diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'chromium/net/third_party/nss/ssl/ssl3ext.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | chromium/net/third_party/nss/ssl/ssl3ext.c | 2299 |
1 files changed, 2299 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/chromium/net/third_party/nss/ssl/ssl3ext.c b/chromium/net/third_party/nss/ssl/ssl3ext.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..04157701e90 --- /dev/null +++ b/chromium/net/third_party/nss/ssl/ssl3ext.c @@ -0,0 +1,2299 @@ +/* + * SSL3 Protocol + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +/* TLS extension code moved here from ssl3ecc.c */ + +#include "nssrenam.h" +#include "nss.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "pk11pub.h" +#ifdef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS +#include "blapit.h" +#else +#include "blapi.h" +#endif +#include "prinit.h" + +static unsigned char key_name[SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN]; +static PK11SymKey *session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11 = NULL; +static PK11SymKey *session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11 = NULL; + +#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS +static unsigned char session_ticket_enc_key[AES_256_KEY_LENGTH]; +static unsigned char session_ticket_mac_key[SHA256_LENGTH]; + +static PRBool session_ticket_keys_initialized = PR_FALSE; +#endif +static PRCallOnceType generate_session_keys_once; + +/* forward static function declarations */ +static SECStatus ssl3_ParseEncryptedSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, + SECItem *data, EncryptedSessionTicket *enc_session_ticket); +static SECStatus ssl3_AppendToItem(SECItem *item, const unsigned char *buf, + PRUint32 bytes); +static SECStatus ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(SECItem *item, PRUint32 num, + PRInt32 lenSize); +static SECStatus ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeysPKCS11(sslSocket *ss, + PK11SymKey **aes_key, PK11SymKey **mac_key); +#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS +static SECStatus ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeys(const unsigned char **aes_key, + PRUint32 *aes_key_length, const unsigned char **mac_key, + PRUint32 *mac_key_length); +#endif +static PRInt32 ssl3_SendRenegotiationInfoXtn(sslSocket * ss, + PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes); +static SECStatus ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn(sslSocket *ss, + PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data); +static SECStatus ssl3_ClientHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket *ss, + PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data); +static SECStatus ssl3_ClientHandleAppProtoXtn(sslSocket *ss, + PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data); +static SECStatus ssl3_ServerHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket *ss, + PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data); +static PRInt32 ssl3_ClientSendAppProtoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append, + PRUint32 maxBytes); +static PRInt32 ssl3_ClientSendNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append, + PRUint32 maxBytes); +static PRInt32 ssl3_SendUseSRTPXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append, + PRUint32 maxBytes); +static SECStatus ssl3_HandleUseSRTPXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRUint16 ex_type, + SECItem *data); +static SECStatus ssl3_ClientHandleChannelIDXtn(sslSocket *ss, + PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data); +static PRInt32 ssl3_ClientSendChannelIDXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append, + PRUint32 maxBytes); +static SECStatus ssl3_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket * ss, + PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes); +static SECStatus ssl3_ServerHandleStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket *ss, + PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data); +static SECStatus ssl3_ClientHandleStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket *ss, + PRUint16 ex_type, + SECItem *data); +static PRInt32 ssl3_ClientSendStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append, + PRUint32 maxBytes); +static PRInt32 ssl3_ClientSendSigAlgsXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append, + PRUint32 maxBytes); +static SECStatus ssl3_ServerHandleSigAlgsXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, + SECItem *data); + +/* + * Write bytes. Using this function means the SECItem structure + * cannot be freed. The caller is expected to call this function + * on a shallow copy of the structure. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_AppendToItem(SECItem *item, const unsigned char *buf, PRUint32 bytes) +{ + if (bytes > item->len) + return SECFailure; + + PORT_Memcpy(item->data, buf, bytes); + item->data += bytes; + item->len -= bytes; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * Write a number in network byte order. Using this function means the + * SECItem structure cannot be freed. The caller is expected to call + * this function on a shallow copy of the structure. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(SECItem *item, PRUint32 num, PRInt32 lenSize) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRUint8 b[4]; + PRUint8 * p = b; + + switch (lenSize) { + case 4: + *p++ = (PRUint8) (num >> 24); + case 3: + *p++ = (PRUint8) (num >> 16); + case 2: + *p++ = (PRUint8) (num >> 8); + case 1: + *p = (PRUint8) num; + } + rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(item, &b[0], lenSize); + return rv; +} + +static SECStatus ssl3_SessionTicketShutdown(void* appData, void* nssData) +{ + if (session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11); + session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11 = NULL; + } + if (session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11); + session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11 = NULL; + } + PORT_Memset(&generate_session_keys_once, 0, + sizeof(generate_session_keys_once)); + return SECSuccess; +} + + +static PRStatus +ssl3_GenerateSessionTicketKeysPKCS11(void *data) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslSocket *ss = (sslSocket *)data; + SECKEYPrivateKey *svrPrivKey = ss->serverCerts[kt_rsa].SERVERKEY; + SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey = ss->serverCerts[kt_rsa].serverKeyPair->pubKey; + + if (svrPrivKey == NULL || svrPubKey == NULL) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Pub or priv key(s) is NULL.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + goto loser; + } + + /* Get a copy of the session keys from shared memory. */ + PORT_Memcpy(key_name, SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_PREFIX, + sizeof(SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_PREFIX)); + if (!ssl_GetSessionTicketKeysPKCS11(svrPrivKey, svrPubKey, + ss->pkcs11PinArg, &key_name[SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_PREFIX_LEN], + &session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11, &session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11)) + return PR_FAILURE; + + rv = NSS_RegisterShutdown(ssl3_SessionTicketShutdown, NULL); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + return PR_SUCCESS; + +loser: + ssl3_SessionTicketShutdown(NULL, NULL); + return PR_FAILURE; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeysPKCS11(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey **aes_key, + PK11SymKey **mac_key) +{ + if (PR_CallOnceWithArg(&generate_session_keys_once, + ssl3_GenerateSessionTicketKeysPKCS11, ss) != PR_SUCCESS) + return SECFailure; + + if (session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11 == NULL || + session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11 == NULL) + return SECFailure; + + *aes_key = session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11; + *mac_key = session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11; + return SECSuccess; +} + +#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS +static PRStatus +ssl3_GenerateSessionTicketKeys(void) +{ + PORT_Memcpy(key_name, SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_PREFIX, + sizeof(SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_PREFIX)); + + if (!ssl_GetSessionTicketKeys(&key_name[SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_PREFIX_LEN], + session_ticket_enc_key, session_ticket_mac_key)) + return PR_FAILURE; + + session_ticket_keys_initialized = PR_TRUE; + return PR_SUCCESS; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeys(const unsigned char **aes_key, + PRUint32 *aes_key_length, const unsigned char **mac_key, + PRUint32 *mac_key_length) +{ + if (PR_CallOnce(&generate_session_keys_once, + ssl3_GenerateSessionTicketKeys) != PR_SUCCESS) + return SECFailure; + + if (!session_ticket_keys_initialized) + return SECFailure; + + *aes_key = session_ticket_enc_key; + *aes_key_length = sizeof(session_ticket_enc_key); + *mac_key = session_ticket_mac_key; + *mac_key_length = sizeof(session_ticket_mac_key); + + return SECSuccess; +} +#endif + +/* Table of handlers for received TLS hello extensions, one per extension. + * In the second generation, this table will be dynamic, and functions + * will be registered here. + */ +/* This table is used by the server, to handle client hello extensions. */ +static const ssl3HelloExtensionHandler clientHelloHandlers[] = { + { ssl_server_name_xtn, &ssl3_HandleServerNameXtn }, +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + { ssl_elliptic_curves_xtn, &ssl3_HandleSupportedCurvesXtn }, + { ssl_ec_point_formats_xtn, &ssl3_HandleSupportedPointFormatsXtn }, +#endif + { ssl_session_ticket_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleSessionTicketXtn }, + { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn }, + { ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleNextProtoNegoXtn }, + { ssl_use_srtp_xtn, &ssl3_HandleUseSRTPXtn }, + { ssl_cert_status_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleStatusRequestXtn }, + { ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleSigAlgsXtn }, + { -1, NULL } +}; + +/* These two tables are used by the client, to handle server hello + * extensions. */ +static const ssl3HelloExtensionHandler serverHelloHandlersTLS[] = { + { ssl_server_name_xtn, &ssl3_HandleServerNameXtn }, + /* TODO: add a handler for ssl_ec_point_formats_xtn */ + { ssl_session_ticket_xtn, &ssl3_ClientHandleSessionTicketXtn }, + { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn }, + { ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn, &ssl3_ClientHandleNextProtoNegoXtn }, + { ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, &ssl3_ClientHandleAppProtoXtn }, + { ssl_use_srtp_xtn, &ssl3_HandleUseSRTPXtn }, + { ssl_channel_id_xtn, &ssl3_ClientHandleChannelIDXtn }, + { ssl_cert_status_xtn, &ssl3_ClientHandleStatusRequestXtn }, + { -1, NULL } +}; + +static const ssl3HelloExtensionHandler serverHelloHandlersSSL3[] = { + { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn }, + { -1, NULL } +}; + +/* Tables of functions to format TLS hello extensions, one function per + * extension. + * These static tables are for the formatting of client hello extensions. + * The server's table of hello senders is dynamic, in the socket struct, + * and sender functions are registered there. + */ +static const +ssl3HelloExtensionSender clientHelloSendersTLS[SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS] = { + { ssl_server_name_xtn, &ssl3_SendServerNameXtn }, + { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_SendRenegotiationInfoXtn }, +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + { ssl_elliptic_curves_xtn, &ssl3_SendSupportedCurvesXtn }, + { ssl_ec_point_formats_xtn, &ssl3_SendSupportedPointFormatsXtn }, +#endif + { ssl_session_ticket_xtn, &ssl3_SendSessionTicketXtn }, + { ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendNextProtoNegoXtn }, + { ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendAppProtoXtn }, + { ssl_use_srtp_xtn, &ssl3_SendUseSRTPXtn }, + { ssl_channel_id_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendChannelIDXtn }, + { ssl_cert_status_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendStatusRequestXtn }, + { ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendSigAlgsXtn } + /* any extra entries will appear as { 0, NULL } */ +}; + +static const +ssl3HelloExtensionSender clientHelloSendersSSL3[SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS] = { + { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_SendRenegotiationInfoXtn } + /* any extra entries will appear as { 0, NULL } */ +}; + +static PRBool +arrayContainsExtension(const PRUint16 *array, PRUint32 len, PRUint16 ex_type) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + if (ex_type == array[i]) + return PR_TRUE; + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +PRBool +ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type) { + TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData; + return arrayContainsExtension(xtnData->negotiated, + xtnData->numNegotiated, ex_type); +} + +static PRBool +ssl3_ClientExtensionAdvertised(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type) { + TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData; + return arrayContainsExtension(xtnData->advertised, + xtnData->numAdvertised, ex_type); +} + +/* Format an SNI extension, using the name from the socket's URL, + * unless that name is a dotted decimal string. + * Used by client and server. + */ +PRInt32 +ssl3_SendServerNameXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append, + PRUint32 maxBytes) +{ + SECStatus rv; + if (!ss) + return 0; + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + PRUint32 len; + PRNetAddr netAddr; + + /* must have a hostname */ + if (!ss->url || !ss->url[0]) + return 0; + /* must not be an IPv4 or IPv6 address */ + if (PR_SUCCESS == PR_StringToNetAddr(ss->url, &netAddr)) { + /* is an IP address (v4 or v6) */ + return 0; + } + len = PORT_Strlen(ss->url); + if (append && maxBytes >= len + 9) { + /* extension_type */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; + /* length of extension_data */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, len + 5, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; + /* length of server_name_list */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, len + 3, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; + /* Name Type (sni_host_name) */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, "\0", 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; + /* HostName (length and value) */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, (PRUint8 *)ss->url, len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData; + xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] = + ssl_server_name_xtn; + } + } + return len + 9; + } + /* Server side */ + if (append && maxBytes >= 4) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; + /* length of extension_data */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; + } + return 4; +} + +/* handle an incoming SNI extension, by ignoring it. */ +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleServerNameXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data) +{ + SECItem *names = NULL; + PRUint32 listCount = 0, namesPos = 0, i; + TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData; + SECItem ldata; + PRInt32 listLenBytes = 0; + + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + /* Verify extension_data is empty. */ + if (data->data || data->len || + !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn)) { + /* malformed or was not initiated by the client.*/ + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* Server side - consume client data and register server sender. */ + /* do not parse the data if don't have user extension handling function. */ + if (!ss->sniSocketConfig) { + return SECSuccess; + } + /* length of server_name_list */ + listLenBytes = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &data->data, &data->len); + if (listLenBytes == 0 || listLenBytes != data->len) { + return SECFailure; + } + ldata = *data; + /* Calculate the size of the array.*/ + while (listLenBytes > 0) { + SECItem litem; + SECStatus rv; + PRInt32 type; + /* Name Type (sni_host_name) */ + type = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &ldata.data, &ldata.len); + if (!ldata.len) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &litem, 2, &ldata.data, &ldata.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* Adjust total length for cunsumed item, item len and type.*/ + listLenBytes -= litem.len + 3; + if (listLenBytes > 0 && !ldata.len) { + return SECFailure; + } + listCount += 1; + } + if (!listCount) { + return SECFailure; + } + names = PORT_ZNewArray(SECItem, listCount); + if (!names) { + return SECFailure; + } + for (i = 0;i < listCount;i++) { + int j; + PRInt32 type; + SECStatus rv; + PRBool nametypePresent = PR_FALSE; + /* Name Type (sni_host_name) */ + type = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &data->data, &data->len); + /* Check if we have such type in the list */ + for (j = 0;j < listCount && names[j].data;j++) { + if (names[j].type == type) { + nametypePresent = PR_TRUE; + break; + } + } + /* HostName (length and value) */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &names[namesPos], 2, + &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + if (nametypePresent == PR_FALSE) { + namesPos += 1; + } + } + /* Free old and set the new data. */ + if (xtnData->sniNameArr) { + PORT_Free(ss->xtnData.sniNameArr); + } + xtnData->sniNameArr = names; + xtnData->sniNameArrSize = namesPos; + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_server_name_xtn; + + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + PORT_Free(names); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Called by both clients and servers. + * Clients sends a filled in session ticket if one is available, and otherwise + * sends an empty ticket. Servers always send empty tickets. + */ +PRInt32 +ssl3_SendSessionTicketXtn( + sslSocket * ss, + PRBool append, + PRUint32 maxBytes) +{ + PRInt32 extension_length; + NewSessionTicket *session_ticket = NULL; + + /* Ignore the SessionTicket extension if processing is disabled. */ + if (!ss->opt.enableSessionTickets) + return 0; + + /* Empty extension length = extension_type (2-bytes) + + * length(extension_data) (2-bytes) + */ + extension_length = 4; + + /* If we are a client then send a session ticket if one is availble. + * Servers that support the extension and are willing to negotiate the + * the extension always respond with an empty extension. + */ + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + session_ticket = &sid->u.ssl3.sessionTicket; + if (session_ticket->ticket.data) { + if (ss->xtnData.ticketTimestampVerified) { + extension_length += session_ticket->ticket.len; + } else if (!append && + (session_ticket->ticket_lifetime_hint == 0 || + (session_ticket->ticket_lifetime_hint + + session_ticket->received_timestamp > ssl_Time()))) { + extension_length += session_ticket->ticket.len; + ss->xtnData.ticketTimestampVerified = PR_TRUE; + } + } + } + + if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) { + SECStatus rv; + /* extension_type */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + if (session_ticket && session_ticket->ticket.data && + ss->xtnData.ticketTimestampVerified) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, session_ticket->ticket.data, + session_ticket->ticket.len, 2); + ss->xtnData.ticketTimestampVerified = PR_FALSE; + } else { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData; + xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] = + ssl_session_ticket_xtn; + } + } else if (maxBytes < extension_length) { + PORT_Assert(0); + return 0; + } + return extension_length; + + loser: + ss->xtnData.ticketTimestampVerified = PR_FALSE; + return -1; +} + +/* handle an incoming Next Protocol Negotiation extension. */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ServerHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data) +{ + if (ss->firstHsDone || data->len != 0) { + /* Clients MUST send an empty NPN extension, if any. */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type; + + /* TODO: server side NPN support would require calling + * ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender here in order to echo the + * extension back to the client. */ + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* ssl3_ValidateNextProtoNego checks that the given block of data is valid: none + * of the lengths may be 0 and the sum of the lengths must equal the length of + * the block. */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ValidateNextProtoNego(const unsigned char* data, unsigned int length) +{ + unsigned int offset = 0; + + while (offset < length) { + unsigned int newOffset = offset + 1 + (unsigned int) data[offset]; + /* Reject embedded nulls to protect against buggy applications that + * store protocol identifiers in null-terminated strings. + */ + if (newOffset > length || data[offset] == 0) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID); + return SECFailure; + } + offset = newOffset; + } + + if (offset > length) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID); + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_ClientHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, + SECItem *data) +{ + SECStatus rv; + unsigned char resultBuffer[255]; + SECItem result = { siBuffer, resultBuffer, 0 }; + + PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone); + + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_ValidateNextProtoNego(data->data, data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; + + /* ss->nextProtoCallback cannot normally be NULL if we negotiated the + * extension. However, It is possible that an application erroneously + * cleared the callback between the time we sent the ClientHello and now. + */ + PORT_Assert(ss->nextProtoCallback != NULL); + if (!ss->nextProtoCallback) { + /* XXX Use a better error code. This is an application error, not an + * NSS bug. */ + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ss->nextProtoCallback(ss->nextProtoArg, ss->fd, data->data, data->len, + result.data, &result.len, sizeof resultBuffer); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; + /* If the callback wrote more than allowed to |result| it has corrupted our + * stack. */ + if (result.len > sizeof resultBuffer) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type; + + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.nextProto, PR_FALSE); + return SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->ssl3.nextProto, &result); +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_ClientHandleAppProtoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data) +{ + const unsigned char* d = data->data; + PRUint16 name_list_len; + SECItem protocol_name; + + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* The extension data from the server has the following format: + * uint16 name_list_len; + * uint8 len; + * uint8 protocol_name[len]; */ + if (data->len < 4 || data->len > 2 + 1 + 255) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID); + return SECFailure; + } + + name_list_len = ((PRUint16) d[0]) << 8 | + ((PRUint16) d[1]); + if (name_list_len != data->len - 2 || + d[2] != data->len - 3) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID); + return SECFailure; + } + + protocol_name.data = data->data + 3; + protocol_name.len = data->len - 3; + + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.nextProto, PR_FALSE); + ss->ssl3.nextProtoState = SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED; + ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type; + return SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->ssl3.nextProto, &protocol_name); +} + +static PRInt32 +ssl3_ClientSendNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append, + PRUint32 maxBytes) +{ + PRInt32 extension_length; + + /* Renegotiations do not send this extension. */ + if (!ss->nextProtoCallback || ss->firstHsDone) { + return 0; + } + + extension_length = 4; + + if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) { + SECStatus rv; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + ss->xtnData.advertised[ss->xtnData.numAdvertised++] = + ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn; + } else if (maxBytes < extension_length) { + return 0; + } + + return extension_length; + +loser: + return -1; +} + +static PRInt32 +ssl3_ClientSendAppProtoXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes) +{ + PRInt32 extension_length; + unsigned char *alpn_protos = NULL; + + /* Renegotiations do not send this extension. */ + if (!ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data || ss->firstHsDone) { + return 0; + } + + extension_length = 2 /* extension type */ + 2 /* extension length */ + + 2 /* protocol name list length */ + + ss->opt.nextProtoNego.len; + + if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) { + /* NPN requires that the client's fallback protocol is first in the + * list. However, ALPN sends protocols in preference order. So we + * allocate a buffer and move the first protocol to the end of the + * list. */ + SECStatus rv; + const unsigned int len = ss->opt.nextProtoNego.len; + + alpn_protos = PORT_Alloc(len); + if (alpn_protos == NULL) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (len > 0) { + /* Each protocol string is prefixed with a single byte length. */ + unsigned int i = ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data[0] + 1; + if (i <= len) { + memcpy(alpn_protos, &ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data[i], len - i); + memcpy(alpn_protos + len - i, ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data, i); + } else { + /* This seems to be invalid data so we'll send as-is. */ + memcpy(alpn_protos, ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data, len); + } + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extension_length - 4, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, alpn_protos, len, 2); + PORT_Free(alpn_protos); + alpn_protos = NULL; + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + ss->xtnData.advertised[ss->xtnData.numAdvertised++] = + ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn; + } else if (maxBytes < extension_length) { + return 0; + } + + return extension_length; + +loser: + if (alpn_protos) + PORT_Free(alpn_protos); + return -1; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_ClientHandleChannelIDXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, + SECItem *data) +{ + PORT_Assert(ss->getChannelID != NULL); + + if (data->len) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CHANNEL_ID_DATA); + return SECFailure; + } + ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type; + return SECSuccess; +} + +static PRInt32 +ssl3_ClientSendChannelIDXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append, + PRUint32 maxBytes) +{ + PRInt32 extension_length = 4; + + if (!ss->getChannelID) + return 0; + + if (maxBytes < extension_length) { + PORT_Assert(0); + return 0; + } + + if (append) { + SECStatus rv; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_channel_id_xtn, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + ss->xtnData.advertised[ss->xtnData.numAdvertised++] = + ssl_channel_id_xtn; + } + + return extension_length; + +loser: + return -1; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_ClientHandleStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, + SECItem *data) +{ + /* The echoed extension must be empty. */ + if (data->len != 0) + return SECFailure; + + /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */ + ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static PRInt32 +ssl3_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn( + sslSocket * ss, + PRBool append, + PRUint32 maxBytes) +{ + PRInt32 extension_length; + SECStatus rv; + int i; + PRBool haveStatus = PR_FALSE; + + for (i = kt_null; i < kt_kea_size; i++) { + /* TODO: This is a temporary workaround. + * The correct code needs to see if we have an OCSP response for + * the server certificate being used, rather than if we have any + * OCSP response. See also ssl3_SendCertificateStatus. + */ + if (ss->certStatusArray[i] && ss->certStatusArray[i]->len) { + haveStatus = PR_TRUE; + break; + } + } + if (!haveStatus) + return 0; + + extension_length = 2 + 2; + if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) { + /* extension_type */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_cert_status_xtn, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return -1; + /* length of extension_data */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return -1; + } + + return extension_length; +} + +/* ssl3_ClientSendStatusRequestXtn builds the status_request extension on the + * client side. See RFC 4366 section 3.6. */ +static PRInt32 +ssl3_ClientSendStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append, + PRUint32 maxBytes) +{ + PRInt32 extension_length; + + if (!ss->opt.enableOCSPStapling) + return 0; + + /* extension_type (2-bytes) + + * length(extension_data) (2-bytes) + + * status_type (1) + + * responder_id_list length (2) + + * request_extensions length (2) + */ + extension_length = 9; + + if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) { + SECStatus rv; + TLSExtensionData *xtnData; + + /* extension_type */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_cert_status_xtn, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return -1; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extension_length - 4, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return -1; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 1 /* status_type ocsp */, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return -1; + /* A zero length responder_id_list means that the responders are + * implicitly known to the server. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return -1; + /* A zero length request_extensions means that there are no extensions. + * Specifically, we don't set the id-pkix-ocsp-nonce extension. This + * means that the server can replay a cached OCSP response to us. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return -1; + + xtnData = &ss->xtnData; + xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] = ssl_cert_status_xtn; + } else if (maxBytes < extension_length) { + PORT_Assert(0); + return 0; + } + return extension_length; +} + +/* + * NewSessionTicket + * Called from ssl3_HandleFinished + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_SendNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss) +{ + int i; + SECStatus rv; + NewSessionTicket ticket; + SECItem plaintext; + SECItem plaintext_item = {0, NULL, 0}; + SECItem ciphertext = {0, NULL, 0}; + PRUint32 ciphertext_length; + PRBool ms_is_wrapped; + unsigned char wrapped_ms[SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH]; + SECItem ms_item = {0, NULL, 0}; + SSL3KEAType effectiveExchKeyType = ssl_kea_null; + PRUint32 padding_length; + PRUint32 message_length; + PRUint32 cert_length; + PRUint8 length_buf[4]; + PRUint32 now; + PK11SymKey *aes_key_pkcs11; + PK11SymKey *mac_key_pkcs11; +#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS + const unsigned char *aes_key; + const unsigned char *mac_key; + PRUint32 aes_key_length; + PRUint32 mac_key_length; + PRUint64 aes_ctx_buf[MAX_CIPHER_CONTEXT_LLONGS]; + AESContext *aes_ctx; + const SECHashObject *hashObj = NULL; + PRUint64 hmac_ctx_buf[MAX_MAC_CONTEXT_LLONGS]; + HMACContext *hmac_ctx; +#endif + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cipherMech = CKM_AES_CBC; + PK11Context *aes_ctx_pkcs11; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE macMech = CKM_SHA256_HMAC; + PK11Context *hmac_ctx_pkcs11; + unsigned char computed_mac[TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH]; + unsigned int computed_mac_length; + unsigned char iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + SECItem ivItem; + SECItem *srvName = NULL; + PRUint32 srvNameLen = 0; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE msWrapMech = 0; /* dummy default value, + * must be >= 0 */ + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send session_ticket handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint = TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_LIFETIME_HINT; + cert_length = (ss->opt.requestCertificate && ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert) ? + 3 + ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert->derCert.len : 0; + + /* Get IV and encryption keys */ + ivItem.data = iv; + ivItem.len = sizeof(iv); + rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(iv, sizeof(iv)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + +#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS + if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { + rv = ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeys(&aes_key, &aes_key_length, + &mac_key, &mac_key_length); + } else +#endif + { + rv = ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeysPKCS11(ss, &aes_key_pkcs11, + &mac_key_pkcs11); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + + if (ss->ssl3.pwSpec->msItem.len && ss->ssl3.pwSpec->msItem.data) { + /* The master secret is available unwrapped. */ + ms_item.data = ss->ssl3.pwSpec->msItem.data; + ms_item.len = ss->ssl3.pwSpec->msItem.len; + ms_is_wrapped = PR_FALSE; + } else { + /* Extract the master secret wrapped. */ + sslSessionID sid; + PORT_Memset(&sid, 0, sizeof(sslSessionID)); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa) { + effectiveExchKeyType = kt_rsa; + } else { + effectiveExchKeyType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType; + } + + rv = ssl3_CacheWrappedMasterSecret(ss, &sid, ss->ssl3.pwSpec, + effectiveExchKeyType); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + if (sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len > sizeof(wrapped_ms)) + goto loser; + memcpy(wrapped_ms, sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret, + sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len); + ms_item.data = wrapped_ms; + ms_item.len = sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; + msWrapMech = sid.u.ssl3.masterWrapMech; + } else { + /* TODO: else send an empty ticket. */ + goto loser; + } + ms_is_wrapped = PR_TRUE; + } + /* Prep to send negotiated name */ + srvName = &ss->ssl3.pwSpec->srvVirtName; + if (srvName->data && srvName->len) { + srvNameLen = 2 + srvName->len; /* len bytes + name len */ + } + + ciphertext_length = + sizeof(PRUint16) /* ticket_version */ + + sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion) /* ssl_version */ + + sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite) /* ciphersuite */ + + 1 /* compression */ + + 10 /* cipher spec parameters */ + + 1 /* SessionTicket.ms_is_wrapped */ + + 1 /* effectiveExchKeyType */ + + 4 /* msWrapMech */ + + 2 /* master_secret.length */ + + ms_item.len /* master_secret */ + + 1 /* client_auth_type */ + + cert_length /* cert */ + + 1 /* server name type */ + + srvNameLen /* name len + length field */ + + sizeof(ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint); + padding_length = AES_BLOCK_SIZE - + (ciphertext_length % AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + ciphertext_length += padding_length; + + message_length = + sizeof(ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint) /* ticket_lifetime_hint */ + + 2 /* length field for NewSessionTicket.ticket */ + + SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN /* key_name */ + + AES_BLOCK_SIZE /* iv */ + + 2 /* length field for NewSessionTicket.ticket.encrypted_state */ + + ciphertext_length /* encrypted_state */ + + TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH; /* mac */ + + if (SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &plaintext_item, ciphertext_length) == NULL) + goto loser; + + plaintext = plaintext_item; + + /* ticket_version */ + rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_VERSION, + sizeof(PRUint16)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + + /* ssl_version */ + rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->version, + sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + + /* ciphersuite */ + rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite, + sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + + /* compression */ + rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->ssl3.hs.compression, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + + /* cipher spec parameters */ + rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->sec.authAlgorithm, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->sec.authKeyBits, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->sec.keaType, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->sec.keaKeyBits, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + + /* master_secret */ + rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ms_is_wrapped, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, effectiveExchKeyType, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, msWrapMech, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ms_item.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(&plaintext, ms_item.data, ms_item.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + + /* client_identity */ + if (ss->opt.requestCertificate && ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert) { + rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, CLIENT_AUTH_CERTIFICATE, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, + ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert->derCert.len, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(&plaintext, + ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert->derCert.data, + ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert->derCert.