summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/deps/lua
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorantirez <antirez@gmail.com>2018-05-14 17:45:40 +0200
committerantirez <antirez@gmail.com>2018-06-13 12:40:33 +0200
commit52a00201fca331217c3b4b8b634f6a0f57d6b7d3 (patch)
tree1d3927ad8247cff39639756b9263af957a4a1d98 /deps/lua
parent032ea657d7ca1923ebebda5f2cfeaa69bfbfb4f5 (diff)
downloadredis-52a00201fca331217c3b4b8b634f6a0f57d6b7d3.tar.gz
Security: fix Lua cmsgpack library stack overflow.
During an auditing effort, the Apple Vulnerability Research team discovered a critical Redis security issue affecting the Lua scripting part of Redis. -- Description of the problem Several years ago I merged a pull request including many small changes at the Lua MsgPack library (that originally I authored myself). The Pull Request entered Redis in commit 90b6337c1, in 2014. Unfortunately one of the changes included a variadic Lua function that lacked the check for the available Lua C stack. As a result, calling the "pack" MsgPack library function with a large number of arguments, results into pushing into the Lua C stack a number of new values proportional to the number of arguments the function was called with. The pushed values, moreover, are controlled by untrusted user input. This in turn causes stack smashing which we believe to be exploitable, while not very deterministic, but it is likely that an exploit could be created targeting specific versions of Redis executables. However at its minimum the issue results in a DoS, crashing the Redis server. -- Versions affected Versions greater or equal to Redis 2.8.18 are affected. -- Reproducing Reproduce with this (based on the original reproduction script by Apple security team): https://gist.github.com/antirez/82445fcbea6d9b19f97014cc6cc79f8a -- Verification of the fix The fix was tested in the following way: 1) I checked that the problem is no longer observable running the trigger. 2) The Lua code was analyzed to understand the stack semantics, and that actually enough stack is allocated in all the cases of mp_pack() calls. 3) The mp_pack() function was modified in order to show exactly what items in the stack were being set, to make sure that there is no silent overflow even after the fix. -- Credits Thank you to the Apple team and to the other persons that helped me checking the patch and coordinating this communication.
Diffstat (limited to 'deps/lua')
-rw-r--r--deps/lua/src/lua_cmsgpack.c3
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/deps/lua/src/lua_cmsgpack.c b/deps/lua/src/lua_cmsgpack.c
index 90a388f3f..ba75ed455 100644
--- a/deps/lua/src/lua_cmsgpack.c
+++ b/deps/lua/src/lua_cmsgpack.c
@@ -515,6 +515,9 @@ int mp_pack(lua_State *L) {
if (nargs == 0)
return luaL_argerror(L, 0, "MessagePack pack needs input.");
+ if (!lua_checkstack(L, nargs))
+ return luaL_argerror(L, 0, "Too many arguments for MessagePack pack.");
+
buf = mp_buf_new(L);
for(i = 1; i <= nargs; i++) {
/* Copy argument i to top of stack for _encode processing;