diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/syscall_unittest.cc')
| -rw-r--r-- | chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/syscall_unittest.cc | 112 |
1 files changed, 64 insertions, 48 deletions
diff --git a/chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/syscall_unittest.cc b/chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/syscall_unittest.cc index 136deb615cb..60db69bcd6b 100644 --- a/chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/syscall_unittest.cc +++ b/chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/syscall_unittest.cc @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ #include "sandbox/linux/tests/unit_tests.h" #include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" -using namespace playground2; +namespace sandbox { namespace { @@ -31,27 +31,27 @@ const int kMMapNr = __NR_mmap; #endif TEST(Syscall, WellKnownEntryPoint) { - // Test that SandboxSyscall(-1) is handled specially. Don't do this on ARM, - // where syscall(-1) crashes with SIGILL. Not running the test is fine, as we - // are still testing ARM code in the next set of tests. +// Test that SandboxSyscall(-1) is handled specially. Don't do this on ARM, +// where syscall(-1) crashes with SIGILL. Not running the test is fine, as we +// are still testing ARM code in the next set of tests. #if !defined(__arm__) EXPECT_NE(SandboxSyscall(-1), syscall(-1)); #endif - // If possible, test that SandboxSyscall(-1) returns the address right after - // a kernel entry point. +// If possible, test that SandboxSyscall(-1) returns the address right after +// a kernel entry point. #if defined(__i386__) - EXPECT_EQ(0x80CDu, ((uint16_t *)SandboxSyscall(-1))[-1]); // INT 0x80 + EXPECT_EQ(0x80CDu, ((uint16_t*)SandboxSyscall(-1))[-1]); // INT 0x80 #elif defined(__x86_64__) - EXPECT_EQ(0x050Fu, ((uint16_t *)SandboxSyscall(-1))[-1]); // SYSCALL + EXPECT_EQ(0x050Fu, ((uint16_t*)SandboxSyscall(-1))[-1]); // SYSCALL #elif defined(__arm__) #if defined(__thumb__) - EXPECT_EQ(0xDF00u, ((uint16_t *)SandboxSyscall(-1))[-1]); // SWI 0 + EXPECT_EQ(0xDF00u, ((uint16_t*)SandboxSyscall(-1))[-1]); // SWI 0 #else - EXPECT_EQ(0xEF000000u, ((uint32_t *)SandboxSyscall(-1))[-1]); // SVC 0 + EXPECT_EQ(0xEF000000u, ((uint32_t*)SandboxSyscall(-1))[-1]); // SVC 0 #endif #else - #warning Incomplete test case; need port for target platform +#warning Incomplete test case; need port for target platform #endif } @@ -64,12 +64,12 @@ TEST(Syscall, TrivialSyscallOneArg) { int new_fd; // Duplicate standard error and close it. ASSERT_GE(new_fd = SandboxSyscall(__NR_dup, 2), 0); - int close_return_value = HANDLE_EINTR(SandboxSyscall(__NR_close, new_fd)); + int close_return_value = IGNORE_EINTR(SandboxSyscall(__NR_close, new_fd)); ASSERT_EQ(close_return_value, 0); } // SIGSYS trap handler that will be called on __NR_uname. -intptr_t CopySyscallArgsToAux(const struct arch_seccomp_data& args, void *aux) { +intptr_t CopySyscallArgsToAux(const struct arch_seccomp_data& args, void* aux) { // |aux| is a pointer to our BPF_AUX. std::vector<uint64_t>* const seen_syscall_args = static_cast<std::vector<uint64_t>*>(aux); @@ -78,8 +78,8 @@ intptr_t CopySyscallArgsToAux(const struct arch_seccomp_data& args, void *aux) { return -ENOMEM; } -ErrorCode CopyAllArgsOnUnamePolicy(Sandbox *sandbox, int sysno, void *aux) { - if (!Sandbox::IsValidSyscallNumber(sysno)) { +ErrorCode CopyAllArgsOnUnamePolicy(SandboxBPF* sandbox, int sysno, void* aux) { + if (!SandboxBPF::IsValidSyscallNumber(sysno)) { return ErrorCode(ENOSYS); } if (sysno == __NR_uname) { @@ -91,7 +91,9 @@ ErrorCode CopyAllArgsOnUnamePolicy(Sandbox *sandbox, int sysno, void *aux) { // We are testing SandboxSyscall() by making use of a BPF filter that allows us // to inspect the system call arguments that the kernel