diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'chromium/net/http/http_auth_handler_ntlm_portable.cc')
| -rw-r--r-- | chromium/net/http/http_auth_handler_ntlm_portable.cc | 730 |
1 files changed, 730 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/chromium/net/http/http_auth_handler_ntlm_portable.cc b/chromium/net/http/http_auth_handler_ntlm_portable.cc new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..d1fbf23c59f --- /dev/null +++ b/chromium/net/http/http_auth_handler_ntlm_portable.cc @@ -0,0 +1,730 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "net/http/http_auth_handler_ntlm.h" + +#include <stdlib.h> +// For gethostname +#if defined(OS_POSIX) +#include <unistd.h> +#elif defined(OS_WIN) +#include <winsock2.h> +#endif + +#include "base/md5.h" +#include "base/rand_util.h" +#include "base/strings/string_util.h" +#include "base/strings/sys_string_conversions.h" +#include "base/strings/utf_string_conversions.h" +#include "net/base/net_errors.h" +#include "net/base/net_util.h" +#include "net/base/zap.h" +#include "net/http/des.h" +#include "net/http/md4.h" + +namespace net { + +// Based on mozilla/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNTLMAuthModule.cpp, +// CVS rev. 1.14. +// +// TODO(wtc): +// - The IS_BIG_ENDIAN code is not tested. +// - Enable the logging code or just delete it. +// - Delete or comment out the LM code, which hasn't been tested and isn't +// being used. + +/* ***** BEGIN LICENSE BLOCK ***** + * Version: MPL 1.1/GPL 2.0/LGPL 2.1 + * + * The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public License Version + * 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with + * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/ + * + * Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, + * WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License + * for the specific language governing rights and limitations under the + * License. + * + * The Original Code is Mozilla. + * + * The Initial Developer of the Original Code is IBM Corporation. + * Portions created by IBM Corporation are Copyright (C) 2003 + * IBM Corporation. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Contributor(s): + * Darin Fisher <darin@meer.net> + * + * Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the terms of + * either the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the "GPL"), or + * the GNU Lesser General Public License Version 2.1 or later (the "LGPL"), + * in which case the provisions of the GPL or the LGPL are applicable instead + * of those above. If you wish to allow use of your version of this file only + * under the terms of either the GPL or the LGPL, and not to allow others to + * use your version of this file under the terms of the MPL, indicate your + * decision by deleting the provisions above and replace them with the notice + * and other provisions required by the GPL or the LGPL. If you do not delete + * the provisions above, a recipient may use your version of this file under + * the terms of any one of the MPL, the GPL or the LGPL. + * + * ***** END LICENSE BLOCK ***** */ + +// Discover the endianness by testing processor architecture. +#if defined(ARCH_CPU_X86) || defined(ARCH_CPU_X86_64)\ + || defined(ARCH_CPU_ARMEL) || defined(ARCH_CPU_MIPSEL) +#define IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN 1 +#undef IS_BIG_ENDIAN +#elif defined(ARCH_CPU_MIPSEB) +#define IS_BIG_ENDIAN 1 +#undef IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN +#else +#error "Unknown endianness" +#endif + +#define NTLM_LOG(x) ((void) 0) + +//----------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// This file contains a cross-platform NTLM authentication implementation. It +// is based on documentation from: http://davenport.sourceforge.net/ntlm.html +//----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +enum { + NTLM_NegotiateUnicode = 0x00000001, + NTLM_NegotiateOEM = 0x00000002, + NTLM_RequestTarget = 0x00000004, + NTLM_Unknown1 = 0x00000008, + NTLM_NegotiateSign = 0x00000010, + NTLM_NegotiateSeal = 0x00000020, + NTLM_NegotiateDatagramStyle = 0x00000040, + NTLM_NegotiateLanManagerKey = 0x00000080, + NTLM_NegotiateNetware = 0x00000100, + NTLM_NegotiateNTLMKey = 0x00000200, + NTLM_Unknown2 = 0x00000400, + NTLM_Unknown3 = 0x00000800, + NTLM_NegotiateDomainSupplied = 0x00001000, + NTLM_NegotiateWorkstationSupplied = 0x00002000, + NTLM_NegotiateLocalCall = 0x00004000, + NTLM_NegotiateAlwaysSign = 0x00008000, + NTLM_TargetTypeDomain = 0x00010000, + NTLM_TargetTypeServer = 0x00020000, + NTLM_TargetTypeShare = 0x00040000, + NTLM_NegotiateNTLM2Key = 0x00080000, + NTLM_RequestInitResponse = 0x00100000, + NTLM_RequestAcceptResponse = 0x00200000, + NTLM_RequestNonNTSessionKey = 0x00400000, + NTLM_NegotiateTargetInfo = 0x00800000, + NTLM_Unknown4 = 0x01000000, + NTLM_Unknown5 = 0x02000000, + NTLM_Unknown6 = 0x04000000, + NTLM_Unknown7 = 0x08000000, + NTLM_Unknown8 = 0x10000000, + NTLM_Negotiate128 = 0x20000000, + NTLM_NegotiateKeyExchange = 0x40000000, + NTLM_Negotiate56 = 0x80000000 +}; + +// We send these flags with our type 1 message. +enum { + NTLM_TYPE1_FLAGS = (NTLM_NegotiateUnicode | + NTLM_NegotiateOEM | + NTLM_RequestTarget | + NTLM_NegotiateNTLMKey | + NTLM_NegotiateAlwaysSign | + NTLM_NegotiateNTLM2Key) +}; + +static const char NTLM_SIGNATURE[] = "NTLMSSP"; +static const char NTLM_TYPE1_MARKER[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; +static const char NTLM_TYPE2_MARKER[] = { 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; +static const char NTLM_TYPE3_MARKER[] = { 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; + +enum { + NTLM_TYPE1_HEADER_LEN = 32, + NTLM_TYPE2_HEADER_LEN = 32, + NTLM_TYPE3_HEADER_LEN = 64, + + LM_HASH_LEN = 16, + LM_RESP_LEN = 24, + + NTLM_HASH_LEN = 16, + NTLM_RESP_LEN = 24 +}; + +//----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +// The return value of this function controls whether or not the LM hash will +// be included in response to a NTLM challenge. +// +// In Mozilla, this function returns the value of the boolean preference +// "network.ntlm.send-lm-response". By default, the preference is disabled +// since servers should almost never need the LM hash, and the LM hash is what +// makes NTLM authentication less secure. See +// https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=250691 for further details. +// +// We just return a hardcoded false. +static bool SendLM() { + return false; +} + +//----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +#define LogFlags(x) ((void) 0) +#define LogBuf(a, b, c) ((void) 0) +#define LogToken(a, b, c) ((void) 0) + +//----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +// Byte order swapping. +#define SWAP16(x) ((((x) & 0xff) << 8) | (((x) >> 8) & 0xff)) +#define SWAP32(x) ((SWAP16((x) & 0xffff) << 16) | (SWAP16((x) >> 16))) + +static void* WriteBytes(void* buf, const void* data, uint32 data_len) { + memcpy(buf, data, data_len); + return static_cast<char*>(buf) + data_len; +} + +static void* WriteDWORD(void* buf, uint32 dword) { +#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN + // NTLM uses little endian on the wire. + dword = SWAP32(dword); +#endif + return WriteBytes(buf, &dword, sizeof(dword)); +} + +static void* WriteSecBuf(void* buf, uint16 length, uint32 offset) { +#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN + length = SWAP16(length); + offset = SWAP32(offset); +#endif + buf = WriteBytes(buf, &length, sizeof(length)); + buf = WriteBytes(buf, &length, sizeof(length)); + buf = WriteBytes(buf, &offset, sizeof(offset)); + return buf; +} + +#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN +/** + * WriteUnicodeLE copies a unicode string from one buffer to another. The + * resulting unicode string is in little-endian format. The input string is + * assumed