diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'chromium/net/third_party/nss/ssl/ssl3ecc.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | chromium/net/third_party/nss/ssl/ssl3ecc.c | 1280 |
1 files changed, 1280 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/chromium/net/third_party/nss/ssl/ssl3ecc.c b/chromium/net/third_party/nss/ssl/ssl3ecc.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a3638e75f1c --- /dev/null +++ b/chromium/net/third_party/nss/ssl/ssl3ecc.c @@ -0,0 +1,1280 @@ +/* + * SSL3 Protocol + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +/* ECC code moved here from ssl3con.c */ + +#include "nss.h" +#include "cert.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "cryptohi.h" /* for DSAU_ stuff */ +#include "keyhi.h" +#include "secder.h" +#include "secitem.h" + +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "sslerr.h" +#include "prtime.h" +#include "prinrval.h" +#include "prerror.h" +#include "pratom.h" +#include "prthread.h" +#include "prinit.h" + +#include "pk11func.h" +#include "secmod.h" + +#include <stdio.h> + +/* This is a bodge to allow this code to be compiled against older NSS headers + * that don't contain the TLS 1.2 changes. */ +#ifndef CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256 +#define CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 24) +#endif + +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + +/* + * In NSS 3.13.2 the definition of the EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED macro + * was moved from the internal header ec.h to the public header blapit.h. + * Define the macro here when compiling against older system NSS headers. + */ +#ifndef EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED +#define EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED 0x04 +#endif + +#ifndef PK11_SETATTRS +#define PK11_SETATTRS(x,id,v,l) (x)->type = (id); \ + (x)->pValue=(v); (x)->ulValueLen = (l); +#endif + +#define SSL_GET_SERVER_PUBLIC_KEY(sock, type) \ + (ss->serverCerts[type].serverKeyPair ? \ + ss->serverCerts[type].serverKeyPair->pubKey : NULL) + +#define SSL_IS_CURVE_NEGOTIATED(curvemsk, curveName) \ + ((curveName > ec_noName) && \ + (curveName < ec_pastLastName) && \ + ((1UL << curveName) & curvemsk) != 0) + + + +static SECStatus ssl3_CreateECDHEphemeralKeys(sslSocket *ss, ECName ec_curve); + +#define supportedCurve(x) (((x) > ec_noName) && ((x) < ec_pastLastName)) + +/* Table containing OID tags for elliptic curves named in the + * ECC-TLS IETF draft. + */ +static const SECOidTag ecName2OIDTag[] = { + 0, + SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT163K1, /* 1 */ + SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT163R1, /* 2 */ + SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT163R2, /* 3 */ + SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT193R1, /* 4 */ + SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT193R2, /* 5 */ + SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT233K1, /* 6 */ + SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT233R1, /* 7 */ + SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT239K1, /* 8 */ + SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT283K1, /* 9 */ + SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT283R1, /* 10 */ + SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT409K1, /* 11 */ + SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT409R1, /* 12 */ + SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT571K1, /* 13 */ + SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT571R1, /* 14 */ + SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP160K1, /* 15 */ + SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP160R1, /* 16 */ + SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP160R2, /* 17 */ + SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP192K1, /* 18 */ + SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP192R1, /* 19 */ + SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP224K1, /* 20 */ + SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP224R1, /* 21 */ + SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP256K1, /* 22 */ + SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP256R1, /* 23 */ + SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP384R1, /* 24 */ + SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP521R1, /* 25 */ +}; + +static const PRUint16 curve2bits[] = { + 0, /* ec_noName = 0, */ + 163, /* ec_sect163k1 = 1, */ + 163, /* ec_sect163r1 = 2, */ + 163, /* ec_sect163r2 = 3, */ + 193, /* ec_sect193r1 = 4, */ + 193, /* ec_sect193r2 = 5, */ + 233, /* ec_sect233k1 = 6, */ + 233, /* ec_sect233r1 = 7, */ + 239, /* ec_sect239k1 = 8, */ + 283, /* ec_sect283k1 = 9, */ + 283, /* ec_sect283r1 = 10, */ + 409, /* ec_sect409k1 = 11, */ + 409, /* ec_sect409r1 = 12, */ + 571, /* ec_sect571k1 = 13, */ + 571, /* ec_sect571r1 = 14, */ + 160, /* ec_secp160k1 = 15, */ + 160, /* ec_secp160r1 = 16, */ + 160, /* ec_secp160r2 = 17, */ + 192, /* ec_secp192k1 = 18, */ + 192, /* ec_secp192r1 = 19, */ + 224, /* ec_secp224k1 = 20, */ + 224, /* ec_secp224r1 = 21, */ + 256, /* ec_secp256k1 = 22, */ + 256, /* ec_secp256r1 = 23, */ + 384, /* ec_secp384r1 = 24, */ + 521, /* ec_secp521r1 = 25, */ + 65535 /* ec_pastLastName */ +}; + +typedef struct Bits2CurveStr { + PRUint16 bits; + ECName curve; +} Bits2Curve; + +static const Bits2Curve bits2curve [] = { + { 192, ec_secp192r1 /* = 19, fast */ }, + { 160, ec_secp160r2 /* = 17, fast */ }, + { 160, ec_secp160k1 /* = 15, */ }, + { 160, ec_secp160r1 /* = 16, */ }, + { 163, ec_sect163k1 /* = 1, */ }, + { 163, ec_sect163r1 /* = 2, */ }, + { 163, ec_sect163r2 /* = 3, */ }, + { 192, ec_secp192k1 /* = 18, */ }, + { 193, ec_sect193r1 /* = 4, */ }, + { 193, ec_sect193r2 /* = 5, */ }, + { 224, ec_secp224r1 /* = 21, fast */ }, + { 224, ec_secp224k1 /* = 20, */ }, + { 233, ec_sect233k1 /* = 6, */ }, + { 233, ec_sect233r1 /* = 7, */ }, + { 239, ec_sect239k1 /* = 8, */ }, + { 256, ec_secp256r1 /* = 23, fast */ }, + { 256, ec_secp256k1 /* = 22, */ }, + { 283, ec_sect283k1 /* = 9, */ }, + { 283, ec_sect283r1 /* = 10, */ }, + { 384, ec_secp384r1 /* = 24, fast */ }, + { 409, ec_sect409k1 /* = 11, */ }, + { 409, ec_sect409r1 /* = 12, */ }, + { 521, ec_secp521r1 /* = 25, fast */ }, + { 571, ec_sect571k1 /* = 13, */ }, + { 571, ec_sect571r1 /* = 14, */ }, + { 65535, ec_noName } +}; + +typedef struct ECDHEKeyPairStr { + ssl3KeyPair * pair; + int error; /* error code of the call-once function */ + PRCallOnceType once; +} ECDHEKeyPair; + +/* arrays of ECDHE KeyPairs */ +static ECDHEKeyPair gECDHEKeyPairs[ec_pastLastName]; + +SECStatus +ssl3_ECName2Params(PLArenaPool * arena, ECName curve, SECKEYECParams * params) +{ + SECOidData *oidData = NULL; + + if ((curve <= ec_noName) || (curve >= ec_pastLastName) || + ((oidData = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(ecName2OIDTag[curve])) == NULL)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); + return SECFailure; + } + + SECITEM_AllocItem(arena, params, (2 + oidData->oid.len)); + /* + * params->data needs to contain the ASN encoding of an object ID (OID) + * representing the named curve. The actual OID is in + * oidData->oid.data so we simply prepend 0x06 and OID length + */ + params->data[0] = SEC_ASN1_OBJECT_ID; + params->data[1] = oidData->oid.len; + memcpy(params->data + 2, oidData->oid.data, oidData->oid.len); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static ECName +params2ecName(SECKEYECParams * params) +{ + SECItem oid = { siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + SECOidData *oidData = NULL; + ECName i; + + /* + * params->data needs to contain the ASN encoding of an object ID (OID) + * representing a named curve. Here, we strip away everything + * before the actual OID and use the OID to look up a named curve. + */ + if (params->data[0] != SEC_ASN1_OBJECT_ID) return ec_noName; + oid.len = params->len - 2; + oid.data = params->data + 2; + if ((oidData = SECOID_FindOID(&oid)) == NULL) return ec_noName; + for (i = ec_noName + 1; i < ec_pastLastName; i++) { + if (ecName2OIDTag[i] == oidData->offset) + return i; + } + + return ec_noName; +} + +/* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeECDHKeyHash(SECOidTag hashAlg, + SECItem ec_params, SECItem server_ecpoint, + SSL3Random *client_rand, SSL3Random *server_rand, + SSL3Hashes *hashes, PRBool bypassPKCS11) +{ + PRUint8 * hashBuf; + PRUint8 * pBuf; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + unsigned int bufLen; + /* + * XXX For now, we only support named curves (the appropriate + * checks are made before this method is called) so ec_params + * takes up only two bytes. ECPoint needs to fit in 256 bytes + * (because the spec says the length must fit in one byte) + */ + PRUint8 buf[2*SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 2 + 1 + 256]; + + bufLen = 2*SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + ec_params.len + 1 + server_ecpoint.len; + if (bufLen <= sizeof buf) { + hashBuf = buf; + } else { + hashBuf = PORT_Alloc(bufLen); + if (!hashBuf) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + memcpy(hashBuf, client_rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + pBuf = hashBuf + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + memcpy(pBuf, server_rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + pBuf += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + memcpy(pBuf, ec_params.data, ec_params.len); + pBuf += ec_params.len; + pBuf[0] = (PRUint8)(server_ecpoint.len); + pBuf += 1; + memcpy(pBuf, server_ecpoint.data, server_ecpoint.len); + pBuf += server_ecpoint.len; + PORT_Assert((unsigned