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authorkernelmethod <wss2ec@virginia.edu>2022-05-23 13:16:10 -0600
committerkernelmethod <wss2ec@virginia.edu>2022-05-23 13:16:10 -0600
commit9fdfc37fcc240cc329bd0c6383aa84d18daea61a (patch)
treeb88e15b906c0e098f4f978a9b9e8a132c0d47f60 /docker
parent065ddfafd19bc802a7c7b6c5e2a601fb42b8150c (diff)
downloadsudo-9fdfc37fcc240cc329bd0c6383aa84d18daea61a.tar.gz
Add an APPARMOR_PROFILE user spec option to sudoers
sudoers now supports an APPARMOR_PROFILE option, which can be specified as e.g. alice ALL=(ALL:ALL) APPARMOR_PROFILE=foo ALL The line above says "user alice can run any command as any user/group, under confinement by the AppArmor profile 'foo'." Profiles can be specified in any way that complies with the rules of aa_change_profile(2). For instance, the sudoers configuration alice ALL=(ALL:ALL) APPARMOR_PROFILE=unconfined ALL allows alice to run any command unconfined (i.e., without an AppArmor profile), while alice ALL=(ALL:ALL) APPARMOR_PROFILE=foo//&bar ALL tells sudoers that alice can run any command under the stacked AppArmor profiles 'foo' and 'bar'. The intention of this option is to give sysadmins on Linux distros supporting AppArmor better options for fine-grained access control. Among other things, this option can enforce mandatory access control (MAC) over the operations that a privileged user is able to perform to ensure that they cannot privesc past the boundaries of a specified profile. It can also be used to limit which users are able to get unconfined system access, by enforcing a default AppArmor profile on all users and then specifying 'APPARMOR_PROFILE=unconfined' for a privileged subset of users.
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