to be in the native endianness of the local machine. It is safe + * to pass the same buffer as both input and output, which is a handy way to + * convert the unicode buffer to little-endian on big-endian platforms. + */ +static void* WriteUnicodeLE(void* buf, const char16* str, uint32 str_len) { + // Convert input string from BE to LE. + uint8* cursor = static_cast<uint8*>(buf); + const uint8* input = reinterpret_cast<const uint8*>(str); + for (uint32 i = 0; i < str_len; ++i, input += 2, cursor += 2) { + // Allow for the case where |buf == str|. + uint8 temp = input[0]; + cursor[0] = input[1]; + cursor[1] = temp; + } + return buf; +} +#endif + +static uint16 ReadUint16(const uint8*& buf) { + uint16 x = (static_cast<uint16>(buf[0])) | + (static_cast<uint16>(buf[1]) << 8); + buf += sizeof(x); + return x; +} + +static uint32 ReadUint32(const uint8*& buf) { + uint32 x = (static_cast<uint32>(buf[0])) | + (static_cast<uint32>(buf[1]) << 8) | + (static_cast<uint32>(buf[2]) << 16) | + (static_cast<uint32>(buf[3]) << 24); + buf += sizeof(x); + return x; +} + +//----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +// LM_Hash computes the LM hash of the given password. +// +// param password +// unicode password. +// param hash +// 16-byte result buffer +// +// Note: This function is not being used because our SendLM() function always +// returns false. +static void LM_Hash(const base::string16& password, uint8* hash) { + static const uint8 LM_MAGIC[] = "KGS!@#$%"; + + // Convert password to OEM character set. We'll just use the native + // filesystem charset. + std::string passbuf = base::SysWideToNativeMB(UTF16ToWide(password)); + StringToUpperASCII(&passbuf); + passbuf.resize(14, '\0'); + + uint8 k1[8], k2[8]; + DESMakeKey(reinterpret_cast<const uint8*>(passbuf.data()) , k1); + DESMakeKey(reinterpret_cast<const uint8*>(passbuf.data()) + 7, k2); + ZapString(&passbuf); + + // Use password keys to hash LM magic string twice. + DESEncrypt(k1, LM_MAGIC, hash); + DESEncrypt(k2, LM_MAGIC, hash + 8); +} + +// NTLM_Hash computes the NTLM hash of the given password. +// +// param password +// null-terminated unicode password. +// param hash +// 16-byte result buffer +static void NTLM_Hash(const base::string16& password, uint8* hash) { +#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN + uint32 len = password.length(); + uint8* passbuf; + + passbuf = static_cast<uint8*>(malloc(len * 2)); + WriteUnicodeLE(passbuf, password.data(), len); + weak_crypto::MD4Sum(passbuf, len * 2, hash); + + ZapBuf(passbuf, len * 2); + free(passbuf); +#else + weak_crypto::MD4Sum(reinterpret_cast<const uint8*>(password.data()), + password.length() * 2, hash); +#endif +} + +//----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +// LM_Response generates the LM response given a 16-byte password hash and the +// challenge from the Type-2 message. +// +// param hash +// 16-byte password hash +// param challenge +// 8-byte challenge from Type-2 message +// param response +// 24-byte buffer to contain the LM response upon return +static void LM_Response(const uint8* hash, + const uint8* challenge, + uint8* response) { + uint8 keybytes[21], k1[8], k2[8], k3[8]; + + memcpy(keybytes, hash, 16); + ZapBuf(keybytes + 16, 5); + + DESMakeKey(keybytes , k1); + DESMakeKey(keybytes + 7, k2); + DESMakeKey(keybytes + 14, k3); + + DESEncrypt(k1, challenge, response); + DESEncrypt(k2, challenge, response + 8); + DESEncrypt(k3, challenge, response + 16); +} + +//----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +// Returns OK or a network error code. +static int GenerateType1Msg(void** out_buf, uint32* out_len) { + // + // Verify that buf_len is sufficient. + // + *out_len = NTLM_TYPE1_HEADER_LEN; + *out_buf = malloc(*out_len); + if (!