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + } else { + rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, 0, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + } + + /* timestamp */ + now = ssl_Time(); + rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, now, + sizeof(ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + + if (srvNameLen) { + /* Name Type (sni_host_name) */ + rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, srvName->type, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + /* HostName (length and value) */ + rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, srvName->len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(&plaintext, srvName->data, srvName->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + } else { + /* No Name */ + rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, (char)TLS_STE_NO_SERVER_NAME, + 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + } + + PORT_Assert(plaintext.len == padding_length); + for (i = 0; i < padding_length; i++) + plaintext.data[i] = (unsigned char)padding_length; + + if (SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &ciphertext, ciphertext_length) == NULL) { + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + + /* Generate encrypted portion of ticket. */ +#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS + if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { + aes_ctx = (AESContext *)aes_ctx_buf; + rv = AES_InitContext(aes_ctx, aes_key, aes_key_length, iv, + NSS_AES_CBC, 1, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + + rv = AES_Encrypt(aes_ctx, ciphertext.data, &ciphertext.len, + ciphertext.len, plaintext_item.data, + plaintext_item.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + } else +#endif + { + aes_ctx_pkcs11 = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipherMech, + CKA_ENCRYPT, aes_key_pkcs11, &ivItem); + if (!aes_ctx_pkcs11) + goto loser; + + rv = PK11_CipherOp(aes_ctx_pkcs11, ciphertext.data, + (int *)&ciphertext.len, ciphertext.len, + plaintext_item.data, plaintext_item.len); + PK11_Finalize(aes_ctx_pkcs11); + PK11_DestroyContext(aes_ctx_pkcs11, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + } + + /* Convert ciphertext length to network order. */ + length_buf[0] = (ciphertext.len >> 8) & 0xff; + length_buf[1] = (ciphertext.len ) & 0xff; + + /* Compute MAC. */ +#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS + if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { + hmac_ctx = (HMACContext *)hmac_ctx_buf; + hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgSHA256); + if (HMAC_Init(hmac_ctx, hashObj, mac_key, + mac_key_length, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + HMAC_Begin(hmac_ctx); + HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, key_name, SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN); + HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, iv, sizeof(iv)); + HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (unsigned char *)length_buf, 2); + HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, ciphertext.data, ciphertext.len); + HMAC_Finish(hmac_ctx, computed_mac, &computed_mac_length, + sizeof(computed_mac)); + } else +#endif + { + SECItem macParam; + macParam.data = NULL; + macParam.len = 0; + hmac_ctx_pkcs11 = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(macMech, + CKA_SIGN, mac_key_pkcs11, &macParam); + if (!hmac_ctx_pkcs11) + goto loser; + + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(hmac_ctx_pkcs11); + rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, key_name, + SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN); + rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, iv, sizeof(iv)); + rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, (unsigned char *)length_buf, 2); + rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, ciphertext.data, ciphertext.len); + rv = PK11_DigestFinal(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, computed_mac, + &computed_mac_length, sizeof(computed_mac)); + PK11_DestroyContext(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + } + + /* Serialize the handshake message. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, new_session_ticket, message_length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint, + sizeof(ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, + message_length - sizeof(ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint) - 2, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, key_name, SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, iv, sizeof(iv)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ciphertext.data, ciphertext.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, computed_mac, computed_mac_length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; + +loser: + if (plaintext_item.data) + SECITEM_FreeItem(&plaintext_item, PR_FALSE); + if (ciphertext.data) + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ciphertext, PR_FALSE); + + return rv; +} + +/* When a client receives a SessionTicket extension a NewSessionTicket + * message is expected during the handshake. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ClientHandleSessionTicketXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, + SECItem *data) +{ + if (data->len != 0) + return SECFailure; + + /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */ + ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_ServerHandleSessionTicketXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, + SECItem *data) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem *decrypted_state = NULL; + SessionTicket *parsed_session_ticket = NULL; + sslSessionID *sid = NULL; + SSL3Statistics *ssl3stats; + + /* Ignore the SessionTicket extension if processing is disabled. */ + if (!ss->opt.enableSessionTickets) + return SECSuccess; + + /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */ + ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type; + + /* Parse the received ticket sent in by the client. We are + * lenient about some parse errors, falling back to a fullshake + * instead of terminating the current connection. + */ + if (data->len == 0) { + ss->xtnData.emptySessionTicket = PR_TRUE; + } else { + int i; + SECItem extension_data; + EncryptedSessionTicket enc_session_ticket; + unsigned char computed_mac[TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH]; + unsigned int computed_mac_length; +#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS + const SECHashObject *hashObj; + const unsigned char *aes_key; + const unsigned char *mac_key; + PRUint32 aes_key_length; + PRUint32 mac_key_length; + PRUint64 hmac_ctx_buf[MAX_MAC_CONTEXT_LLONGS]; + HMACContext *hmac_ctx; + PRUint64 aes_ctx_buf[MAX_CIPHER_CONTEXT_LLONGS]; + AESContext *aes_ctx; +#endif + PK11SymKey *aes_key_pkcs11; + PK11SymKey *mac_key_pkcs11; + PK11Context *hmac_ctx_pkcs11; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE macMech = CKM_SHA256_HMAC; + PK11Context *aes_ctx_pkcs11; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cipherMech = CKM_AES_CBC; + unsigned char * padding; + PRUint32 padding_length; + unsigned char *buffer; + unsigned int buffer_len; + PRInt32 temp; + SECItem cert_item; + PRInt8 nameType = TLS_STE_NO_SERVER_NAME; + + /* Turn off stateless session resumption if the client sends a + * SessionTicket extension, even if the extension turns out to be + * malformed (ss->sec.ci.sid is non-NULL when doing session + * renegotiation.) + */ + if (ss->sec.ci.sid != NULL) { + if (ss->sec.uncache) + ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid); + ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); + ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; + } + + extension_data.data = data->data; /* Keep a copy for future use. */ + extension_data.len = data->len; + + if (ssl3_ParseEncryptedSessionTicket(ss, data, &enc_session_ticket) + != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + + /* Get session ticket keys. */ +#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS + if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { + rv = ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeys(&aes_key, &aes_key_length, + &mac_key, &mac_key_length); + } else +#endif + { + rv = ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeysPKCS11(ss, &aes_key_pkcs11, + &mac_key_pkcs11); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Unable to get/generate session ticket keys.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + goto loser; + } + + /* If the ticket sent by the client was generated under a key different + * from the one we have, bypass ticket processing. + */ + if (PORT_Memcmp(enc_session_ticket.key_name, key_name, + SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN) != 0) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Session ticket key_name sent mismatch.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + goto no_ticket; + } + + /* Verify the MAC on the ticket. MAC verification may also + * fail if the MAC key has been recently refreshed. + */ +#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS + if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { + hmac_ctx = (HMACContext *)hmac_ctx_buf; + hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgSHA256); + if (HMAC_Init(hmac_ctx, hashObj, mac_key, + sizeof(session_ticket_mac_key), PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess) + goto no_ticket; + HMAC_Begin(hmac_ctx); + HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, extension_data.data, + extension_data.len - TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH); + if (HMAC_Finish(hmac_ctx, computed_mac, &computed_mac_length, + sizeof(computed_mac)) != SECSuccess) + goto no_ticket; + } else +#endif + { + SECItem macParam; + macParam.data = NULL; + macParam.len = 0; + hmac_ctx_pkcs11 = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(macMech, + CKA_SIGN, mac_key_pkcs11, &macParam); + if (!hmac_ctx_pkcs11) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Unable to create HMAC context: %d.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, PORT_GetError())); + goto no_ticket; + } else { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Successfully created HMAC context.