saw. -BPF_TEST(Syscall, SyntheticSixArgs, CopyAllArgsOnUnamePolicy, +BPF_TEST(Syscall, + SyntheticSixArgs, + CopyAllArgsOnUnamePolicy, std::vector<uint64_t> /* BPF_AUX */) { const int kExpectedValue = 42; // In this test we only pass integers to the kernel. We might want to make @@ -105,12 +107,13 @@ BPF_TEST(Syscall, SyntheticSixArgs, CopyAllArgsOnUnamePolicy, // We could use pretty much any system call we don't need here. uname() is // nice because it doesn't have any dangerous side effects. - BPF_ASSERT(SandboxSyscall(__NR_uname, syscall_args[0], - syscall_args[1], - syscall_args[2], - syscall_args[3], - syscall_args[4], - syscall_args[5]) == -ENOMEM); + BPF_ASSERT(SandboxSyscall(__NR_uname, + syscall_args[0], + syscall_args[1], + syscall_args[2], + syscall_args[3], + syscall_args[4], + syscall_args[5]) == -ENOMEM); // We expect the trap handler to have copied the 6 arguments. BPF_ASSERT(BPF_AUX.size() == 6); @@ -131,43 +134,54 @@ TEST(Syscall, ComplexSyscallSixArgs) { ASSERT_LE(0, fd = SandboxSyscall(__NR_open, "/dev/null", O_RDWR, 0L)); // Use mmap() to allocate some read-only memory - char *addr0; - ASSERT_NE((char *)NULL, - addr0 = reinterpret_cast<char *>( - SandboxSyscall(kMMapNr, (void *)NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, - MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, fd, 0L))); + char* addr0; + ASSERT_NE((char*)NULL, + addr0 = reinterpret_cast<char*>( + SandboxSyscall(kMMapNr, + (void*)NULL, + 4096, + PROT_READ, + MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, + fd, + 0L))); // Try to replace the existing mapping with a read-write mapping - char *addr1; + char* addr1; ASSERT_EQ(addr0, - addr1 = reinterpret_cast<char *>( - SandboxSyscall(kMMapNr, addr0, 4096L, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, - MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_FIXED, - fd, 0L))); - ++*addr1; // This should not seg fault + addr1 = reinterpret_cast<char*>( + SandboxSyscall(kMMapNr, + addr0, + 4096L, + PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, + MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, + fd, + 0L))); + ++*addr1; // This should not seg fault // Clean up EXPECT_EQ(0, SandboxSyscall(__NR_munmap, addr1, 4096L)); - EXPECT_EQ(0, HANDLE_EINTR(SandboxSyscall(__NR_close, fd))); + EXPECT_EQ(0, IGNORE_EINTR(SandboxSyscall(__NR_close, fd))); // Check that the offset argument (i.e. the sixth argument) is processed // correctly. ASSERT_GE(fd = SandboxSyscall(__NR_open, "/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY, 0L), 0); - char *addr2, *addr3; - ASSERT_NE((char *)NULL, - addr2 = reinterpret_cast<char *>( - SandboxSyscall(kMMapNr, (void *)NULL, 8192L, PROT_READ, - MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0L))); - ASSERT_NE((char *)NULL, - addr3 = reinterpret_cast<char *>( - SandboxSyscall(kMMapNr, (void *)NULL, 4096L, PROT_READ, - MAP_PRIVATE, fd, + char* addr2, *addr3; + ASSERT_NE((char*)NULL, + addr2 = reinterpret_cast<char*>(SandboxSyscall( + kMMapNr, (void*)NULL, 8192L, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0L))); + ASSERT_NE((char*)NULL, + addr3 = reinterpret_cast<char*>(SandboxSyscall(kMMapNr, + (void*)NULL, + 4096L, + PROT_READ, + MAP_PRIVATE, + fd, #if defined(__NR_mmap2) - 1L + 1L #else - 4096L + 4096L #endif - ))); + ))); EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(addr2 + 4096, addr3, 4096)); // Just to be absolutely on the safe side, also verify that the file @@ -179,7 +193,9 @@ TEST(Syscall, ComplexSyscallSixArgs) { // Clean up EXPECT_EQ(0, SandboxSyscall(__NR_munmap, addr2, 8192L)); EXPECT_EQ(0, SandboxSyscall(__NR_munmap, addr3, 4096L)); - EXPECT_EQ(0, HANDLE_EINTR(SandboxSyscall(__NR_close, fd))); + EXPECT_EQ(0, IGNORE_EINTR(SandboxSyscall(__NR_close, fd))); } -} // namespace +} // namespace + +} // namespace sandbox |