build-sys: use #if Y instead of #ifdef Y everywhere

The advantage is that is the name is mispellt, cpp will warn us.

$ git grep -Ee "conf.set\('(HAVE|ENABLE)_" -l|xargs sed -r -i "s/conf.set\('(HAVE|ENABLE)_/conf.set10('\1_/"
$ git grep -Ee '#ifn?def (HAVE|ENABLE)' -l|xargs sed -r -i 's/#ifdef (HAVE|ENABLE)/#if \1/; s/#ifndef (HAVE|ENABLE)/#if ! \1/;'
$ git grep -Ee 'if.*defined\(HAVE' -l|xargs sed -i -r 's/defined\((HAVE_[A-Z0-9_]*)\)/\1/g'
$ git grep -Ee 'if.*defined\(ENABLE' -l|xargs sed -i -r 's/defined\((ENABLE_[A-Z0-9_]*)\)/\1/g'
+ manual changes to meson.build

squash! build-sys: use #if Y instead of #ifdef Y everywhere

v2:
- fix incorrect setting of HAVE_LIBIDN2

16 files changed, 74 insertions, 74 deletions

diff --git a/src/core/audit-fd.c b/src/core/audit-fd.c
index bc421a4343..6207f8185e 100644
--- a/src/core/audit-fd.c
+++ b/src/core/audit-fd.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 
 #include "audit-fd.h"
 
-#ifdef HAVE_AUDIT
+#if HAVE_AUDIT
 
 #include <libaudit.h>
 #include <stdbool.h>
diff --git a/src/core/dbus-execute.c b/src/core/dbus-execute.c
index 1a388f5592..e0aa9fdd82 100644
--- a/src/core/dbus-execute.c
+++ b/src/core/dbus-execute.c
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 
 #include <sys/prctl.h>
 
-#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
 #include <seccomp.h>
 #endif
 
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
 #include "path-util.h"
 #include "process-util.h"
 #include "rlimit-util.h"
-#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
 #include "seccomp-util.h"
 #endif
 #include "securebits-util.h"
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ static int property_get_syscall_filter(
         _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL;
         int r;
 
-#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
         Iterator i;
         void *id;
 #endif
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ static int property_get_syscall_filter(
         if (r < 0)
                 return r;
 
-#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
         SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_filter, i) {
                 char *name;
 
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ static int property_get_syscall_archs(
         _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL;
         int r;
 
-#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
         Iterator i;
         void *id;
 #endif
@@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ static int property_get_syscall_archs(
         assert(reply);
         assert(c);
 
-#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
         SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_archs, i) {
                 const char *name;
 
@@ -1185,7 +1185,7 @@ int bus_exec_context_set_transient_property(
 
                 return 1;
 
-#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
 
         } else if (streq(name, "SystemCallFilter")) {
                 int whitelist;
diff --git a/src/core/dbus.c b/src/core/dbus.c
index 6d3f714192..210b344cd3 100644
--- a/src/core/dbus.c
+++ b/src/core/dbus.c
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ failed:
         return 0;
 }
 
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
 static int mac_selinux_filter(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_bus_error *error) {
         Manager *m = userdata;
         const char *verb, *path;
@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ static int bus_setup_api_vtables(Manager *m, sd_bus *bus) {
         assert(m);
         assert(bus);
 
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
         r = sd_bus_add_filter(bus, NULL, mac_selinux_filter, m);
         if (r < 0)
                 return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to add SELinux access filter: %m");
diff --git a/src/core/execute.c b/src/core/execute.c
index e1c2a57cc6..2271a2876a 100644
--- a/src/core/execute.c
+++ b/src/core/execute.c
@@ -37,19 +37,19 @@
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <utmpx.h>
 
-#ifdef HAVE_PAM
+#if HAVE_PAM
 #include <security/pam_appl.h>
 #endif
 
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
 #include <selinux/selinux.h>
 #endif
 
-#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
 #include <seccomp.h>
 #endif
 
-#ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR
+#if HAVE_APPARMOR
 #include <sys/apparmor.h>
 #endif
 