*out_buf) + return ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + + // + // Write out type 1 message. + // + void* cursor = *out_buf; + + // 0 : signature + cursor = WriteBytes(cursor, NTLM_SIGNATURE, sizeof(NTLM_SIGNATURE)); + + // 8 : marker + cursor = WriteBytes(cursor, NTLM_TYPE1_MARKER, sizeof(NTLM_TYPE1_MARKER)); + + // 12 : flags + cursor = WriteDWORD(cursor, NTLM_TYPE1_FLAGS); + + // + // NOTE: It is common for the domain and workstation fields to be empty. + // This is true of Win2k clients, and my guess is that there is + // little utility to sending these strings before the charset has + // been negotiated. We follow suite -- anyways, it doesn't hurt + // to save some bytes on the wire ;-) + // + + // 16 : supplied domain security buffer (empty) + cursor = WriteSecBuf(cursor, 0, 0); + + // 24 : supplied workstation security buffer (empty) + cursor = WriteSecBuf(cursor, 0, 0); + + return OK; +} + +struct Type2Msg { + uint32 flags; // NTLM_Xxx bitwise combination + uint8 challenge[8]; // 8 byte challenge + const void* target; // target string (type depends on flags) + uint32 target_len; // target length in bytes +}; + +// Returns OK or a network error code. +// TODO(wtc): This function returns ERR_UNEXPECTED when the input message is +// invalid. We should return a better error code. +static int ParseType2Msg(const void* in_buf, uint32 in_len, Type2Msg* msg) { + // Make sure in_buf is long enough to contain a meaningful type2 msg. + // + // 0 NTLMSSP Signature + // 8 NTLM Message Type + // 12 Target Name + // 20 Flags + // 24 Challenge + // 32 end of header, start of optional data blocks + // + if (in_len < NTLM_TYPE2_HEADER_LEN) + return ERR_UNEXPECTED; + + const uint8* cursor = (const uint8*) in_buf; + + // verify NTLMSSP signature + if (memcmp(cursor, NTLM_SIGNATURE, sizeof(NTLM_SIGNATURE)) != 0) + return ERR_UNEXPECTED; + cursor += sizeof(NTLM_SIGNATURE); + + // verify Type-2 marker + if (memcmp(cursor, NTLM_TYPE2_MARKER, sizeof(NTLM_TYPE2_MARKER)) != 0) + return ERR_UNEXPECTED; + cursor += sizeof(NTLM_TYPE2_MARKER); + + // read target name security buffer + uint32 target_len = ReadUint16(cursor); + ReadUint16(cursor); // discard next 16-bit value + uint32 offset = ReadUint32(cursor); // get offset from in_buf + msg->target_len = 0; + msg->target = NULL; + // Check the offset / length combo is in range of the input buffer, including + // integer overflow checking. + if (offset + target_len > offset && offset + target_len <= in_len) { + msg->target_len = target_len; + msg->target = ((const uint8*) in_buf) + offset; + } + + // read flags + msg->flags = ReadUint32(cursor); + + // read challenge + memcpy(msg->challenge, cursor, sizeof(msg->challenge)); + cursor += sizeof(msg->challenge); + + NTLM_LOG(("NTLM type 2 message:\n")); + LogBuf("target", (const uint8*) msg->target, msg->target_len); + LogBuf("flags", (const uint8*) &msg->flags, 4); + LogFlags(msg->flags); + LogBuf("challenge", msg->challenge, sizeof(msg->challenge)); + + // We currently do not implement LMv2/NTLMv2 or NTLM2 responses, + // so we can ignore target information. We may want to enable + // support for these alternate mechanisms in the future. + return OK; +} + +static void GenerateRandom(uint8* output, size_t n) { + for (size_t i = 0; i < n; ++i) + output[i] = base::RandInt(0, 255); +} + +// Returns OK or a network error code. +static int GenerateType3Msg(const base::string16& domain, + const base::string16& username, + const base::string16& password, + const std::string& hostname, + const void* rand_8_bytes, + const void* in_buf, + uint32 in_len, + void** out_buf, + uint32* out_len) { + // in_buf contains Type-2 msg (the challenge) from server. + + int rv; + Type2Msg msg; + + rv = ParseType2Msg(in_buf, in_len, &msg); + if (rv != OK) + return rv; + + bool unicode = (msg.flags & NTLM_NegotiateUnicode) != 0; + + // Temporary buffers for unicode strings +#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN + base::string16 ucs_domain_buf, ucs_user_buf; +#endif + base::string16 ucs_host_buf; + // Temporary