int)(pBuf - hashBuf) == bufLen); + + rv = ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(hashAlg, hashBuf, bufLen, hashes, + bypassPKCS11); + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "ECDHkey hash: ", hashBuf, bufLen)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "ECDHkey hash: MD5 result", + hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "ECDHkey hash: SHA1 result", + hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH)); + + if (hashBuf != buf) + PORT_Free(hashBuf); + return rv; +} + + +/* Called from ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(). */ +SECStatus +ssl3_SendECDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket * ss, SECKEYPublicKey * svrPubKey) +{ + PK11SymKey * pms = NULL; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + PRBool isTLS, isTLS12; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = NULL; /* Ephemeral ECDH key */ + SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey = NULL; /* Ephemeral ECDH key */ + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + + /* Generate ephemeral EC keypair */ + if (svrPubKey->keyType != ecKey) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY); + goto loser; + } + /* XXX SHOULD CALL ssl3_CreateECDHEphemeralKeys here, instead! */ + privKey = SECKEY_CreateECPrivateKey(&svrPubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams, + &pubKey, ss->pkcs11PinArg); + if (!privKey || !pubKey) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "ECDH public value:", + pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data, + pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len)); + + if (isTLS12) { + target = CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256; + } else if (isTLS) { + target = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + } else { + target = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + } + + /* Determine the PMS */ + pms = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(privKey, svrPubKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL, + CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, target, CKA_DERIVE, 0, + CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL); + + if (pms == NULL) { + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); + privKey = NULL; + + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms); + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); pms = NULL; + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_key_exchange, + pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len + 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, + pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data, + pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len, 1); + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + pubKey = NULL; + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + + rv = SECSuccess; + +loser: + if(pms) PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + if(privKey) SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); + if(pubKey) SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + return rv; +} + + +/* +** Called from ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange() +*/ +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleECDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, + PRUint32 length, + SECKEYPublicKey *srvrPubKey, + SECKEYPrivateKey *srvrPrivKey) +{ + PK11SymKey * pms; + SECStatus rv; + SECKEYPublicKey clntPubKey; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target; + PRBool isTLS, isTLS12; + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + clntPubKey.keyType = ecKey; + clntPubKey.u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len = + srvrPubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len; + clntPubKey.u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data = + srvrPubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data; + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &clntPubKey.u.ec.publicValue, + 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SEND_ALERT + return SECFailure; /* XXX Who sets the error code?? */ + } + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + + if (isTLS12) { + target = CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256; + } else if (isTLS) { + target = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + } else { + target = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + } + + /* Determine the PMS */ + pms = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(srvrPrivKey, &clntPubKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL, + CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, target, CKA_DERIVE, 0, + CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL); + + if (pms == NULL) { + /* last gasp. */ + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms); + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SEND_ALERT + return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec */ + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +ECName +ssl3_GetCurveWithECKeyStrength(PRUint32 curvemsk, int requiredECCbits) +{ + int i; + + for ( i = 0; bits2curve[i].curve != ec_noName; i++) { + if (bits2curve[i].bits < requiredECCbits) + continue; + if (SSL_IS_CURVE_NEGOTIATED(curvemsk, bits2curve[i].curve)) { + return bits2curve[i].curve; + } + } + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return ec_noName; +} + +/* find the "weakest link". Get strength of signature key and of sym key. + * choose curve for the weakest of those two. + */ +ECName +ssl3_GetCurveNameForServerSocket(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECKEYPublicKey * svrPublicKey = NULL; + ECName ec_curve = ec_noName; + int signatureKeyStrength = 521; + int requiredECCbits = ss->sec.secretKeyBits * 2; + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_ecdsa) { + svrPublicKey = SSL_GET_SERVER_PUBLIC_KEY(ss, kt_ecdh); + if (svrPublicKey) + ec_curve = params2ecName(&svrPublicKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams); + if (!SSL_IS_CURVE_NEGOTIATED(ss->ssl3.hs.negotiatedECCurves, ec_curve)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return ec_noName; + } + signatureKeyStrength = curve2bits[ ec_curve ]; + } else { + /* RSA is our signing cert */ + int serverKeyStrengthInBits; + + svrPublicKey = SSL_GET_SERVER_PUBLIC_KEY(ss, kt_rsa); + if (!svrPublicKey) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return ec_noName; + } + + /* currently strength in bytes */ + serverKeyStrengthInBits = svrPublicKey->u.rsa.modulus.len; + if (svrPublicKey->u.rsa.modulus.data[0] == 0) { + serverKeyStrengthInBits--; + } + /* convert to strength in bits */ + serverKeyStrengthInBits *= BPB; + + signatureKeyStrength = + SSL_RSASTRENGTH_TO_ECSTRENGTH(serverKeyStrengthInBits); + } + if ( requiredECCbits > signatureKeyStrength ) + requiredECCbits = signatureKeyStrength; + + return ssl3_GetCurveWithECKeyStrength(ss->ssl3.hs.negotiatedECCurves, + requiredECCbits); +} + +/* function to clear out the lists */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ShutdownECDHECurves(void *appData, void *nssData) +{ + int i; + ECDHEKeyPair *keyPair = &gECDHEKeyPairs[0]; + + for (i=0; i < ec_pastLastName; i++, keyPair++) { + if (keyPair->pair) { + ssl3_FreeKeyPair(keyPair->pair); + } + } + memset(gECDHEKeyPairs, 0, sizeof gECDHEKeyPairs); + return SECSuccess; +} + +static PRStatus +ssl3_ECRegister(void) +{ + SECStatus rv; + rv = NSS_RegisterShutdown(ssl3_ShutdownECDHECurves, gECDHEKeyPairs); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + gECDHEKeyPairs[ec_noName].error = PORT_GetError(); + } + return (PRStatus)rv; +} + +/* CallOnce function, called once for each named curve. */ +static PRStatus +ssl3_CreateECDHEphemeralKeyPair(void * arg) +{ + SECKEYPrivateKey * privKey = NULL; + SECKEYPublicKey * pubKey = NULL; + ssl3KeyPair * keyPair = NULL; + ECName ec_curve = (ECName)arg; + SECKEYECParams ecParams = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + + PORT_Assert(gECDHEKeyPairs[ec_curve].pair == NULL); + + /* ok, no one has generated a global key for this curve yet, do so */ + if (ssl3_ECName2Params(NULL, ec_curve, &ecParams) != SECSuccess) { + gECDHEKeyPairs[ec_curve].error = PORT_GetError(); + return PR_FAILURE; + } + + privKey = SECKEY_CreateECPrivateKey(&ecParams, &pubKey, NULL); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ecParams, PR_FALSE); + + if (!privKey || !pubKey || !(keyPair = ssl3_NewKeyPair(privKey, pubKey))) { + if (privKey) { + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); + } + if (pubKey) { + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + } + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL); + gECDHEKeyPairs[ec_curve].error = PORT_GetError(); + return PR_FAILURE; + } + + gECDHEKeyPairs[ec_curve].pair = keyPair; + return PR_SUCCESS; +} + +/* + * Creates the ephemeral public and private ECDH keys used by + * server in ECDHE_RSA and ECDHE_ECDSA handshakes. + * For now, the elliptic curve is chosen to be the same + * strength as the signing certificate (ECC or RSA). + * We need an API to specify the curve. This won't be a real + * issue until we further develop server-side support for ECC + * cipher suites. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_CreateECDHEphemeralKeys(sslSocket *ss, ECName ec_curve) +{ + ssl3KeyPair * keyPair = NULL; + + /* if there's no global key for this curve, make one. */ + if (gECDHEKeyPairs[ec_curve].pair == NULL) { + PRStatus status; + + status = PR_CallOnce(&gECDHEKeyPairs[ec_noName].once, ssl3_ECRegister); + if (status != PR_SUCCESS) { + PORT_SetError(gECDHEKeyPairs[ec_noName].error); + return SECFailure; + } + status = PR_CallOnceWithArg(&gECDHEKeyPairs[ec_curve].once, + ssl3_CreateECDHEphemeralKeyPair, + (void *)ec_curve); + if (status != PR_SUCCESS) { + PORT_SetError(gECDHEKeyPairs[ec_curve].error); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + keyPair = gECDHEKeyPairs[ec_curve].pair; + PORT_Assert(keyPair != NULL); + if (!keyPair) + return SECFailure; + ss->ephemeralECDHKeyPair = ssl3_GetKeyPairRef(keyPair); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleECDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + PLArenaPool * arena = NULL; + SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey = NULL; + PRBool isTLS, isTLS12; + SECStatus rv; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + SECItem signature = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + + SECItem ec_params = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + SECItem ec_point = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + unsigned char paramBuf[3]; /* only for curve_type == named_curve */ + SSL3SignatureAndHashAlgorithm sigAndHash; + + sigAndHash.hashAlg = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN; + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + + /* XXX This works only for named curves, revisit this when + * we support generic curves. + */ + ec_params.len = sizeof paramBuf; + ec_params.data = paramBuf; + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(ss, ec_params.data, ec_params.len, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + /* Fail if the curve is not a named curve */ + if ((ec_params.data[0] != ec_type_named) || + (ec_params.data[1] != 0) || + !supportedCurve(ec_params.data[2])) { + errCode = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE; + desc = handshake_failure; + goto alert_loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ec_point, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + /* Fail if the ec point uses compressed representation */ + if (ec_point.data[0] != EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED) { + errCode = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EC_POINT_FORM; + desc = handshake_failure; + goto alert_loser; + } + + if (isTLS12) { + rv = ssl3_ConsumeSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(ss, &b, &length, + &sigAndHash); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed or unsupported. */ + } + rv = ssl3_CheckSignatureAndHashAlgorithmConsistency( + &sigAndHash, ss->sec.peerCert); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signature, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + if (length != 0) { + if (isTLS) + desc = decode_error; + goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server EC params", ec_params.data, + ec_params.len)); + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server EC point", ec_point.data, ec_point.len)); + + /* failures after this point are not malformed handshakes. */ + /* TLS: send decrypt_error if signature failed. */ + desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure; + + /* + * check to make sure the hash is signed by right guy + */ + rv = ssl3_ComputeECDHKeyHash(sigAndHash.hashAlg, ec_params, ec_point, + &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, + &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, + &hashes, ss->opt.bypassPKCS11); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto alert_loser; + } + rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(&hashes, ss->sec.peerCert, &signature, + isTLS, ss->pkcs11PinArg); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto alert_loser; + } + + arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); + if (arena == NULL) { + goto no_memory; + } + + ss->sec.peerKey = peerKey = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, SECKEYPublicKey); + if (peerKey == NULL) { + goto no_memory; + } + + peerKey->arena = arena; + peerKey->keyType = ecKey; + + /* set up EC parameters in peerKey */ + if (ssl3_ECName2Params(arena, ec_params.data[2], + &peerKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams) != SECSuccess) { + /* we should never get here since we already + * checked that we are dealing with a supported curve + */ + errCode = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE; + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* copy publicValue in peerKey */ + if (SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.ec.publicValue, &ec_point)) + { + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + goto no_memory; + } + peerKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL; + peerKey->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + ss->sec.peerKey = peerKey; + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_cert_request; + + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); +loser: + PORT_SetError( errCode ); + return SECFailure; + +no_memory: /* no-memory error has already been set. */ + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_SendECDHServerKeyExchange( + sslSocket *ss, + const SSL3SignatureAndHashAlgorithm *sigAndHash) +{ + const ssl3KEADef * kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + int length; + PRBool isTLS, isTLS12; + SECItem signed_hash = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + + SECKEYPublicKey * ecdhePub; + SECItem ec_params = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + unsigned char paramBuf[3]; + ECName curve; + SSL3KEAType certIndex; + + /* Generate ephemeral ECDH key pair and send the public key */ + curve = ssl3_GetCurveNameForServerSocket(ss); + if (curve == ec_noName) { + goto loser; + } + rv = ssl3_CreateECDHEphemeralKeys(ss, curve); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + ecdhePub = ss->ephemeralECDHKeyPair->pubKey; + PORT_Assert(ecdhePub != NULL); + if (!ecdhePub) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + ec_params.len = sizeof paramBuf; + ec_params.data = paramBuf; + curve = params2ecName(&ecdhePub->u.ec.DEREncodedParams); + if (curve != ec_noName) { + ec_params.data[0] = ec_type_named; + ec_params.data[1] = 0x00; + ec_params.data[2] = curve; + } else { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_ComputeECDHKeyHash(sigAndHash->hashAlg, + ec_params, + ecdhePub->u.ec.publicValue, + &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, + &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, + &hashes, ss->opt.bypassPKCS11); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + + /* XXX SSLKEAType isn't really a good choice for + * indexing certificates but that's all we have + * for now. + */ + if (kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa) + certIndex = kt_rsa; + else /* kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_ecdsa */ + certIndex = kt_ecdh; + + rv = ssl3_SignHashes(&hashes, ss->serverCerts[certIndex].SERVERKEY, + &signed_hash, isTLS); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* ssl3_SignHashes has set err. */ + } + if (signed_hash.data == NULL) { + /* how can this happen and rv == SECSuccess ?? */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + length = ec_params.len + + 1 + ecdhePub->u.ec.publicValue.len + + (isTLS12 ? 2 : 0) + 2 + signed_hash.len; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_key_exchange, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, ec_params.data, ec_params.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ecdhePub->u.ec.publicValue.data, + ecdhePub->u.ec.publicValue.len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + if (isTLS12) { + rv = ssl3_AppendSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(ss, sigAndHash); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, signed_hash.data, + signed_hash.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + PORT_Free(signed_hash.data); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (signed_hash.data != NULL) + PORT_Free(signed_hash.data); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Lists of ECC cipher suites for searching and disabling. */ + +static const ssl3CipherSuite ecdh_suites[] = { + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + 0 /* end of list marker */ +}; + +static const ssl3CipherSuite ecdh_ecdsa_suites[] = { + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + 0 /* end of list marker */ +}; + +static const ssl3CipherSuite ecdh_rsa_suites[] = { + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + 0 /* end of list marker */ +}; + +static const ssl3CipherSuite ecdhe_ecdsa_suites[] = { + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + 0 /* end of list marker */ +}; + +static const ssl3CipherSuite ecdhe_rsa_suites[] = { + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + 0 /* end of list marker */ +}; + +/* List of all ECC cipher suites */ +static const ssl3CipherSuite ecSuites[] = { + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + 0 /* end of list marker */ +}; + +/* On this socket, Disable the ECC cipher suites in the argument's list */ +SECStatus +ssl3_DisableECCSuites(sslSocket * ss, const ssl3CipherSuite * suite) +{ + if (!suite) + suite = ecSuites; + for (; *suite; ++suite) { + SECStatus rv = ssl3_CipherPrefSet(ss, *suite, PR_FALSE); + + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); /* else is coding error */ + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Look at the server certs configured on this socket, and disable any + * ECC cipher suites that are not supported by those certs. + */ +void +ssl3_FilterECCipherSuitesByServerCerts(sslSocket * ss) +{ + CERTCertificate * svrCert; + + svrCert = ss->serverCerts[kt_rsa].serverCert; + if (!svrCert) { + ssl3_DisableECCSuites(ss, ecdhe_rsa_suites); + } + + svrCert = ss->serverCerts[kt_ecdh].serverCert; + if (!svrCert) { + ssl3_DisableECCSuites(ss, ecdh_suites); + ssl3_DisableECCSuites(ss, ecdhe_ecdsa_suites); + } else { + SECOidTag sigTag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&svrCert->signature); + + switch (sigTag) { + case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION: + case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD2_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: + case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD4_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: + case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: + case SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: + case SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA224_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: + case SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: + case SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA384_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: + case SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA512_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: + ssl3_DisableECCSuites(ss, ecdh_ecdsa_suites); + break; + case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA1_SIGNATURE: + case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA224_SIGNATURE: + case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA256_SIGNATURE: + case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA384_SIGNATURE: + case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA512_SIGNATURE: + case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_RECOMMENDED_DIGEST: + case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SPECIFIED_DIGEST: + ssl3_DisableECCSuites(ss, ecdh_rsa_suites); + break; + default: + ssl3_DisableECCSuites(ss, ecdh_suites); + break; + } + } +} + +/* Ask: is ANY ECC cipher suite enabled on this socket? */ +/* Order(N^2). Yuk. Also, this ignores export policy. */ +PRBool +ssl3_IsECCEnabled(sslSocket * ss) +{ + const ssl3CipherSuite * suite; + PK11SlotInfo *slot; + + /* make sure we can do ECC */ + slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, ss->pkcs11PinArg); + if (!slot) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + + /* make sure an ECC cipher is enabled */ + for (suite = ecSuites; *suite; ++suite) { + PRBool enabled = PR_FALSE; + SECStatus rv = ssl3_CipherPrefGet(ss, *suite, &enabled); + + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); /* else is coding error */ + if (rv == SECSuccess && enabled) + return PR_TRUE; + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +#define BE(n) 0, n + +/* Prefabricated TLS client hello extension, Elliptic Curves List, + * offers only 3 curves, the Suite B curves, 23-25 + */ +static const PRUint8 suiteBECList[12] = { + BE(10), /* Extension type */ + BE( 8), /* octets that follow ( 3 pairs + 1 length pair) */ + BE( 6), /* octets that follow ( 3 pairs) */ + BE(23), BE(24), BE(25) +}; + +/* Prefabricated TLS client hello extension, Elliptic Curves List, + * offers curves 1-25. + */ +static const PRUint8 tlsECList[56] = { + BE(10), /* Extension type */ + BE(52), /* octets that follow (25 pairs + 1 length pair) */ + BE(50), /* octets that follow (25 pairs) */ + BE( 1), BE( 2), BE( 3), BE( 4), BE( 5), BE( 6), BE( 7), + BE( 8), BE( 9), BE(10), BE(11), BE(12), BE(13), BE(14), BE(15), + BE(16), BE(17), BE(18), BE(19), BE(20), BE(21), BE(22), BE(23), + BE(24), BE(25) +}; + +static const PRUint8 ecPtFmt[6] = { + BE(11), /* Extension type */ + BE( 2), /* octets that follow */ + 1, /* octets that follow */ + 0 /* uncompressed type only */ +}; + +/* This function already presumes we can do ECC, ssl3_IsECCEnabled must be + * called before this function. It looks to see if we have a token which + * is capable of doing smaller than SuiteB curves. If the token can, we + * presume the token can do the whole SSL suite of curves. If it can't we + * presume the token that allowed ECC to be enabled can only do suite B + * curves. */ +static PRBool +ssl3_SuiteBOnly(sslSocket *ss) +{ +#if 0 + /* See if we can support small curves (like 163). If not, assume we can + * only support Suite-B curves (P-256, P-384, P-521). */ + PK11SlotInfo *slot = + PK11_GetBestSlotWithAttributes(CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, 0, 163, + ss ? ss->pkcs11PinArg : NULL); + + if (!slot) { + /* nope, presume we can only do suite B */ + return PR_TRUE; + } + /* we can, presume we can do all curves */ + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + return PR_FALSE; +#else + return PR_TRUE; +#endif +} + +/* Send our "canned" (precompiled) Supported Elliptic Curves extension, + * which says that we support all TLS-defined named curves. + */ +PRInt32 +ssl3_SendSupportedCurvesXtn( + sslSocket * ss, + PRBool append, + PRUint32 