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
 
 #include "af-list.h"
 #include "alloc-util.h"
-#ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR
+#if HAVE_APPARMOR
 #include "apparmor-util.h"
 #endif
 #include "async.h"
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@
 #include "process-util.h"
 #include "rlimit-util.h"
 #include "rm-rf.h"
-#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
 #include "seccomp-util.h"
 #endif
 #include "securebits.h"
@@ -1019,7 +1019,7 @@ static int enforce_user(const ExecContext *context, uid_t uid) {
         return 0;
 }
 
-#ifdef HAVE_PAM
+#if HAVE_PAM
 
 static int null_conv(
                 int num_msg,
@@ -1043,7 +1043,7 @@ static int setup_pam(
                 char ***env,
                 int fds[], unsigned n_fds) {
 
-#ifdef HAVE_PAM
+#if HAVE_PAM
 
         static const struct pam_conv conv = {
                 .conv = null_conv,
@@ -1318,7 +1318,7 @@ static bool context_has_no_new_privileges(const ExecContext *c) {
                 c->lock_personality;
 }
 
-#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
 
 static bool skip_seccomp_unavailable(const Unit* u, const char* msg) {
 
@@ -2688,13 +2688,13 @@ static int exec_child(
                 needs_setuid,           /* Do we need to do the actual setresuid()/setresgid() calls? */
                 needs_mount_namespace,  /* Do we need to set up a mount namespace for this kernel? */
                 needs_ambient_hack;     /* Do we need to apply the ambient capabilities hack? */
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
         bool use_selinux = false;
 #endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SMACK
+#if HAVE_SMACK
         bool use_smack = false;
 #endif
-#ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR
+#if HAVE_APPARMOR
         bool use_apparmor = false;
 #endif
         uid_t uid = UID_INVALID;
@@ -3048,13 +3048,13 @@ static int exec_child(
                  * present. The actual MAC context application will happen later, as late as possible, to avoid
                  * impacting our own code paths. */
 
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
                 use_selinux = mac_selinux_use();
 #endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SMACK
+#if HAVE_SMACK
                 use_smack = mac_smack_use();
 #endif
-#ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR
+#if HAVE_APPARMOR
                 use_apparmor = mac_apparmor_use();
 #endif
         }
@@ -3101,7 +3101,7 @@ static int exec_child(
         }
 
         if (needs_sandboxing) {
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
                 if (use_selinux && params->selinux_context_net && socket_fd >= 0) {
                         r = mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd, command->path, context->selinux_context, &mac_selinux_context_net);
                         if (r < 0) {
@@ -3223,7 +3223,7 @@ static int exec_child(
                  * syscalls that are subject to seccomp filtering, hence should probably be applied before the syscalls
                  * are restricted. */
 
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
                 if (use_selinux) {
                         char *exec_context = mac_selinux_context_net ?: context->selinux_context;
 
@@ -3237,7 +3237,7 @@ static int exec_child(
                 }
 #endif
 
-#ifdef HAVE_SMACK
+#if HAVE_SMACK
                 if (use_smack) {
                         r = setup_smack(context, command);
                         if (r < 0) {
@@ -3247,7 +3247,7 @@ static int exec_child(
                 }
 #endif
 
-#ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR
+#if HAVE_APPARMOR
                 if (use_apparmor && context->apparmor_profile) {
                         r = aa_change_onexec(context->apparmor_profile);
                         if (r < 0 && !context->apparmor_profile_ignore) {
@@ -3271,7 +3271,7 @@ static int exec_child(
                                 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to disable new privileges: %m");
                         }
 
-#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
                 r = apply_address_families(unit, context);
                 if (r < 0) {
                         *exit_status = EXIT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES;
@@ -4118,7 +4118,7 @@ void exec_context_dump(ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) {
                 prefix, yes_no(c->lock_personality));
 
         if (c->syscall_filter) {
-#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
                 Iterator j;
                 void *id;
                 bool first = true;
@@ -4131,7 +4131,7 @@ void exec_context_dump(ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) {
                 if (!c->syscall_whitelist)
                         fputc('~', f);
 
