-xsw-assertion-wrapper.xml")
SIGNED_XSW_ASSERTION_EXTENSIONS = full_path("xsw/signed-xsw-assertion-extensions.xml")
SIGNED_XSW_ASSERTION_ASSERTION = full_path("xsw/signed-xsw-assertion-assertion.xml")
+SIGNED_ASSERTION_FIRST_SIG = full_path("xsw/signed-xsw-assertion-in-assertion-first-sig.xml")
+SIGNED_REPONSE_FIRST_SIG = full_path("xsw/signed-xsw-response-in-response-first-sig.xml")
class TestXSW:
@@ -87,3 +89,42 @@ class TestXSW:
assert self.ar.ava is None
assert self.ar.name_id is None
+
+
+class TestInvalidDepthFirstSig:
+ def setup_class(self):
+ self.conf = config_factory("sp", dotname("server_conf"))
+ self.ar = authn_response(self.conf, return_addrs="https://example.org/acs/post")
+
+ @patch('saml2.response.validate_on_or_after', return_value=True)
+ def test_signed_assertion_first_sig_should_fail(self, mock_validate_on_or_after):
+ self.ar.issue_instant_ok = Mock(return_value=True)
+
+ with open(SIGNED_ASSERTION_FIRST_SIG) as fp:
+ xml_response = fp.read()
+
+ self.ar.outstanding_queries = {"id-abc": "http://localhost:8088/sso"}
+ self.ar.timeslack = 10000
+ self.ar.loads(xml_response, decode=False)
+
+ assert self.ar.came_from == 'http://localhost:8088/sso'
+ assert self.ar.session_id() == "id-abc"
+ assert self.ar.issuer() == 'urn:mace:example.com:saml:roland:idp'
+
+ with raises(SignatureError):
+ self.ar.verify()
+
+ assert self.ar.ava is None
+ assert self.ar.name_id is None
+
+ @patch('saml2.response.validate_on_or_after', return_value=True)
+ def test_signed_response_first_sig_should_fail(self, mock_validate_on_or_after):
+ self.ar.issue_instant_ok = Mock(return_value=True)
+
+ with open(SIGNED_REPONSE_FIRST_SIG) as fp:
+ xml_response = fp.read()
+
+ self.ar.outstanding_queries = {"id-abc": "http://localhost:8088/sso"}
+ self.ar.timeslack = 10000
+ with raises(SignatureError):
+ self.ar.loads(xml_response, decode=False)