buffers for oem strings + std::string oem_domain_buf, oem_user_buf; + // Pointers and lengths for the string buffers; encoding is unicode if + // the "negotiate unicode" flag was set in the Type-2 message. + const void* domain_ptr; + const void* user_ptr; + const void* host_ptr; + uint32 domain_len, user_len, host_len; + + // + // Get domain name. + // + if (unicode) { +#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN + ucs_domain_buf = domain; + domain_ptr = ucs_domain_buf.data(); + domain_len = ucs_domain_buf.length() * 2; + WriteUnicodeLE(const_cast<void*>(domain_ptr), (const char16*) domain_ptr, + ucs_domain_buf.length()); +#else + domain_ptr = domain.data(); + domain_len = domain.length() * 2; +#endif + } else { + oem_domain_buf = base::SysWideToNativeMB(UTF16ToWide(domain)); + domain_ptr = oem_domain_buf.data(); + domain_len = oem_domain_buf.length(); + } + + // + // Get user name. + // + if (unicode) { +#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN + ucs_user_buf = username; + user_ptr = ucs_user_buf.data(); + user_len = ucs_user_buf.length() * 2; + WriteUnicodeLE(const_cast<void*>(user_ptr), (const char16*) user_ptr, + ucs_user_buf.length()); +#else + user_ptr = username.data(); + user_len = username.length() * 2; +#endif + } else { + oem_user_buf = base::SysWideToNativeMB(UTF16ToWide(username)); + user_ptr = oem_user_buf.data(); + user_len = oem_user_buf.length(); + } + + // + // Get workstation name (use local machine's hostname). + // + if (unicode) { + // hostname is ASCII, so we can do a simple zero-pad expansion: + ucs_host_buf.assign(hostname.begin(), hostname.end()); + host_ptr = ucs_host_buf.data(); + host_len = ucs_host_buf.length() * 2; +#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN + WriteUnicodeLE(const_cast<void*>(host_ptr), (const char16*) host_ptr, + ucs_host_buf.length()); +#endif + } else { + host_ptr = hostname.data(); + host_len = hostname.length(); + } + + // + // Now that we have generated all of the strings, we can allocate out_buf. + // + *out_len = NTLM_TYPE3_HEADER_LEN + host_len + domain_len + user_len + + LM_RESP_LEN + NTLM_RESP_LEN; + *out_buf = malloc(*out_len); + if (!*out_buf) + return ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + + // + // Next, we compute the LM and NTLM responses. + // + uint8 lm_resp[LM_RESP_LEN]; + uint8 ntlm_resp[NTLM_RESP_LEN]; + uint8 ntlm_hash[NTLM_HASH_LEN]; + if (msg.flags & NTLM_NegotiateNTLM2Key) { + // compute NTLM2 session response + base::MD5Digest session_hash; + uint8 temp[16]; + + memcpy(lm_resp, rand_8_bytes, 8); + memset(lm_resp + 8, 0, LM_RESP_LEN - 8); + + memcpy(temp, msg.challenge, 8); + memcpy(temp + 8, lm_resp, 8); + base::MD5Sum(temp, 16, &session_hash); + + NTLM_Hash(password, ntlm_hash); + LM_Response(ntlm_hash, session_hash.a, ntlm_resp); + } else { + NTLM_Hash(password, ntlm_hash); + LM_Response(ntlm_hash, msg.challenge, ntlm_resp); + + if (SendLM()) { + uint8 lm_hash[LM_HASH_LEN]; + LM_Hash(password, lm_hash); + LM_Response(lm_hash, msg.challenge, lm_resp); + } else { + // According to http://davenport.sourceforge.net/ntlm.html#ntlmVersion2, + // the correct way to not send the LM hash is to send the NTLM hash twice + // in both the LM and NTLM response fields. + LM_Response(ntlm_hash, msg.challenge, lm_resp); + } + } + + // + // Finally, we assemble the Type-3 msg :-) + // + void* cursor = *out_buf; + uint32 offset; + + // 0 : signature + cursor = WriteBytes(cursor, NTLM_SIGNATURE, sizeof(NTLM_SIGNATURE)); + + // 8 : marker + cursor = WriteBytes(cursor, NTLM_TYPE3_MARKER, sizeof(NTLM_TYPE3_MARKER)); + + // 12 : LM response sec buf + offset = NTLM_TYPE3_HEADER_LEN + domain_len + user_len + host_len; + cursor = WriteSecBuf(cursor, LM_RESP_LEN, offset); + memcpy(static_cast<uint8*>(*out_buf) + offset, lm_resp, LM_RESP_LEN); + + // 20 : NTLM response sec buf + offset += LM_RESP_LEN; + cursor = WriteSecBuf(cursor, NTLM_RESP_LEN, offset); + memcpy(static_cast<uint8*>(*out_buf) + offset, ntlm_resp, NTLM_RESP_LEN); + + // 28 : domain name sec buf + offset = NTLM_TYPE3_HEADER_LEN; + cursor = WriteSecBuf(cursor, domain_len, offset); + memcpy(static_cast<uint8*>(*out_buf) + offset, domain_ptr, domain_len); + + // 36 : user name sec buf + offset += domain_len; + cursor = WriteSecBuf(cursor, user_len, offset); + memcpy(static_cast<uint8*>(*out_buf) + offset, user_ptr, user_len); + + // 44 : workstation (host) name sec buf + offset += user_len; + cursor = WriteSecBuf(cursor, host_len, offset); + memcpy(static_cast<uint8*>(*out_buf) + offset, host_ptr, host_len); + + // 52 : session key sec buf (not used) + cursor = WriteSecBuf(cursor, 0, 0); + + // 60 : negotiated flags + cursor = WriteDWORD(cursor, msg.flags & NTLM_TYPE1_FLAGS); + + return OK; +} + +// NTLM authentication is specified in "NTLM Over HTTP Protocol Specification" +// [MS-NTHT]. + +// static +HttpAuthHandlerNTLM::GenerateRandomProc +HttpAuthHandlerNTLM::generate_random_proc_ = GenerateRandom; + +// static +HttpAuthHandlerNTLM::HostNameProc +HttpAuthHandlerNTLM::get_host_name_proc_ = GetHostName; + +HttpAuthHandlerNTLM::HttpAuthHandlerNTLM() { +} + +bool HttpAuthHandlerNTLM::NeedsIdentity() { + // This gets called for each round-trip. Only require identity on + // the first call (when auth_data_ is empty). On subsequent calls, + // we use the initially established identity. + return auth_data_.empty(); +} + +bool HttpAuthHandlerNTLM::AllowsDefaultCredentials() { + // Default credentials are not supported in the portable implementation of + // NTLM, but are supported in the SSPI implementation. + return false; +} + +int HttpAuthHandlerNTLM::InitializeBeforeFirstChallenge() { + return OK; +} + +HttpAuthHandlerNTLM::~HttpAuthHandlerNTLM() { + credentials_.Zap(); +} + +// static +HttpAuthHandlerNTLM::GenerateRandomProc +HttpAuthHandlerNTLM::SetGenerateRandomProc( + GenerateRandomProc proc) { + GenerateRandomProc old_proc = generate_random_proc_; + generate_random_proc_ = proc; + return old_proc; +} + +// static +HttpAuthHandlerNTLM::HostNameProc HttpAuthHandlerNTLM::SetHostNameProc( + HostNameProc proc) { + HostNameProc old_proc = get_host_name_proc_; + get_host_name_proc_ = proc; + return old_proc; +} + +HttpAuthHandlerNTLM::Factory::Factory() { +} + +HttpAuthHandlerNTLM::Factory::~Factory() { +} + +int HttpAuthHandlerNTLM::GetNextToken(const void* in_token, + uint32 in_token_len, + void** out_token, + uint32* out_token_len) { + int rv = 0; + + // If in_token is non-null, then assume it contains a type 2 message... + if (in_token) { + LogToken("in-token", in_token, in_token_len); + std::string hostname = get_host_name_proc_(); + if (hostname.empty()) + return ERR_UNEXPECTED; + uint8 rand_buf[8]; + generate_random_proc_(rand_buf, 8); + rv = GenerateType3Msg(domain_, + credentials_.username(), credentials_.password(), + hostname, rand_buf, + in_token, in_token_len, out_token, out_token_len); + } else { + rv = GenerateType1Msg(out_token, out_token_len); + } + + if (rv == OK) + LogToken("out-token", *out_token, *out_token_len); + + return rv; +} + +int HttpAuthHandlerNTLM::Factory::CreateAuthHandler( + HttpAuth::ChallengeTokenizer* challenge, + HttpAuth::Target target, + const GURL& origin, + CreateReason reason, + int digest_nonce_count, + const BoundNetLog& net_log, + scoped_ptr<HttpAuthHandler>* handler) { + if (reason == CREATE_PREEMPTIVE) + return ERR_UNSUPPORTED_AUTH_SCHEME; + // TODO(cbentzel): Move towards model of parsing in the factory + // method and only constructing when valid. + // NOTE: Default credentials are not supported for the portable implementation + // of NTLM. + scoped_ptr<HttpAuthHandler> tmp_handler(new HttpAuthHandlerNTLM); + if (!tmp_handler->InitFromChallenge(challenge, target, origin, net_log)) + return ERR_INVALID_RESPONSE; + handler->swap(tmp_handler); + return OK; +} + +} // namespace net |