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-rw-r--r--src/basic/user-util.c185
1 files changed, 110 insertions, 75 deletions
diff --git a/src/basic/user-util.c b/src/basic/user-util.c
index 68a924770b..cd870c4361 100644
--- a/src/basic/user-util.c
+++ b/src/basic/user-util.c
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
#include <unistd.h>
#include <utmp.h>
+#include "sd-messages.h"
+
#include "alloc-util.h"
#include "fd-util.h"
#include "fileio.h"
@@ -576,92 +578,125 @@ int take_etc_passwd_lock(const char *root) {
return fd;
}
-bool valid_user_group_name_full(const char *u, bool strict) {
+bool valid_user_group_name(const char *u, ValidUserFlags flags) {
const char *i;
- long sz;
- bool warned = false;
- /* Checks if the specified name is a valid user/group name. Also see POSIX IEEE Std 1003.1-2008, 2016 Edition,
- * 3.437. We are a bit stricter here however. Specifically we deviate from POSIX rules:
- *
- * - We require that names fit into the appropriate utmp field
- * - We don't allow empty user names
- * - No dots in the first character
+ /* Checks if the specified name is a valid user/group name. There are two flavours of this call:
+ * strict mode is the default which is POSIX plus some extra rules; and relaxed mode where we accept
+ * pretty much everything except the really worst offending names.
*
- * If strict==true, additionally:
- * - We don't allow any dots (this conflicts with chown syntax which permits dots as user/group name separator)
- * - We don't allow a digit as the first character
- *
- * Note that other systems are even more restrictive, and don't permit underscores or uppercase characters.
- */
+ * Whenever we synthesize users ourselves we should use the strict mode. But when we process users
+ * created by other stuff, let's be more liberal. */
- if (isempty(u))
+ if (isempty(u)) /* An empty user name is never valid */
return false;
- if (!(u[0] >= 'a' && u[0] <= 'z') &&
- !(u[0] >= 'A' && u[0] <= 'Z') &&
- !(u[0] >= '0' && u[0] <= '9' && !strict) &&
- u[0] != '_')
- return false;
-
- bool only_digits_seen = u[0] >= '0' && u[0] <= '9';
-
- if (only_digits_seen) {
- log_warning("User or group name \"%s\" starts with a digit, accepting for compatibility.", u);
- warned = true;
- }
-
- for (i = u+1; *i; i++) {
- if (((*i >= 'a' && *i <= 'z') ||
- (*i >= 'A' && *i <= 'Z') ||
- (*i >= '0' && *i <= '9') ||
- IN_SET(*i, '_', '-'))) {
- if (!(*i >= '0' && *i <= '9'))
- only_digits_seen = false;
- continue;
- }
-
- if (*i == '.' && !strict) {
- if (!warned) {
- log_warning("Bad user or group name \"%s\", accepting for compatibility.", u);
- warned = true;
- }
-
- continue;
- }
-
- return false;
+ if (parse_uid(u, NULL) >= 0) /* Something that parses as numeric UID string is valid exactly when the
+ * flag for it is set */
+ return FLAGS_SET(flags, VALID_USER_ALLOW_NUMERIC);
+
+ if (FLAGS_SET(flags, VALID_USER_RELAX)) {
+
+ /* In relaxed mode we just check very superficially. Apparently SSSD and other stuff is
+ * extremely liberal (way too liberal if you ask me, even inserting "@" in user names, which
+ * is bound to cause problems for example when used with an MTA), hence only filter the most
+ * obvious cases, or where things would result in an invalid entry if such a user name would
+ * show up in /etc/passwd (or equivalent getent output).
