diff options
author | Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net> | 2021-06-21 11:19:20 +0200 |
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committer | Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net> | 2021-07-08 09:30:29 +0200 |
commit | 21bc0b6fa1de44b520353b935bf14160f9f70591 (patch) | |
tree | 35a1b89f5d80ca8ae57ec8aaddaa95bcb1fd4d3d /src/shared/creds-util.c | |
parent | 8f860b4df0bf0c92b4b1bca242b70fe0b7ab1d48 (diff) | |
download | systemd-21bc0b6fa1de44b520353b935bf14160f9f70591.tar.gz |
creds-util: add infra for encrypting/decrypting credentials
Diffstat (limited to 'src/shared/creds-util.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/shared/creds-util.c | 876 |
1 files changed, 876 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/shared/creds-util.c b/src/shared/creds-util.c index 58076705e7..6c2d9dbc76 100644 --- a/src/shared/creds-util.c +++ b/src/shared/creds-util.c @@ -1,9 +1,30 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ +#include <sys/file.h> + +#if HAVE_OPENSSL +#include <openssl/err.h> +#endif + +#include "sd-id128.h" + +#include "blockdev-util.h" +#include "chattr-util.h" #include "creds-util.h" +#include "env-util.h" #include "fd-util.h" #include "fileio.h" +#include "fs-util.h" +#include "io-util.h" +#include "memory-util.h" +#include "mkdir.h" +#include "openssl-util.h" #include "path-util.h" +#include "random-util.h" +#include "sparse-endian.h" +#include "stat-util.h" +#include "tpm2-util.h" +#include "virt.h" bool credential_name_valid(const char *s) { /* We want that credential names are both valid in filenames (since that's our primary way to pass @@ -52,3 +73,858 @@ int read_credential(const char *name, void **ret, size_t *ret_size) { NULL, (char**) ret, ret_size); } + +#if HAVE_OPENSSL + +#define CREDENTIAL_HOST_SECRET_SIZE 4096 + +static const sd_id128_t credential_app_id = + SD_ID128_MAKE(d3,ac,ec,ba,0d,ad,4c,df,b8,c9,38,15,28,93,6c,58); + +struct credential_host_secret_format { + /* The hashed machine ID of the machine this belongs to. Why? We want to ensure that each machine + * gets its own secret, even if people forget to flush out this secret file. Hence we bind it to the + * machine ID, for which there's hopefully a better chance it will be flushed out. We use a hashed + * machine ID instead of the literal one, because it's trivial to, and it might be a good idea not + * being able to directly associate a secret key file with a host. */ + sd_id128_t machine_id; + + /* The actual secret key */ + uint8_t data[CREDENTIAL_HOST_SECRET_SIZE]; +} _packed_; + +static int make_credential_host_secret( + int dfd, + const sd_id128_t machine_id, + const char *fn, + void **ret_data, + size_t *ret_size) { + + struct credential_host_secret_format buf; + _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL; + _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1; + int r; + + assert(dfd >= 0); + assert(fn); + + fd = openat(dfd, ".", O_CLOEXEC|O_WRONLY|O_TMPFILE, 0400); + if (fd < 0) { + log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create temporary credential file with O_TMPFILE, proceeding without: %m"); + + if (asprintf(&t, "credential.secret.%016" PRIx64, random_u64()) < 0) + return -ENOMEM; + + fd = openat(dfd, t, O_CLOEXEC|O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_NOFOLLOW, 0400); + if (fd < 0) + return -errno; + } + + r = chattr_secret(fd, 0); + if (r < 0) + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set file attributes for secrets file, ignoring: %m"); + + buf = (struct credential_host_secret_format) { + .machine_id = machine_id, + }; + + r = genuine_random_bytes(buf.data, sizeof(buf.data), RANDOM_BLOCK); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + r = loop_write(fd, &buf, sizeof(buf), false); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + if (fsync(fd) < 0) { + r = -errno; + goto finish; + } + + if (t) { + r = rename_noreplace(dfd, t, dfd, fn); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + t = mfree(t); + } else if (linkat(fd, "", dfd, fn, AT_EMPTY_PATH) < 0) { + r = -errno; + goto finish; + } + + if (fsync(dfd) < 0) { + r = -errno; + goto finish; + } + + if (ret_data) { + void *copy; + + copy = memdup(buf.data, sizeof(buf.data)); + if (!copy) { + r = -ENOMEM; + goto finish; + } + + *ret_data = copy; + } + + if (ret_size) + *ret_size = sizeof(buf.data); + + r = 0; + +finish: + if (t && unlinkat(dfd, t, 0) < 0) + log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remove temporary credential key: %m"); + + explicit_bzero_safe(&buf, sizeof(buf)); + return r; +} + +int get_credential_host_secret(CredentialSecretFlags flags, void **ret, size_t *ret_size) { + _cleanup_free_ char *efn = NULL, *ep = NULL; + _cleanup_close_ int dfd = -1; + sd_id128_t machine_id; + const char *e, *fn, *p; + int r; + + r = sd_id128_get_machine_app_specific(credential_app_id, &machine_id); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + e = secure_getenv("SYSTEMD_CREDENTIAL_SECRET"); + if (e) { + if (!path_is_normalized(e)) + return -EINVAL; + if (!path_is_absolute(e)) + return -EINVAL; + + r = path_extract_directory(e, &ep); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = path_extract_filename(e, &efn); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + p = ep; + fn = efn; + } else { + p = "/var/lib/systemd"; + fn = "credential.secret"; + } + + (void) mkdir_p(p, 0755); + dfd = open(p, O_CLOEXEC|O_DIRECTORY|O_RDONLY); + if (dfd < 0) + return -errno; + + if (FLAGS_SET(flags, CREDENTIAL_SECRET_FAIL_ON_TEMPORARY_FS)) { + r = fd_is_temporary_fs(dfd); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0) + return -ENOMEDIUM; + } + + for (unsigned attempt = 0;; attempt++) { + _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) struct credential_host_secret_format *f = NULL; + _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1; + size_t l = 0; + ssize_t n = 0; + struct stat st; + + if (attempt >= 3) /* Somebody is playing games with us */ + return -EIO; + + fd = openat(dfd, fn, O_CLOEXEC|O_RDONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_NOFOLLOW); + if (fd < 0) { + if (errno != ENOENT || !FLAGS_SET(flags, CREDENTIAL_SECRET_GENERATE)) + return -errno; + + r = make_credential_host_secret(dfd, machine_id, fn, ret, ret_size); + if (r == -EEXIST) { + log_debug_errno(r, "Credential secret was created while we were creating it. Trying to read new secret."); + continue; + } + if (r < 0) + return r; + + return 0; + } + + if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) + return -errno; + + r = stat_verify_regular(&st); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (st.st_nlink == 0) /* Deleted by now, try again */ + continue; + if (st.st_nlink > 1) + return -EPERM; /* Our deletion check won't work if hardlinked somewhere else */ + if ((st.st_mode & 07777) != 0400) /* Don't use file if not 0400 access mode */ + return -EPERM; + if (st.st_size > 16*1024*1024) + return -E2BIG; + l = st.st_size; + if (l < offsetof(struct credential_host_secret_format, data) + 1) + return -EINVAL; + + f = malloc(l+1); + if (!f) + return -ENOMEM; + + n = read(fd, f, l+1); + if (n < 0) + return -errno; + if ((size_t) n != l) /* What? The size changed? */ + return -EIO; + + if (sd_id128_equal(machine_id, f->machine_id)) { + size_t sz; + + if (FLAGS_SET(flags, CREDENTIAL_SECRET_WARN_NOT_ENCRYPTED)) { + r = fd_is_encrypted(fd); + if (r < 0) + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to determine if credential secret file '%s/%s' is encrypted.", p, fn); + else if (r == 0) + log_warning("Credential secret file '%s/%s' is not located on encrypted media, using anyway.", p, fn); + } + + sz = l - offsetof(struct credential_host_secret_format, data); + assert(sz > 0); + + if (ret) { + void *copy; + + copy = memdup(f->data, sz); + if (!copy) + return -ENOMEM; + + *ret = copy; + } + + if (ret_size) + *ret_size = sz; + + return 0; + } + + /* Hmm, this secret is from somewhere else. Let's delete the file. Let's first acquire a lock + * to ensure we are the only ones accessing the file while we delete it. */ + + if (flock(fd, LOCK_EX) < 0) + return -errno; + + /* Before we delete it check that the file is still linked into the file system */ + if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) + return -errno; + if (st.st_nlink == 0) /* Already deleted by now? */ + continue; + if (st.st_nlink != 1) /* Safety check, someone is playing games with us */ + return -EPERM; + + if (unlinkat(dfd, fn, 0) < 0) + return -errno; + + /* And now try again */ + } +} + +/* Construction is like this: + * + * A symmetric encryption key is derived from: + * + * 1. Either the "host" key (a key stored in /var/lib/credential.secret) + * + * 2. A key generated by letting the TPM2 calculate an HMAC hash of some nonce we pass to it, keyed + * by a key derived from its internal seed key. + * + * 3. The concatenation of the above. + * + * The above is hashed with SHA256 which is then used as encryption key for AES256-GCM. The encrypted + * credential is a short (unencrypted) header describing which of the three keys to use, the IV to use for + * AES256-GCM and some more meta information (sizes of certain objects) that is strictly speaking redundant, + * but kinda nice to have since we can have a more generic parser. If the TPM2 key is used this is followed + * by another (unencrypted) header, with information about the TPM2 policy used (specifically: the PCR mask + * to