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + } + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(hmac_ctx_pkcs11); + rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, extension_data.data, + extension_data.len - TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PK11_DestroyContext(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, PR_TRUE); + goto no_ticket; + } + rv = PK11_DigestFinal(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, computed_mac, + &computed_mac_length, sizeof(computed_mac)); + PK11_DestroyContext(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto no_ticket; + } + if (NSS_SecureMemcmp(computed_mac, enc_session_ticket.mac, + computed_mac_length) != 0) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Session ticket MAC mismatch.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + goto no_ticket; + } + + /* We ignore key_name for now. + * This is ok as MAC verification succeeded. + */ + + /* Decrypt the ticket. */ + + /* Plaintext is shorter than the ciphertext due to padding. */ + decrypted_state = SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, NULL, + enc_session_ticket.encrypted_state.len); + +#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS + if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { + aes_ctx = (AESContext *)aes_ctx_buf; + rv = AES_InitContext(aes_ctx, aes_key, + sizeof(session_ticket_enc_key), enc_session_ticket.iv, + NSS_AES_CBC, 0,AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Unable to create AES context.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + goto no_ticket; + } + + rv = AES_Decrypt(aes_ctx, decrypted_state->data, + &decrypted_state->len, decrypted_state->len, + enc_session_ticket.encrypted_state.data, + enc_session_ticket.encrypted_state.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto no_ticket; + } else +#endif + { + SECItem ivItem; + ivItem.data = enc_session_ticket.iv; + ivItem.len = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + aes_ctx_pkcs11 = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipherMech, + CKA_DECRYPT, aes_key_pkcs11, &ivItem); + if (!aes_ctx_pkcs11) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Unable to create AES context.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + goto no_ticket; + } + + rv = PK11_CipherOp(aes_ctx_pkcs11, decrypted_state->data, + (int *)&decrypted_state->len, decrypted_state->len, + enc_session_ticket.encrypted_state.data, + enc_session_ticket.encrypted_state.len); + PK11_Finalize(aes_ctx_pkcs11); + PK11_DestroyContext(aes_ctx_pkcs11, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto no_ticket; + } + + /* Check padding. */ + padding_length = + (PRUint32)decrypted_state->data[decrypted_state->len - 1]; + if (padding_length == 0 || padding_length > AES_BLOCK_SIZE) + goto no_ticket; + + padding = &decrypted_state->data[decrypted_state->len - padding_length]; + for (i = 0; i < padding_length; i++, padding++) { + if (padding_length != (PRUint32)*padding) + goto no_ticket; + } + + /* Deserialize session state. */ + buffer = decrypted_state->data; + buffer_len = decrypted_state->len; + + parsed_session_ticket = PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(SessionTicket)); + if (parsed_session_ticket == NULL) { + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + + /* Read ticket_version (which is ignored for now.) */ + temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &buffer, &buffer_len); + if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket; + parsed_session_ticket->ticket_version = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp; + + /* Read SSLVersion. */ + temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &buffer, &buffer_len); + if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket; + parsed_session_ticket->ssl_version = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp; + + /* Read cipher_suite. */ + temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &buffer, &buffer_len); + if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket; + parsed_session_ticket->cipher_suite = (ssl3CipherSuite)temp; + + /* Read compression_method. */ + temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len); + if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket; + parsed_session_ticket->compression_method = (SSLCompressionMethod)temp; + + /* Read cipher spec parameters. */ + temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len); + if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket; + parsed_session_ticket->authAlgorithm = (SSLSignType)temp; + temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 4, &buffer, &buffer_len); + if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket; + parsed_session_ticket->authKeyBits = (PRUint32)temp; + temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len); + if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket; + parsed_session_ticket->keaType = (SSLKEAType)temp; + temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 4, &buffer, &buffer_len); + if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket; + parsed_session_ticket->keaKeyBits = (PRUint32)temp; + + /* Read wrapped master_secret. */ + temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len); + if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket; + parsed_session_ticket->ms_is_wrapped = (PRBool)temp; + + temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len); + if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket; + parsed_session_ticket->exchKeyType = (SSL3KEAType)temp; + + temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 4, &buffer, &buffer_len); + if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket; + parsed_session_ticket->msWrapMech = (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)temp; + + temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &buffer, &buffer_len); + if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket; + parsed_session_ticket->ms_length = (PRUint16)temp; + if (parsed_session_ticket->ms_length == 0 || /* sanity check MS. */ + parsed_session_ticket->ms_length > + sizeof(parsed_session_ticket->master_secret)) + goto no_ticket; + + /* Allow for the wrapped master secret to be longer. */ + if (buffer_len < sizeof(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH)) + goto no_ticket; + PORT_Memcpy(parsed_session_ticket->master_secret, buffer, + parsed_session_ticket->ms_length); + buffer += parsed_session_ticket->ms_length; + buffer_len -= parsed_session_ticket->ms_length; + + /* Read client_identity */ + temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len); + if (temp < 0) + goto no_ticket; + parsed_session_ticket->client_identity.client_auth_type = + (ClientAuthenticationType)temp; + switch(parsed_session_ticket->client_identity.client_auth_type) { + case CLIENT_AUTH_ANONYMOUS: + break; + case CLIENT_AUTH_CERTIFICATE: + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &cert_item, 3, + &buffer, &buffer_len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto no_ticket; + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &parsed_session_ticket->peer_cert, + &cert_item); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto no_ticket; + break; + default: + goto no_ticket; + } + /* Read timestamp. */ + temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 4, &buffer, &buffer_len); + if (temp < 0) + goto no_ticket; + parsed_session_ticket->timestamp = (PRUint32)temp; + + /* Read server name */ + nameType = + ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len); + if (nameType != TLS_STE_NO_SERVER_NAME) { + SECItem name_item; + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &name_item, 2, &buffer, + &buffer_len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto no_ticket; + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &parsed_session_ticket->srvName, + &name_item); + if (rv != SECSuccess) goto no_ticket; + parsed_session_ticket->srvName.type = nameType; + } + + /* Done parsing. Check that all bytes have been consumed. */ + if (buffer_len != padding_length) + goto no_ticket; + + /* Use the ticket if it has not expired, otherwise free the allocated + * memory since the ticket is of no use. + */ + if (parsed_session_ticket->timestamp != 0 && + parsed_session_ticket->timestamp + + TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_LIFETIME_HINT > ssl_Time()) { + + sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE); + if (sid == NULL) { + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + + /* Copy over parameters. */ + sid->version = parsed_session_ticket->ssl_version; + sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite = parsed_session_ticket->cipher_suite; + sid->u.ssl3.compression = parsed_session_ticket->compression_method; + sid->authAlgorithm = parsed_session_ticket->authAlgorithm; + sid->authKeyBits = parsed_session_ticket->authKeyBits; + sid->keaType = parsed_session_ticket->keaType; + sid->keaKeyBits = parsed_session_ticket->keaKeyBits; + + /* Copy master secret. */ +#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS + if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11 && + parsed_session_ticket->ms_is_wrapped) + goto no_ticket; +#endif + if (parsed_session_ticket->ms_length > + sizeof(sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret)) + goto no_ticket; + PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret, + parsed_session_ticket->master_secret, + parsed_session_ticket->ms_length); + sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len = + parsed_session_ticket->ms_length; + sid->u.ssl3.exchKeyType = parsed_session_ticket->exchKeyType; + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech = parsed_session_ticket->msWrapMech; + sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped = + parsed_session_ticket->ms_is_wrapped; + sid->u.ssl3.masterValid = PR_TRUE; + sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable = PR_TRUE; + + /* Copy over client cert from session ticket if there is one. */ + if (parsed_session_ticket->peer_cert.data != NULL) { + if (sid->peerCert != NULL) + CERT_DestroyCertificate(sid->peerCert); + sid->peerCert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, + &parsed_session_ticket->peer_cert, NULL, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE); + if (sid->peerCert == NULL) { + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + } + if (parsed_session_ticket->srvName.data != NULL) { + sid->u.ssl3.srvName = parsed_session_ticket->srvName; + } + ss->statelessResume = PR_TRUE; + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; + } + } + + if (0) { +no_ticket: + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Session ticket parsing failed.