-#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
                 SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_filter, j) {
                         _cleanup_free_ char *name = NULL;
 
@@ -4149,7 +4149,7 @@ void exec_context_dump(ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) {
         }
 
         if (c->syscall_archs) {
-#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
                 Iterator j;
                 void *id;
 #endif
@@ -4158,7 +4158,7 @@ void exec_context_dump(ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) {
                         "%sSystemCallArchitectures:",
                         prefix);
 
-#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
                 SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_archs, j)
                         fprintf(f, " %s", strna(seccomp_arch_to_string(PTR_TO_UINT32(id) - 1)));
 #endif
diff --git a/src/core/ima-setup.c b/src/core/ima-setup.c
index 7b5c98a57c..1aaae9f49e 100644
--- a/src/core/ima-setup.c
+++ b/src/core/ima-setup.c
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
 #define IMA_POLICY_PATH "/etc/ima/ima-policy"
 
 int ima_setup(void) {
-#ifdef HAVE_IMA
+#if HAVE_IMA
         _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *input = NULL;
         _cleanup_close_ int imafd = -1;
         unsigned lineno = 0;
diff --git a/src/core/kmod-setup.c b/src/core/kmod-setup.c
index 30b42fffe5..066b959770 100644
--- a/src/core/kmod-setup.c
+++ b/src/core/kmod-setup.c
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 
-#ifdef HAVE_KMOD
+#if HAVE_KMOD
 #include <libkmod.h>
 #endif
 
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
 #include "macro.h"
 #include "string-util.h"
 
-#ifdef HAVE_KMOD
+#if HAVE_KMOD
 static void systemd_kmod_log(
                 void *data,
                 int priority,
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ static bool has_virtio_rng(void) {
 #endif
 
 int kmod_setup(void) {
-#ifdef HAVE_KMOD
+#if HAVE_KMOD
 
         static const struct {
                 const char *module;
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ int kmod_setup(void) {
                 /* this should never be a module */
                 { "unix",      "/proc/net/unix",            true,   true,    NULL      },
 
-#ifdef HAVE_LIBIPTC
+#if HAVE_LIBIPTC
                 /* netfilter is needed by networkd, nspawn among others, and cannot be autoloaded */
                 { "ip_tables", "/proc/net/ip_tables_names", false,  false,   NULL      },
 #endif
diff --git a/src/core/load-fragment.c b/src/core/load-fragment.c
index 2c3783a9f0..04170695c5 100644
--- a/src/core/load-fragment.c
+++ b/src/core/load-fragment.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/oom.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
 #include <seccomp.h>
 #endif
 #include <sched.h>
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
 #include "path-util.h"
 #include "process-util.h"
 #include "rlimit-util.h"
-#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
 #include "seccomp-util.h"
 #endif
 #include "securebits.h"
@@ -1246,7 +1246,7 @@ int config_parse_limit(
         return 0;
 }
 
-#ifdef HAVE_SYSV_COMPAT
+#if HAVE_SYSV_COMPAT
 int config_parse_sysv_priority(const char *unit,
                                const char *filename,
                                unsigned line,
@@ -2643,7 +2643,7 @@ int config_parse_documentation(const char *unit,
         return r;
 }
 