bind against, and a hash of the resulting policy — the latter being redundant, but speeding up things a + * bit, since we can more quickly refuse PCR state), followed by a sealed/exported TPM2 HMAC key. This is + * then followed by the encrypted data, which begins with a metadata header (which contains validity + * timestamps as well as the credential name), followed by the actual credential payload. The file ends in + * the AES256-GCM tag. To make things simple, the AES256-GCM AAD covers the main and the TPM2 header in + * full. This means the whole file is either protected by AAD, or is ciphertext, or is the tag. No + * unprotected data is included. + */ + +struct _packed_ encrypted_credential_header { + sd_id128_t id; + le32_t key_size; + le32_t block_size; + le32_t iv_size; + le32_t tag_size; + uint8_t iv[]; + /* Followed by NUL bytes until next 8 byte boundary */ +}; + +struct _packed_ tpm2_credential_header { + le64_t pcr_mask; + le32_t blob_size; + le32_t policy_hash_size; + uint8_t policy_hash_and_blob[]; + /* Followed by NUL bytes until next 8 byte boundary */ +}; + +struct _packed_ metadata_credential_header { + le64_t timestamp; + le64_t not_after; + le32_t name_size; + char name[]; + /* Followed by NUL bytes until next 8 byte boundary */ +}; + +/* Some generic limit for parts of the encrypted credential for which we don't know the right size ahead of + * time, but where we are really sure it won't be larger than this. Should be larger than any possible IV, + * padding, tag size and so on. This is purely used for early filtering out of invalid sizes. */ +#define CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX (16U*1024U) + +static int sha256_hash_host_and_tpm2_key( + const void *host_key, + size_t host_key_size, + const void *tpm2_key, + size_t tpm2_key_size, + uint8_t ret[static SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]) { + + SHA256_CTX sha256_context; + + assert(host_key_size == 0 || host_key); + assert(tpm2_key_size == 0 || tpm2_key); + assert(ret); + + /* Combines the host key and the TPM2 HMAC hash into a SHA256 hash value we'll use as symmetric encryption key. */ + + if (SHA256_Init(&sha256_context) != 1) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to initial SHA256 context."); + + if (host_key && SHA256_Update(&sha256_context, host_key, host_key_size) != 1) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to hash host key."); + + if (tpm2_key && SHA256_Update(&sha256_context, tpm2_key, tpm2_key_size) != 1) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to hash TPM2 key."); + + if (SHA256_Final(ret, &sha256_context) != 1) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to finalize SHA256 hash."); + + return 0; +} + +int encrypt_credential_and_warn( + sd_id128_t with_key, + const char *name, + usec_t timestamp, + usec_t not_after, + const char *tpm2_device, + uint32_t tpm2_pcr_mask, + const void *input, + size_t input_size, + void **ret, + size_t *ret_size) { + + _cleanup_(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_freep) EVP_CIPHER_CTX *context = NULL; + _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *host_key = NULL, *tpm2_key = NULL; + size_t host_key_size = 0, tpm2_key_size = 0, tpm2_blob_size = 0, tpm2_policy_hash_size = 0, output_size, p, ml; + _cleanup_free_ void *tpm2_blob = NULL, *tpm2_policy_hash = NULL, *iv = NULL, *output = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ struct metadata_credential_header *m = NULL; + struct encrypted_credential_header *h; + int ksz, bsz, ivsz, tsz, added, r; + uint8_t md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + const EVP_CIPHER *cc; +#if HAVE_TPM2 + bool try_tpm2 = false; +#endif + sd_id128_t id; + + assert(input || input_size == 0); + assert(ret); + assert(ret_size); + + if (name && !credential_name_valid(name)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Invalid credential name: %s", name); + + if (not_after != USEC_INFINITY && timestamp != USEC_INFINITY && not_after < timestamp) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Credential is invalidated before it is valid (" USEC_FMT " < " USEC_FMT ").", not_after, timestamp); + + if (DEBUG_LOGGING) { + char buf[FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_MAX]; + + if (name) + log_debug("Including credential name '%s' in encrypted credential.", name); + if (timestamp != USEC_INFINITY) + log_debug("Including timestamp '%s' in encrypted credential.", format_timestamp(buf, sizeof(buf), timestamp)); + if (not_after != USEC_INFINITY) + log_debug("Including not-after timestamp '%s' in encrypted credential.", format_timestamp(buf, sizeof(buf), not_after)); + } + + if (sd_id128_is_null(with_key) || + sd_id128_in_set(with_key, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC)) { + + r = get_credential_host_secret( + CREDENTIAL_SECRET_GENERATE| + CREDENTIAL_SECRET_WARN_NOT_ENCRYPTED| + (sd_id128_is_null(with_key) ? CREDENTIAL_SECRET_FAIL_ON_TEMPORARY_FS : 0), + &host_key, + &host_key_size); + if (r == -ENOMEDIUM && sd_id128_is_null(with_key)) + log_debug_errno(r, "Credential host secret location on temporary file system, not using."); + else if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to determine local credential host secret: %m"); + } + +#if HAVE_TPM2 + if (sd_id128_is_null(with_key)) { + /* If automatic mode is selected and we are running in a container, let's not try TPM2. OTOH + * if user picks TPM2 explicitly, let's always honour the request and try. */ + + r = detect_container(); + if (r < 0) + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to determine whether we are running in a container, ignoring: %m"); + else if (r > 0) + log_debug("Running in container, not attempting to use TPM2."); + + try_tpm2 = r <= 0; + } + + if (try_tpm2 || + sd_id128_in_set(with_key, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_HMAC, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC)) { + + r = tpm2_seal(tpm2_device, + tpm2_pcr_mask, + &tpm2_key, + &tpm2_key_size, + &tpm2_blob, + &tpm2_blob_size, + &tpm2_policy_hash, + &tpm2_policy_hash_size); + if (r < 0) { + if (!sd_id128_is_null(with_key)) + return r; + + log_debug_errno(r, "TPM2 sealing didn't work, not using: %m"); + } + + assert(tpm2_blob_size <= CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX); + assert(tpm2_policy_hash_size <= CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX); + } +#endif + + if (sd_id128_is_null(with_key)) { + /* Let's settle the key type in auto mode now. */ + + if (host_key && tpm2_key) + id = CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC; + else if (tpm2_key) + id = CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_HMAC; + else if (host_key) + id = CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST; + else + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOTRECOVERABLE), + "TPM2 not available and host key located on temporary file system, no encryption key available."); + } else + id = with_key; + + /* Let's now take the host key and the TPM2 key and hash it together, to use as encryption key for the data */ + r = sha256_hash_host_and_tpm2_key(host_key, host_key_size, tpm2_key, tpm2_key_size, md); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + assert_se(cc = EVP_aes_256_gcm()); + + ksz = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cc); + assert(ksz == sizeof(md)); + + bsz = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(cc); + assert(bsz > 0); + assert((size_t) bsz <= CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX); + + ivsz = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cc); + if (ivsz > 0) { + assert((size_t) ivsz <= CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX); + + iv = malloc(ivsz); + if (!iv) + return log_oom(); + + r = genuine_random_bytes(iv, ivsz, RANDOM_BLOCK); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to acquired randomized IV: %m"); + } + + tsz = 16; /* FIXME: On OpenSSL 3 there is EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_tag_length(), until then let's hardcode this */ + + context = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + if (!context) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOMEM), "Failed to allocate encryption object: %s", + ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + + if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(context, cc, NULL, md, iv) != 1) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to initialize encryption context: %s", + ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + + /* Just an upper estimate */ + output_size = + ALIGN8(offsetof(struct encrypted_credential_header, iv) + ivsz) + + ALIGN8(tpm2_key ? offsetof(struct tpm2_credential_header, policy_hash_and_blob) + tpm2_blob_size + tpm2_policy_hash_size : 0) + + ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name) + strlen_ptr(name)) + + input_size + 2U * (size_t) bsz + + tsz; + + output = malloc0(output_size); + if (!output) + return log_oom(); + + h = (struct encrypted_credential_header*) output; + h->id = id; + h->block_size = htole32(bsz); + h->key_size = htole32(ksz); + h->tag_size = htole32(tsz); + h->iv_size = htole32(ivsz); + memcpy(h->iv, iv, ivsz); + + p = ALIGN8(offsetof(struct encrypted_credential_header, iv) + ivsz); + + if (tpm2_key) { + struct tpm2_credential_header *t; + + t = (struct tpm2_credential_header*) ((uint8_t*) output + p); + t->pcr_mask = htole64(tpm2_pcr_mask); + t->blob_size = htole32(tpm2_blob_size); + t->policy_hash_size = htole32(tpm2_policy_hash_size); + memcpy(t->policy_hash_and_blob, tpm2_blob, tpm2_blob_size); + memcpy(t->policy_hash_and_blob + tpm2_blob_size, tpm2_policy_hash, tpm2_policy_hash_size); + + p += ALIGN8(offsetof(struct tpm2_credential_header, policy_hash_and_blob) + tpm2_blob_size + tpm2_policy_hash_size); + } + + /* Pass the encrypted + TPM2 header as AAD */ + if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(context, NULL, &added, output, p) != 1) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to write AAD data: %s", + ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + + /* Now construct the metadata header */ + ml = strlen_ptr(name); + m = malloc0(ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name) + ml)); + if (!m) + return log_oom(); + + m->timestamp = htole64(timestamp); + m->not_after = htole64(not_after); + m->name_size = htole32(ml); + memcpy_safe(m->name, name, ml); + + /* And encrypt the metadata header */ + if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(context, (uint8_t*) output + p, &added, (const unsigned char*) m, ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name) + ml)) != 1) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to encrypt metadata header: %s", + ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + + assert(added >= 0); + assert((size_t) added <= output_size - p); + p += added; + + /* Then encrypt the plaintext */ + if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(context, (uint8_t*) output + p, &added, input, input_size) != 1) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to encrypt data: %s", + ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + + assert(added >= 0); + assert((size_t) added <= output_size - p); + p += added; + + /* Finalize */ + if (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(context, (uint8_t*) output + p, &added) != 1) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to finalize data encryption: %s", + ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + + assert(added >= 0); + assert((size_t) added <= output_size - p); + p += added; + + assert(p <= output_size - tsz); + + /* Append tag */ + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(context, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, tsz, (uint8_t*) output + p) != 1) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to get tag: %s", + ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + + p += tsz; + assert(p <= output_size); + + if (DEBUG_LOGGING) { + size_t base64_size; + + base64_size = DIV_ROUND_UP(p * 4, 3); /* Include base64 size increase in debug output */ + + log_debug("Input of %zu bytes grew to output of %zu bytes (+%2zu%%).", input_size, base64_size, base64_size * 100 / input_size - 100); + } + + *ret = TAKE_PTR(output); + *ret_size = p; + + return 0; +} + +int decrypt_credential_and_warn( + const char *validate_name, + usec_t validate_timestamp, + const char *tpm2_device, + const void *input, + size_t input_size, + void **ret, + size_t *ret_size) { + + _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *host_key = NULL, *tpm2_key = NULL, *plaintext = NULL; + _cleanup_(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_freep) EVP_CIPHER_CTX *context = NULL; + size_t host_key_size = 0, tpm2_key_size = 0, plaintext_size, p, hs; + struct encrypted_credential_header *h; + struct metadata_credential_header *m; + uint8_t md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + bool with_tpm2, with_host_key; + const EVP_CIPHER *cc; + int r, added; + + assert(input || input_size == 0); + assert(ret); + assert(ret_size); + + h = (struct encrypted_credential_header*) input; + + /* The ID must fit in, for the current and all future formats */ + if (input_size < sizeof(h->id)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Encrypted file too short."); + + with_host_key = sd_id128_in_set(h->id, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC); + with_tpm2 = sd_id128_in_set(h->id, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_HMAC, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC); + + if (!with_host_key && !with_tpm2) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Unknown encryption format, or corrupted data: %m"); + + /* Now we know the minimum header size */ + if (input_size < offsetof(struct encrypted_credential_header, iv)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Encrypted file too short."); + + /* Verify some basic header values */ + if (le32toh(h->key_size) != sizeof(md)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected key size in header."); + if (le32toh(h->block_size) <= 0 || le32toh(h->block_size) > CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected block size in header."); + if (le32toh(h->iv_size) > CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "IV size too large."); + if (le32toh(h->tag_size) != 16) /* FIXME: On OpenSSL 3, let's verify via EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_tag_length() */ + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected tag size in header."); + + /* Ensure we have space for the full header now (we don't know the size of the name hence this is a + * lower limit only) */ + if (input_size < + ALIGN8(offsetof(struct encrypted_credential_header, iv) + le32toh(h->iv_size)) + + ALIGN8((with_tpm2 ? offsetof(struct tpm2_credential_header, policy_hash_and_blob) : 0)) + + ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name)) + + le32toh(h->tag_size)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Encrypted file too short."); + + p = ALIGN8(offsetof(struct encrypted_credential_header, iv) + le32toh(h->iv_size)); + + if (with_tpm2) { +#if HAVE_TPM2 + struct tpm2_credential_header* t = (struct tpm2_credential_header*) ((uint8_t*) input + p); + + if (le64toh(t->pcr_mask) >= (UINT64_C(1) << TPM2_PCRS_MAX)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "TPM2 PCR mask out of range."); + if (le32toh(t->blob_size) > CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected TPM2 blob size."); + if (le32toh(t->policy_hash_size) > CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected TPM2 policy hash size."); + + /* Ensure we have space for the full TPM2 header now (still don't know the name, and its size + * though, hence still just a lower limit test only) */ + if (input_size < + ALIGN8(offsetof(struct encrypted_credential_header, iv) + le32toh(h->iv_size)) + + ALIGN8(offsetof(struct tpm2_credential_header, policy_hash_and_blob) + le32toh(t->blob_size) + le32toh(t->policy_hash_size)) + + ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name)) + + le32toh(h->tag_size)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Encrypted file too short."); + + r = tpm2_unseal(tpm2_device, + le64toh(t->pcr_mask), + t->policy_hash_and_blob, + le32toh(t->blob_size), + t->policy_hash_and_blob + le32toh(t->blob_size), + le32toh(t->policy_hash_size), + &tpm2_key, + &tpm2_key_size); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + p += ALIGN8(offsetof(struct tpm2_credential_header, policy_hash_and_blob) + + le32toh(t->blob_size) + + le32toh(t->policy_hash_size)); +#else + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Credential requires TPM2 support, but TPM2 support not available."); +#endif + } + + if (with_host_key) { + r = get_credential_host_secret( + 0, + &host_key, + &host_key_size); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to determine local credential key: %m"); + } + + sha256_hash_host_and_tpm2_key(host_key, host_key_size, tpm2_key, tpm2_key_size, md); + + assert_se(cc = EVP_aes_256_gcm()); + + /* Make sure cipher expectations match the header */ + if (EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cc) != (int) le32toh(h->key_size)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected key size in header."); + if (EVP_CIPHER_block_size(cc) != (int) le32toh(h->block_size)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected block size in header."); + + context = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + if (!context) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOMEM), "Failed to allocate decryption object: %s", + ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + + if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(context, cc, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 1) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to initialize decryption context: %s", + ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(context, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, le32toh(h->iv_size), NULL) != 1) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to set IV size on decryption context: %s", + ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + + if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(context, NULL, NULL, md, h->iv) != 1) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to set IV and key: %s", + ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + + if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(context, NULL, &added, input, p) != 1) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to write AAD data: %s", + ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + + plaintext = malloc(input_size - p - le32toh(h->tag_size)); + if (!plaintext) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (EVP_DecryptUpdate( + context, + plaintext, + &added, + (uint8_t*) input + p, + input_size - p - le32toh(h->tag_size)) != 1) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to decrypt data: %s", + ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + + assert(added >= 0); + assert((size_t) added <= input_size - p - le32toh(h->tag_size)); + plaintext_size = added; + + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(context, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, le32toh(h->tag_size), (uint8_t*) input + input_size - le32toh(h->tag_size)) != 1) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to set tag: %s", + ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + + if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(context, (uint8_t*) plaintext + plaintext_size, &added) != 1) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Decryption failed (incorrect key?): %s", + ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + + plaintext_size += added; + + if (plaintext_size < ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name))) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Metadata header incomplete."); + + m = plaintext; + + if (le64toh(m->timestamp) != USEC_INFINITY && + le64toh(m->not_after) != USEC_INFINITY && + le64toh(m->timestamp) >= le64toh(m->not_after)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Timestamps of credential are not in order, refusing."); + + if (le32toh(m->name_size) > CREDENTIAL_NAME_MAX) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Embedded credential name too long, refusing."); + + hs = ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name) + le32toh(m->name_size)); + if (plaintext_size < hs) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Metadata header incomplete."); + + if (le32toh(m->name_size) > 0) { + _cleanup_free_ char *embedded_name = NULL; + + if (memchr(m->name, 0, le32toh(m->name_size))) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Embedded credential name contains NUL byte, refusing."); + + embedded_name = memdup_suffix0(m->name, le32toh(m->name_size)); + if (!embedded_name) + return log_oom(); + + if (!credential_name_valid(embedded_name)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Embedded credential name is not valid, refusing."); + + if (validate_name && !streq(embedded_name, validate_name)) { + + r = getenv_bool_secure("SYSTEMD_CREDENTIAL_VALIDATE_NAME"); + if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO) + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse $SYSTEMD_CREDENTIAL_VALIDATE_NAME: %m"); + if (r != 0) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EREMOTE), "Embedded credential name '%s' does not match filename '%s', refusing.", embedded_name, validate_name); + + log_debug("Embedded credential name '%s' does not match expected name '%s', but configured to use credential anyway.", embedded_name, validate_name); + } + } + + if (validate_timestamp != USEC_INFINITY) { + if (le64toh(m->timestamp) != USEC_INFINITY && le64toh(m->timestamp) > validate_timestamp) + log_debug("Credential timestamp is from the future, assuming clock skew."); + + if (le64toh(m->not_after) != USEC_INFINITY && le64toh(m->not_after) < validate_timestamp) { + + r = getenv_bool_secure("SYSTEMD_CREDENTIAL_VALIDATE_NOT_AFTER"); + if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO) + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse $SYSTEMD_CREDENTIAL_VALIDATE_NOT_AFTER: %m"); + if (r != 0) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESTALE), "Credential's time passed, refusing to use."); + + log_debug("Credential not-after timestamp has passed, but configured to use credential anyway."); + } + } + + if (ret) { + char *without_metadata; + + without_metadata = memdup((uint8_t*) plaintext + hs, plaintext_size - hs); + if (!without_metadata) + return log_oom(); + + *ret = without_metadata; + } + + if (ret_size) + *ret_size = plaintext_size - hs; + + return 0; +} + +#else + +int get_credential_host_secret(CredentialSecretFlags flags, void **ret, size_t *ret_size) { + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Support for encrypted credentials not available."); +} + +int encrypt_credential_and_warn(sd_id128_t with_key, const char *name, usec_t timestamp, usec_t not_after, const char *tpm2_device, uint32_t tpm2_pcr_mask, const void *input, size_t input_size, void **ret, size_t *ret_size) { + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Support for encrypted credentials not available."); +} + +int decrypt_credential_and_warn(const char *validate_name, usec_t validate_timestamp, const char *tpm2_device, const void *input, size_t input_size, void **ret, size_t *ret_size) { + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Support for encrypted credentials not available."); +} + +#endif |