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + ssl3stats = SSL_GetStatistics(); + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats->hch_sid_ticket_parse_failures ); + } + rv = SECSuccess; + +loser: + /* ss->sec.ci.sid == sid if it did NOT come here via goto statement + * in that case do not free sid + */ + if (sid && (ss->sec.ci.sid != sid)) { + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + sid = NULL; + } + if (decrypted_state != NULL) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(decrypted_state, PR_TRUE); + decrypted_state = NULL; + } + + if (parsed_session_ticket != NULL) { + if (parsed_session_ticket->peer_cert.data) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&parsed_session_ticket->peer_cert, PR_FALSE); + } + PORT_ZFree(parsed_session_ticket, sizeof(SessionTicket)); + } + + return rv; +} + +/* + * Read bytes. Using this function means the SECItem structure + * cannot be freed. The caller is expected to call this function + * on a shallow copy of the structure. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ConsumeFromItem(SECItem *item, unsigned char **buf, PRUint32 bytes) +{ + if (bytes > item->len) + return SECFailure; + + *buf = item->data; + item->data += bytes; + item->len -= bytes; + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_ParseEncryptedSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *data, + EncryptedSessionTicket *enc_session_ticket) +{ + if (ssl3_ConsumeFromItem(data, &enc_session_ticket->key_name, + SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN) != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + if (ssl3_ConsumeFromItem(data, &enc_session_ticket->iv, + AES_BLOCK_SIZE) != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + if (ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &enc_session_ticket->encrypted_state, + 2, &data->data, &data->len) != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + if (ssl3_ConsumeFromItem(data, &enc_session_ticket->mac, + TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH) != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + if (data->len != 0) /* Make sure that we have consumed all bytes. */ + return SECFailure; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* go through hello extensions in buffer "b". + * For each one, find the extension handler in the table, and + * if present, invoke that handler. + * Servers ignore any extensions with unknown extension types. + * Clients reject any extensions with unadvertised extension types. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleHelloExtensions(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque **b, PRUint32 *length) +{ + const ssl3HelloExtensionHandler * handlers; + + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + handlers = clientHelloHandlers; + } else if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { + handlers = serverHelloHandlersTLS; + } else { + handlers = serverHelloHandlersSSL3; + } + + while (*length) { + const ssl3HelloExtensionHandler * handler; + SECStatus rv; + PRInt32 extension_type; + SECItem extension_data; + + /* Get the extension's type field */ + extension_type = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, b, length); + if (extension_type < 0) /* failure to decode extension_type */ + return SECFailure; /* alert already sent */ + + /* get the data for this extension, so we can pass it or skip it. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &extension_data, 2, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; + + /* Check whether the server sent an extension which was not advertised + * in the ClientHello. + */ + if (!ss->sec.isServer && + !ssl3_ClientExtensionAdvertised(ss, extension_type)) + return SECFailure; /* TODO: send unsupported_extension alert */ + + /* Check whether an extension has been sent multiple times. */ + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, extension_type)) + return SECFailure; + + /* find extension_type in table of Hello Extension Handlers */ + for (handler = handlers; handler->ex_type >= 0; handler++) { + /* if found, call this handler */ + if (handler->ex_type == extension_type) { + rv = (*handler->ex_handler)(ss, (PRUint16)extension_type, + &extension_data); + /* Ignore this result */ + /* Treat all bad extensions as unrecognized types. */ + break; + } + } + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Add a callback function to the table of senders of server hello extensions. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, + ssl3HelloExtensionSenderFunc cb) +{ + int i; + ssl3HelloExtensionSender *sender = &ss->xtnData.serverSenders[0]; + + for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS; ++i, ++sender) { + if (!sender->ex_sender) { + sender->ex_type = ex_type; + sender->ex_sender = cb; + return SECSuccess; + } + /* detect duplicate senders */ + PORT_Assert(sender->ex_type != ex_type); + if (sender->ex_type == ex_type) { + /* duplicate */ + break; + } + } + PORT_Assert(i < SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS); /* table needs to grow */ + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* call each of the extension senders and return the accumulated length */ +PRInt32 +ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes, + const ssl3HelloExtensionSender *sender) +{ + PRInt32 total_exten_len = 0; + int i; + + if (!sender) { + sender = ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 ? + &clientHelloSendersTLS[0] : &clientHelloSendersSSL3[0]; + } + + for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS; ++i, ++sender) { + if (sender->ex_sender) { + PRInt32 extLen = (*sender->ex_sender)(ss, append, maxBytes); + if (extLen < 0) + return -1; + maxBytes -= extLen; + total_exten_len += extLen; + } + } + return total_exten_len; +} + + +/* Extension format: + * Extension number: 2 bytes + * Extension length: 2 bytes + * Verify Data Length: 1 byte + * Verify Data (TLS): 12 bytes (client) or 24 bytes (server) + * Verify Data (SSL): 36 bytes (client) or 72 bytes (server) + */ +static PRInt32 +ssl3_SendRenegotiationInfoXtn( + sslSocket * ss, + PRBool append, + PRUint32 maxBytes) +{ + PRInt32 len, needed; + + /* In draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03, it is NOT RECOMMENDED to send + * both the SCSV and the empty RI, so when we send SCSV in + * the initial handshake, we don't also send RI. + */ + if (!ss || ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV) + return 0; + len = !ss->firstHsDone ? 0 : + (ss->sec.isServer ? ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes * 2 + : ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes); + needed = 5 + len; + if (append && maxBytes >= needed) { + SECStatus rv; + /* extension_type */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; + /* length of extension_data */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, len + 1, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; + /* verify_Data from previous Finished message(s) */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.data, len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData; + xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] = + ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn; + } + } + return needed; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_ServerHandleStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, + SECItem *data) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + /* remember that we got this extension. */ + ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type; + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); + /* prepare to send back the appropriate response */ + rv = ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender(ss, ex_type, + ssl3_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn); + return rv; +} + +/* This function runs in both the client and server. */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + PRUint32 len = 0; + + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + len = ss->sec.isServer ? ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes + : ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes * 2; + } + if (data->len != 1 + len || + data->data[0] != len || (len && + NSS_SecureMemcmp(ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.data, + data->data + 1, len))) { + /* Can we do this here? Or, must we arrange for the caller to do it? */ + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); + return SECFailure; + } + /* remember that we got this extension and it was correct. */ + ss->peerRequestedProtection = 1; + ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type; + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + /* prepare to send back the appropriate response */ + rv = ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender(ss, ex_type, + ssl3_SendRenegotiationInfoXtn); + } + return rv; +} + +static PRInt32 +ssl3_SendUseSRTPXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes) +{ + PRUint32 ext_data_len; + PRInt16 i; + SECStatus rv; + + if (!ss) + return 0; + + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + /* Client side */ + + if (!IS_DTLS(ss) || !ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount) + return 0; /* Not relevant */ + + ext_data_len = 2 + 2 * ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount + 1; + + if (append && maxBytes >= 4 + ext_data_len) { + /* Extension type */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_use_srtp_xtn, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; + /* Length of extension data */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ext_data_len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; + /* Length of the SRTP cipher list */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, + 2 * ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount, + 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; + /* The SRTP ciphers */ + for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount; i++) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, + ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCiphers[i], + 2); + } + /* Empty MKI value */ + ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, NULL, 0, 1); + + ss->xtnData.advertised[ss->xtnData.numAdvertised++] = + ssl_use_srtp_xtn; + } + + return 4 + ext_data_len; + } + + /* Server side */ + if (append && maxBytes >= 9) { + /* Extension type */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_use_srtp_xtn, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; + /* Length of extension data */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 5, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; + /* Length of the SRTP cipher list */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; + /* The selected cipher */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherSuite, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; + /* Empty MKI value */ + ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, NULL, 0, 1); + } + + return 9; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleUseSRTPXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem ciphers = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + PRUint16 i; + unsigned int j; + PRUint16 cipher = 0; + PRBool found = PR_FALSE; + SECItem litem; + + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + /* Client side */ + if (!data->data || !data->len) { + /* malformed */ + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Get the cipher list */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ciphers, 2, + &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* Now check that the number of ciphers listed is 1 (len = 2) */ + if (ciphers.len != 2) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Get the selected cipher */ + cipher = (ciphers.data[0] << 8) | ciphers.data[1]; + + /* Now check that this is one of the ciphers we offered */ + for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount; i++) { + if (cipher == ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCiphers[i]) { + found = PR_TRUE; + break; + } + } + + if (!found) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Get the srtp_mki value */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &litem, 1, + &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* We didn't offer an MKI, so this must be 0 length */ + /* XXX RFC 5764 Section 4.1.3 says: + * If the client detects a nonzero-length MKI in the server's + * response that is different than the one the client offered, + * then the client MUST abort the handshake and SHOULD send an + * invalid_parameter alert. + * + * Due to a limitation of the ssl3_HandleHelloExtensions function, + * returning SECFailure here won't abort the handshake. It will + * merely cause the use_srtp extension to be not negotiated. We + * should fix this. See NSS bug 753136. + */ + if (litem.len != 0) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (data->len != 0) { + /* malformed */ + return SECFailure; + } + + /* OK, this looks fine. */ + ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ssl_use_srtp_xtn; + ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherSuite = cipher; + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* Server side */ + if (!IS_DTLS(ss) || !ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount) { + /* Ignore the extension if we aren't doing DTLS or no DTLS-SRTP + * preferences have been set. */ + return SECSuccess; + } + + if (!data->data || data->len < 5) { + /* malformed */ + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Get the cipher list */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ciphers, 2, + &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* Check that the list is even length */ + if (ciphers.len % 2) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Walk through the offered list and pick the most preferred of our + * ciphers, if any */ + for (i = 0; !found && i < ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount; i++) { + for (j = 0; j + 1 < ciphers.len; j += 2) { + cipher = (ciphers.data[j] << 8) | ciphers.data[j + 1]; + if (cipher == ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCiphers[i]) { + found = PR_TRUE; + break; + } + } + } + + /* Get the srtp_mki value */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &litem, 1, &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (data->len != 0) { + return SECFailure; /* Malformed */ + } + + /* Now figure out what to do */ + if (!found) { + /* No matching ciphers */ + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* OK, we have a valid cipher and we've selected it */ + ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherSuite = cipher; + ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ssl_use_srtp_xtn; + + return ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender(ss, ssl_use_srtp_xtn, + ssl3_SendUseSRTPXtn); +} + +/* ssl3_ServerHandleSigAlgsXtn handles the signature_algorithms extension + * from a client. + * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ServerHandleSigAlgsXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem algorithms; + const unsigned char *b; + unsigned int numAlgorithms, i; + + /* Ignore this extension if we aren't doing TLS 1.2 or greater. */ + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */ + ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type; + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &algorithms, 2, &data->data, + &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* Trailing data, empty value, or odd-length value is invalid. */ + if (data->len != 0 || algorithms.len == 0 || (algorithms.len & 1) != 0) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO); + return SECFailure; + } + + numAlgorithms = algorithms.len/2; + + /* We don't care to process excessive numbers of algorithms. */ + if (numAlgorithms > 512) { + numAlgorithms = 512; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash = + PORT_NewArray(SSL3SignatureAndHashAlgorithm, numAlgorithms); + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash) { + return SECFailure; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.numClientSigAndHash = 0; + + b = algorithms.data; + for (i = 0; i < numAlgorithms; i++) { + unsigned char tls_hash = *(b++); + unsigned char tls_sig = *(b++); + SECOidTag hash = ssl3_TLSHashAlgorithmToOID(tls_hash); + + if (hash == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) { + /* We ignore formats that we don't understand. */ + continue; + } + /* tls_sig support will be checked later in + * ssl3_PickSignatureHashAlgorithm. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash[i].hashAlg = hash; + ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash[i].sigAlg = tls_sig; + ss->ssl3.hs.numClientSigAndHash++; + } + + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.numClientSigAndHash) { + /* We didn't understand any of the client's requested signature + * formats. We'll use the defaults. */ + PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash); + ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash = NULL; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* ssl3_ClientSendSigAlgsXtn sends the signature_algorithm extension for TLS + * 1.2 ClientHellos. */ +static PRInt32 +ssl3_ClientSendSigAlgsXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes) +{ + static const unsigned char signatureAlgorithms[] = { + /* This block is the contents of our signature_algorithms extension, in + * wire format. See + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */ + tls_hash_sha256, tls_sig_rsa, + tls_hash_sha384, tls_sig_rsa, + tls_hash_sha1, tls_sig_rsa, +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + tls_hash_sha256, tls_sig_ecdsa, + tls_hash_sha384, tls_sig_ecdsa, + tls_hash_sha1, tls_sig_ecdsa, +#endif + tls_hash_sha256, tls_sig_dsa, + tls_hash_sha1, tls_sig_dsa, + }; + PRInt32 extension_length; + + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + return 0; + } + + extension_length = + 2 /* extension type */ + + 2 /* extension length */ + + 2 /* supported_signature_algorithms length */ + + sizeof(signatureAlgorithms); + + if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) { + SECStatus rv; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extension_length - 4, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, signatureAlgorithms, + sizeof(signatureAlgorithms), 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + ss->xtnData.advertised[ss->xtnData.numAdvertised++] = + ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn; + } else if (maxBytes < extension_length) { + PORT_Assert(0); + return 0; + } + + return extension_length; + +loser: + return -1; +} |