+ *
+ * Note that we stepped far out of POSIX territory here. It's not our fault though, but
+ * SSSD's, Samba's and everybody else who ignored POSIX on this. (I mean, I am happy to step
+ * outside of POSIX' bounds any day, but I must say in this case I probably wouldn't
+ * have...) */
+
+ if (startswith(u, " ") || endswith(u, " ")) /* At least expect whitespace padding is removed
+ * at front and back (accept in the middle, since
+ * that's apparently a thing on Windows). Note
+ * that this also blocks usernames consisting of
+ * whitespace only. */
+ return false;
+
+ if (!utf8_is_valid(u)) /* We want to synthesize JSON from this, hence insist on UTF-8 */
+ return false;
+
+ if (string_has_cc(u, NULL)) /* CC characters are just dangerous (and \n in particular is the
+ * record separator in /etc/passwd), so we can't allow that. */
+ return false;
+
+ if (strpbrk(u, ":/")) /* Colons are the field separator in /etc/passwd, we can't allow
+ * that. Slashes are special to file systems paths and user names
+ * typically show up in the file system as home directories, hence
+ * don't allow slashes. */
+ return false;
+
+ if (in_charset(u, "0123456789")) /* Don't allow fully numeric strings, they might be confused
+ * with with UIDs (note that this test is more broad than
+ * the parse_uid() test above, as it will cover more than
+ * the 32bit range, and it will detect 65535 (which is in
+ * invalid UID, even though in the unsigned 32 bit range) */
+ return false;
+
+ if (u[0] == '-' && in_charset(u + 1, "0123456789")) /* Don't allow negative fully numeric
+ * strings either. After all some people
+ * write 65535 as -1 (even though that's
+ * not even true on 32bit uid_t
+ * anyway) */
+ return false;
+
+ if (dot_or_dot_dot(u)) /* User names typically become home directory names, and these two are
+ * special in that context, don't allow that. */
+ return false;
+
+ /* Compare with strict result and warn if result doesn't match */
+ if (FLAGS_SET(flags, VALID_USER_WARN) && !valid_user_group_name(u, 0))
+ log_struct(LOG_NOTICE,
+ "MESSAGE=Accepting user/group name '%s', which does not match strict user/group name rules.", u,
+ "USER_GROUP_NAME=%s", u,
+ "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_UNSAFE_USER_NAME_STR);
+
+ /* Note that we make no restrictions on the length in relaxed mode! */
+ } else {
+ long sz;
+ size_t l;
+
+ /* Also see POSIX IEEE Std 1003.1-2008, 2016 Edition, 3.437. We are a bit stricter here
+ * however. Specifically we deviate from POSIX rules:
+ *
+ * - We don't allow empty user names (see above)
+ * - We require that names fit into the appropriate utmp field
+ * - We don't allow any dots (this conflicts with chown syntax which permits dots as user/group name separator)
+ * - We don't allow dashes or digit as the first character
+ *
+ * Note that other systems are even more restrictive, and don't permit underscores or uppercase characters.
+ */
+
+ if (!(u[0] >= 'a' && u[0] <= 'z') &&
+ !(u[0] >= 'A' && u[0] <= 'Z') &&
+ u[0] != '_')
+ return false;
+
+ for (i = u+1; *i; i++)
+ if (!(*i >= 'a' && *i <= 'z') &&
+ !(*i >= 'A' && *i <= 'Z') &&
+ !(*i >= '0' && *i <= '9') &&
+ !IN_SET(*i, '_', '-'))
+ return false;
+
+ l = i - u;
+
+ sz = sysconf(_SC_LOGIN_NAME_MAX);
+ assert_se(sz > 0);
+
+ if (l > (size_t) sz)
+ return false;
+ if (l > FILENAME_MAX)
+ return false;
+ if (l > UT_NAMESIZE - 1)
+ return false;
}
- if (only_digits_seen)
- return false;
-
- sz = sysconf(_SC_LOGIN_NAME_MAX);
- assert_se(sz > 0);
-
- if ((size_t) (i-u) > (size_t) sz)
- return false;
-
- if ((size_t) (i-u) > UT_NAMESIZE - 1)
- return false;
-
return true;
}
-bool valid_user_group_name_or_id_full(const char *u, bool strict) {
-
- /* Similar as above, but is also fine with numeric UID/GID specifications, as long as they are in the
- * right range, and not the invalid user ids. */
-
- if (isempty(u))
- return false;
-
- if (parse_uid(u, NULL) >= 0)
- return true;
-
- return valid_user_group_name_full(u, strict);
-}
-
bool valid_gecos(const char *d) {
if (!d)
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