-#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
 
 static int syscall_filter_parse_one(
                 const char *unit,
@@ -4504,7 +4504,7 @@ void unit_dump_config_items(FILE *f) {
                 const ConfigParserCallback callback;
                 const char *rvalue;
         } table[] = {
-#if !defined(HAVE_SYSV_COMPAT) || !defined(HAVE_SECCOMP) || !defined(HAVE_PAM) || !defined(HAVE_SELINUX) || !defined(HAVE_SMACK) || !defined(HAVE_APPARMOR)
+#if !HAVE_SYSV_COMPAT || !HAVE_SECCOMP || !HAVE_PAM || !HAVE_SELINUX || !HAVE_SMACK || !HAVE_APPARMOR
                 { config_parse_warn_compat,           "NOTSUPPORTED" },
 #endif
                 { config_parse_int,                   "INTEGER" },
@@ -4537,7 +4537,7 @@ void unit_dump_config_items(FILE *f) {
                 { config_parse_exec,                  "PATH [ARGUMENT [...]]" },
                 { config_parse_service_type,          "SERVICETYPE" },
                 { config_parse_service_restart,       "SERVICERESTART" },
-#ifdef HAVE_SYSV_COMPAT
+#if HAVE_SYSV_COMPAT
                 { config_parse_sysv_priority,         "SYSVPRIORITY" },
 #endif
                 { config_parse_kill_mode,             "KILLMODE" },
@@ -4567,7 +4567,7 @@ void unit_dump_config_items(FILE *f) {
                 { config_parse_set_status,            "STATUS" },
                 { config_parse_service_sockets,       "SOCKETS" },
                 { config_parse_environ,               "ENVIRON" },
-#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
                 { config_parse_syscall_filter,        "SYSCALLS" },
                 { config_parse_syscall_archs,         "ARCHS" },
                 { config_parse_syscall_errno,         "ERRNO" },
@@ -4587,7 +4587,7 @@ void unit_dump_config_items(FILE *f) {
                 { config_parse_blockio_device_weight, "DEVICEWEIGHT" },
                 { config_parse_long,                  "LONG" },
                 { config_parse_socket_service,        "SERVICE" },
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
                 { config_parse_exec_selinux_context,  "LABEL" },
 #endif
                 { config_parse_job_mode,              "MODE" },
diff --git a/src/core/main.c b/src/core/main.c
index 2dfd48005b..60863d2eed 100644
--- a/src/core/main.c
+++ b/src/core/main.c
@@ -28,10 +28,10 @@
 #include <sys/reboot.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
 #include <seccomp.h>
 #endif
-#ifdef HAVE_VALGRIND_VALGRIND_H
+#if HAVE_VALGRIND_VALGRIND_H
 #include <valgrind/valgrind.h>
 #endif
 
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@
 #include "process-util.h"
 #include "raw-clone.h"
 #include "rlimit-util.h"
-#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
 #include "seccomp-util.h"
 #endif
 #include "selinux-setup.h"
@@ -717,7 +717,7 @@ static int parse_config_file(void) {
                 { "Manager", "RuntimeWatchdogSec",        config_parse_sec,              0, &arg_runtime_watchdog                  },
                 { "Manager", "ShutdownWatchdogSec",       config_parse_sec,              0, &arg_shutdown_watchdog                 },
                 { "Manager", "CapabilityBoundingSet",     config_parse_capability_set,   0, &arg_capability_bounding_set           },
-#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
                 { "Manager", "SystemCallArchitectures",   config_parse_syscall_archs,    0, &arg_syscall_archs                     },
 #endif
                 { "Manager", "TimerSlackNSec",            config_parse_nsec,             0, &arg_timer_slack_nsec                  },
@@ -1264,7 +1264,7 @@ oom:
 }
 
 static int enforce_syscall_archs(Set *archs) {
-#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
         int r;
 
         if (!is_seccomp_available())
@@ -1411,7 +1411,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
         struct rlimit saved_rlimit_nofile = RLIMIT_MAKE_CONST(0), saved_rlimit_memlock = RLIMIT_MAKE_CONST((rlim_t) -1);
         const char *error_message = NULL;
 
-#ifdef HAVE_SYSV_COMPAT
+#if HAVE_SYSV_COMPAT
         if (getpid_cached() != 1 && strstr(program_invocation_short_name, "init")) {
                 /* This is compatibility support for SysV, where
                  * calling init as a user is identical to telinit. */
@@ -2172,7 +2172,7 @@ finish:
         arg_serialization = safe_fclose(arg_serialization);
         fds = fdset_free(fds);
 
-#ifdef HAVE_VALGRIND_VALGRIND_H
+#if HAVE_VALGRIND_VALGRIND_H
         /* If we are PID 1 and running under valgrind, then let's exit
          * here explicitly. valgrind will only generate nice output on
          * exit(), not on exec(), hence let's do the former not the
diff --git a/src/core/manager.c b/src/core/manager.c
index 5c127e0848..a0d3c85ff1 100644
--- a/src/core/manager.c
+++ b/src/core/manager.c
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
 #include <sys/wait.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 
-#ifdef HAVE_AUDIT
+#if HAVE_AUDIT
 #include <libaudit.h>
 #endif
 
@@ -620,7 +620,7 @@ int manager_new(UnitFileScope scope, unsigned test_run_flags, Manager **_m) {
         m->default_timeout_stop_usec = DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_USEC;
         m->default_restart_usec = DEFAULT_RESTART_USEC;
 
-#ifdef ENABLE_EFI
+#if ENABLE_EFI
         if (MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM(m) && detect_container() <= 0)
                 boot_timestamps(&m->userspace_timestamp, &m->firmware_timestamp, &m->loader_timestamp);
 #endif
@@ -2457,7 +2457,7 @@ int manager_get_job_from_dbus_path(Manager *m, const char *s, Job **_j) {
 
 void manager_send_unit_audit(Manager *m, Unit *u, int type, bool success) {
 
-#ifdef HAVE_AUDIT
+#if HAVE_AUDIT
         _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL;
         const char *msg;
         int audit_fd, r;
diff --git a/src/core/mount-setup.c b/src/core/mount-setup.c
index b343bb7e09..676c82dcc9 100644
--- a/src/core/mount-setup.c
+++ b/src/core/mount-setup.c
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ typedef struct MountPoint {
  * fourth (securityfs) is needed by IMA to load a custom policy. The
  * other ones we can delay until SELinux and IMA are loaded. When
  * SMACK is enabled we need smackfs, too, so it's a fifth one. */
-#ifdef HAVE_SMACK
+#if HAVE_SMACK
 #define N_EARLY_MOUNT 5
 #else
 #define N_EARLY_MOUNT 4
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static const MountPoint mount_table[] = {
           NULL,          MNT_FATAL|MNT_IN_CONTAINER },
         { "securityfs",  "/sys/kernel/security",      "securityfs", NULL,                      MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV,
           NULL,          MNT_NONE                   },
-#ifdef HAVE_SMACK
+#if HAVE_SMACK
         { "smackfs",     "/sys/fs/smackfs",           "smackfs",    "smackfsdef=*",            MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV,
           mac_smack_use, MNT_FATAL                  },
         { "tmpfs",       "/dev/shm",                  "tmpfs",      "mode=1777,smackfsroot=*", MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME,
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ static const MountPoint mount_table[] = {
           NULL,          MNT_FATAL|MNT_IN_CONTAINER },
         { "devpts",      "/dev/pts",                  "devpts",     "mode=620,gid=" STRINGIFY(TTY_GID), MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC,
           NULL,          MNT_IN_CONTAINER           },
-#ifdef HAVE_SMACK
+#if HAVE_SMACK
         { "tmpfs",       "/run",                      "tmpfs",      "mode=755,smackfsroot=*",  MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME,
           mac_smack_use, MNT_FATAL                  },
 #endif
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ static const MountPoint mount_table[] = {
           cg_is_legacy_wanted, MNT_FATAL|MNT_IN_CONTAINER },
         { "pstore",      "/sys/fs/pstore",            "pstore",     NULL,                      MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV,
           NULL,          MNT_NONE                   },
-#ifdef ENABLE_EFI
+#if ENABLE_EFI
         { "efivarfs",    "/sys/firmware/efi/efivars", "efivarfs",   NULL,                      MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV,
           is_efi_boot,   MNT_NONE                   },
 #endif
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ int mount_cgroup_controllers(char ***join_controllers) {
         return 0;
 }
 
-#if defined(HAVE_SELINUX) || defined(HAVE_SMACK)
+#if HAVE_SELINUX || HAVE_SMACK
 static int nftw_cb(
                 const char *fpath,
                 const struct stat *sb,
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ int mount_setup(bool loaded_policy) {
         if (r < 0)
                 return r;
 