maxBytes) +{ + PRInt32 ecListSize = 0; + const PRUint8 *ecList = NULL; + + if (!ss || !ssl3_IsECCEnabled(ss)) + return 0; + + if (ssl3_SuiteBOnly(ss)) { + ecListSize = sizeof suiteBECList; + ecList = suiteBECList; + } else { + ecListSize = sizeof tlsECList; + ecList = tlsECList; + } + + if (append && maxBytes >= ecListSize) { + SECStatus rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, ecList, ecListSize); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return -1; + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData; + xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] = + ssl_elliptic_curves_xtn; + } + } + return ecListSize; +} + +PRUint32 +ssl3_GetSupportedECCurveMask(sslSocket *ss) +{ + if (ssl3_SuiteBOnly(ss)) { + return SSL3_SUITE_B_SUPPORTED_CURVES_MASK; + } + return SSL3_ALL_SUPPORTED_CURVES_MASK; +} + +/* Send our "canned" (precompiled) Supported Point Formats extension, + * which says that we only support uncompressed points. + */ +PRInt32 +ssl3_SendSupportedPointFormatsXtn( + sslSocket * ss, + PRBool append, + PRUint32 maxBytes) +{ + if (!ss || !ssl3_IsECCEnabled(ss)) + return 0; + if (append && maxBytes >= (sizeof ecPtFmt)) { + SECStatus rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, ecPtFmt, (sizeof ecPtFmt)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return -1; + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData; + xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] = + ssl_ec_point_formats_xtn; + } + } + return (sizeof ecPtFmt); +} + +/* Just make sure that the remote client supports uncompressed points, + * Since that is all we support. Disable ECC cipher suites if it doesn't. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleSupportedPointFormatsXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, + SECItem *data) +{ + int i; + + if (data->len < 2 || data->len > 255 || !data->data || + data->len != (unsigned int)data->data[0] + 1) { + /* malformed */ + goto loser; + } + for (i = data->len; --i > 0; ) { + if (data->data[i] == 0) { + /* indicate that we should send a reply */ + SECStatus rv; + rv = ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender(ss, ex_type, + &ssl3_SendSupportedPointFormatsXtn); + return rv; + } + } +loser: + /* evil client doesn't support uncompressed */ + ssl3_DisableECCSuites(ss, ecSuites); + return SECFailure; +} + + +#define SSL3_GET_SERVER_PUBLICKEY(sock, type) \ + (ss->serverCerts[type].serverKeyPair ? \ + ss->serverCerts[type].serverKeyPair->pubKey : NULL) + +/* Extract the TLS curve name for the public key in our EC server cert. */ +ECName ssl3_GetSvrCertCurveName(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECKEYPublicKey *srvPublicKey; + ECName ec_curve = ec_noName; + + srvPublicKey = SSL3_GET_SERVER_PUBLICKEY(ss, kt_ecdh); + if (srvPublicKey) { + ec_curve = params2ecName(&srvPublicKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams); + } + return ec_curve; +} + +/* Ensure that the curve in our server cert is one of the ones suppored + * by the remote client, and disable all ECC cipher suites if not. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleSupportedCurvesXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data) +{ + PRInt32 list_len; + PRUint32 peerCurves = 0; + PRUint32 mutualCurves = 0; + PRUint16 svrCertCurveName; + + if (!data->data || data->len < 4 || data->len > 65535) + goto loser; + /* get the length of elliptic_curve_list */ + list_len = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &data->data, &data->len); + if (list_len < 0 || data->len != list_len || (data->len % 2) != 0) { + /* malformed */ + goto loser; + } + /* build bit vector of peer's supported curve names */ + while (data->len) { + PRInt32 curve_name = + ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &data->data, &data->len); + if (curve_name > ec_noName && curve_name < ec_pastLastName) { + peerCurves |= (1U << curve_name); + } + } + /* What curves do we support in common? */ + mutualCurves = ss->ssl3.hs.negotiatedECCurves &= peerCurves; + if (!mutualCurves) { /* no mutually supported EC Curves */ + goto loser; + } + + /* if our ECC cert doesn't use one of these supported curves, + * disable ECC cipher suites that require an ECC cert. + */ + svrCertCurveName = ssl3_GetSvrCertCurveName(ss); + if (svrCertCurveName != ec_noName && + (mutualCurves & (1U << svrCertCurveName)) != 0) { + return SECSuccess; + } + /* Our EC cert doesn't contain a mutually supported curve. + * Disable all ECC cipher suites that require an EC cert + */ + ssl3_DisableECCSuites(ss, ecdh_ecdsa_suites); + ssl3_DisableECCSuites(ss, ecdhe_ecdsa_suites); + return SECFailure; + +loser: + /* no common curve supported */ + ssl3_DisableECCSuites(ss, ecSuites); + return SECFailure; +} + +#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ |