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// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#ifndef NET_CERT_CERT_VERIFY_PROC_H_
#define NET_CERT_CERT_VERIFY_PROC_H_
#include <string>
#include <vector>
#include "base/feature_list.h"
#include "base/gtest_prod_util.h"
#include "base/macros.h"
#include "base/memory/ref_counted.h"
#include "build/build_config.h"
#include "net/base/net_export.h"
#include "net/cert/x509_cert_types.h"
namespace net {
class CertNetFetcher;
class CertVerifyResult;
class CRLSet;
class NetLogWithSource;
class X509Certificate;
typedef std::vector<scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> > CertificateList;
// Class to perform certificate path building and verification for various
// certificate uses. All methods of this class must be thread-safe, as they
// may be called from various non-joinable worker threads.
class NET_EXPORT CertVerifyProc
: public base::RefCountedThreadSafe<CertVerifyProc> {
public:
enum VerifyFlags {
// If set, enables online revocation checking via CRLs and OCSP for the
// certificate chain.
VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED = 1 << 0,
// If set, this is equivalent to VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED, in that it
// enables online revocation checking via CRLs or OCSP, but only
// for certificates issued by non-public trust anchors. Failure to check
// revocation is treated as a hard failure.
// Note: If VERIFY_CERT_IO_ENABLE is not also supplied, certificates
// that chain to local trust anchors will likely fail - for example, due to
// lacking fresh cached revocation issue (Windows) or because OCSP stapling
// can only provide information for the leaf, and not for any
// intermediates.
VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_REQUIRED_LOCAL_ANCHORS = 1 << 1,
// If set, certificates with SHA-1 signatures will be allowed, but only if
// they are issued by non-public trust anchors.
VERIFY_ENABLE_SHA1_LOCAL_ANCHORS = 1 << 2,
// If set, disables the policy enforcement described at
// https://security.googleblog.com/2017/09/chromes-plan-to-distrust-symantec.html
VERIFY_DISABLE_SYMANTEC_ENFORCEMENT = 1 << 3,
};
// These values are persisted to logs. Entries should not be renumbered and
// numeric values should never be reused.
enum class NameNormalizationResult {
kError = 0,
kByteEqual = 1,
kNormalized = 2,
kChainLengthOne = 3,
kMaxValue = kChainLengthOne
};
#if !(defined(OS_FUCHSIA) || defined(OS_LINUX) || defined(OS_CHROMEOS))
// Creates and returns a CertVerifyProc that uses the system verifier.
// |cert_net_fetcher| may not be used, depending on the implementation.
static scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> CreateSystemVerifyProc(
scoped_refptr<CertNetFetcher> cert_net_fetcher);
#endif
#if defined(OS_FUCHSIA) || defined(USE_NSS_CERTS) || defined(OS_MAC)
// Creates and returns a CertVerifyProcBuiltin using the SSL SystemTrustStore.
static scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> CreateBuiltinVerifyProc(
scoped_refptr<CertNetFetcher> cert_net_fetcher);
#endif
// Verifies the certificate against the given hostname as an SSL server
// certificate. Returns OK if successful or an error code upon failure.
//
// The |*verify_result| structure, including the |verify_result->cert_status|
// bitmask, is always filled out regardless of the return value. If the
// certificate has multiple errors, the corresponding status flags are set in
// |verify_result->cert_status|, and the error code for the most serious
// error is returned.
//
// |ocsp_response|, if non-empty, is a stapled OCSP response to use.
//
// |sct_list|, if non-empty, is a SignedCertificateTimestampList from the TLS
// extension as described in RFC6962 section 3.3.1.
//
// |flags| is bitwise OR'd of VerifyFlags:
//
// If VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED is set in |flags|, online certificate
// revocation checking is performed (i.e. OCSP and downloading CRLs). CRLSet
// based revocation checking is always enabled, regardless of this flag, if
// |crl_set| is given.
//
// |crl_set|, which is required, points to an CRLSet structure which can be
// used to avoid revocation checks over the network. If you do not have one
// handy, use CRLSet::BuiltinCRLSet().
//
// |additional_trust_anchors| lists certificates that can be trusted when
// building a certificate chain, in addition to the anchors known to the
// implementation.
int Verify(X509Certificate* cert,
const std::string& hostname,
const std::string& ocsp_response,
const std::string& sct_list,
int flags,
CRLSet* crl_set,
const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors,
CertVerifyResult* verify_result,
const NetLogWithSource& net_log);
// Returns true if the implementation supports passing additional trust
// anchors to the Verify() call. The |additional_trust_anchors| parameter
// passed to Verify() is ignored when this returns false.
virtual bool SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors() const = 0;
protected:
CertVerifyProc();
virtual ~CertVerifyProc();
// Record a histogram of whether Name normalization was used in verifying the
// chain. This should only be called for successfully validated chains.
static void LogNameNormalizationResult(const std::string& histogram_suffix,
NameNormalizationResult result);
// Record a histogram of whether Name normalization was used in verifying the
// chain. This should only be called for successfully validated chains.
static void LogNameNormalizationMetrics(const std::string& histogram_suffix,
X509Certificate* verified_cert,
bool is_issued_by_known_root);
private:
friend class base::RefCountedThreadSafe<CertVerifyProc>;
FRIEND_TEST_ALL_PREFIXES(CertVerifyProcTest, DigiNotarCerts);
FRIEND_TEST_ALL_PREFIXES(CertVerifyProcTest, TestHasTooLongValidity);
FRIEND_TEST_ALL_PREFIXES(CertVerifyProcTest,
VerifyRejectsSHA1AfterDeprecationLegacyMode);
FRIEND_TEST_ALL_PREFIXES(CertVerifyProcTest, SymantecCertsRejected);
// Performs the actual verification using the desired underlying
//
// On entry, |verify_result| will be default-initialized as a successful
// validation, with |verify_result->verified_cert| set to |cert|.
//
// Implementations are expected to fill in all applicable fields, excluding:
//
// * ocsp_result
// * has_md2
// * has_md4
// * has_md5
// * has_sha1
// * has_sha1_leaf
//
// which will be filled in by |Verify()|. If an error code is returned,
// |verify_result->cert_status| should be non-zero, indicating an
// error occurred.
//
// On success, net::OK should be returned, with |verify_result| updated to
// reflect the successfully verified chain.
virtual int VerifyInternal(X509Certificate* cert,
const std::string& hostname,
const std::string& ocsp_response,
const std::string& sct_list,
int flags,
CRLSet* crl_set,
const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors,
CertVerifyResult* verify_result,
const NetLogWithSource& net_log) = 0;
// HasNameConstraintsViolation returns true iff one of |public_key_hashes|
// (which are hashes of SubjectPublicKeyInfo structures) has name constraints
// imposed on it and the names in |dns_names| are not permitted.
static bool HasNameConstraintsViolation(
const HashValueVector& public_key_hashes,
const std::string& common_name,
const std::vector<std::string>& dns_names,
const std::vector<std::string>& ip_addrs);
// The CA/Browser Forum's Baseline Requirements specify maximum validity
// periods (https://cabforum.org/baseline-requirements-documents/).
//
// For certificates issued after 1 July 2012: 60 months.
// For certificates issued after 1 April 2015: 39 months.
// For certificates issued after 1 March 2018: 825 days.
//
// For certificates issued before the BRs took effect, there were no
// guidelines, but clamp them at a maximum of 10 year validity, with the
// requirement they expire within 7 years after the effective date of the BRs
// (i.e. by 1 July 2019).
static bool HasTooLongValidity(const X509Certificate& cert);
// Feature flag affecting the Legacy Symantec PKI deprecation, documented
// at https://g.co/chrome/symantecpkicerts
static const base::Feature kLegacySymantecPKIEnforcement;
DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(CertVerifyProc);
};
} // namespace net
#endif // NET_CERT_CERT_VERIFY_PROC_H_
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