-#if defined(HAVE_SELINUX) || defined(HAVE_SMACK)
+#if HAVE_SELINUX || HAVE_SMACK
         /* Nodes in devtmpfs and /run need to be manually updated for
          * the appropriate labels, after mounting. The other virtual
          * API file systems like /sys and /proc do not need that, they
diff --git a/src/core/namespace.c b/src/core/namespace.c
index 932fbe5c54..6d74b8da67 100644
--- a/src/core/namespace.c
+++ b/src/core/namespace.c
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static const MountEntry protect_kernel_tunables_table[] = {
 
 /* ProtectKernelModules= option */
 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_modules_table[] = {
-#ifdef HAVE_SPLIT_USR
+#if HAVE_SPLIT_USR
         { "/lib/modules",        INACCESSIBLE, true  },
 #endif
         { "/usr/lib/modules",    INACCESSIBLE, true  },
diff --git a/src/core/selinux-access.c b/src/core/selinux-access.c
index 0f8a2d68e2..2db4189401 100644
--- a/src/core/selinux-access.c
+++ b/src/core/selinux-access.c
@@ -19,13 +19,13 @@
 
 #include "selinux-access.h"
 
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
 
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <selinux/avc.h>
 #include <selinux/selinux.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_AUDIT
+#if HAVE_AUDIT
 #include <libaudit.h>
 #endif
 
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ _printf_(2, 3) static int log_callback(int type, const char *fmt, ...) {
         va_list ap;
         const char *fmt2;
 
-#ifdef HAVE_AUDIT
+#if HAVE_AUDIT
         int fd;
 
         fd = get_audit_fd();
diff --git a/src/core/selinux-access.h b/src/core/selinux-access.h
index f46370d020..1f6a518a61 100644
--- a/src/core/selinux-access.h
+++ b/src/core/selinux-access.h
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
 
 int mac_selinux_generic_access_check(sd_bus_message *message, const char *path, const char *permission, sd_bus_error *error);
 
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
 
 #define mac_selinux_access_check(message, permission, error) \
         mac_selinux_generic_access_check((message), NULL, (permission), (error))
diff --git a/src/core/selinux-setup.c b/src/core/selinux-setup.c
index 527aa8add0..60361a5638 100644
--- a/src/core/selinux-setup.c
+++ b/src/core/selinux-setup.c
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
 #include <selinux/selinux.h>
 #endif
 
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 #include "string-util.h"
 #include "util.h"
 
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
 _printf_(2,3)
 static int null_log(int type, const char *fmt, ...) {
         return 0;
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ static int null_log(int type, const char *fmt, ...) {
 
 int mac_selinux_setup(bool *loaded_policy) {
 
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
         int enforce = 0;
         usec_t before_load, after_load;
         char *con;
diff --git a/src/core/smack-setup.c b/src/core/smack-setup.c
index 9f25364335..be32c43423 100644
--- a/src/core/smack-setup.c
+++ b/src/core/smack-setup.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
 #include "string-util.h"
 #include "util.h"
 
-#ifdef HAVE_SMACK
+#if HAVE_SMACK
 
 static int write_access2_rules(const char* srcdir) {
         _cleanup_close_ int load2_fd = -1, change_fd = -1;
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static int write_onlycap_list(void) {
 
 int mac_smack_setup(bool *loaded_policy) {
 
-#ifdef HAVE_SMACK
+#if HAVE_SMACK
 
         int r;
 
diff --git a/src/core/umount.c b/src/core/umount.c
index 7e9ea20388..813d257139 100644
--- a/src/core/umount.c
+++ b/src/core/umount.c
@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ static int delete_dm(dev_t devnum) {
 
 static bool nonunmountable_path(const char *path) {
         return path_equal(path, "/")
-#ifndef HAVE_SPLIT_USR
+#if ! HAVE_SPLIT_USR
                 || path_equal(path, "/usr")
 #endif
                 || path_startswith(path, "/run/initramfs");