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Now that the random seed is used on virtualized systems, there's no
point in having a random-seed-mode toggle switch. Let's just always
require it now, with the existing logic already being there to allow not
having it if EFI itself has an RNG. In other words, the logic for this
can now be automatic.
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Removing the virtualization check might not be the worst thing in the
world, and would potentially get many, many more systems properly seeded
rather than not seeded. There are a few reasons to consider this:
- In most QEMU setups and most guides on how to setup QEMU, a separate
pflash file is used for nvram variables, and this generally isn't
copied around.
- We're now hashing in a timestamp, which should provide some level of
differentiation, given that EFI_TIME has a nanoseconds field.
- The kernel itself will additionally hash in: a high resolution time
stamp, a cycle counter, RDRAND output, the VMGENID uniquely
identifying the virtual machine, any other seeds from the hypervisor
(like from FDT or setup_data).
- During early boot, the RNG is reseeded quite frequently to account for
the importance of early differentiation.
So maybe the mitigating factors make the actual feared problem
significantly less likely and therefore the pros of having file-based
seeding might outweigh the cons of weird misconfigured setups having a
hypothetical problem on first boot.
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Rather than passing seeds up to userspace via EFI variables, pass seeds
directly to the kernel's EFI stub loader, via LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID.
EFI variables can potentially leak and suffer from forward secrecy
issues, and processing these with userspace means that they are
initialized much too late in boot to be useful. In contrast,
LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID uses EFI configuration tables, and so
is hidden from userspace entirely, and is parsed extremely early on by
the kernel, so that every single call to get_random_bytes() by the
kernel is seeded.
In order to do this properly, we use a bit more robust hashing scheme,
and make sure that each input is properly memzeroed out after use. The
scheme is:
key = HASH(LABEL || sizeof(input1) || input1 || ... || sizeof(inputN) || inputN)
new_disk_seed = HASH(key || 0)
seed_for_linux = HASH(key || 1)
The various inputs are:
- LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID from prior bootloaders
- 256 bits of seed from EFI's RNG
- The (immutable) system token, from its EFI variable
- The prior on-disk seed
- The UEFI monotonic counter
- A timestamp
This also adjusts the secure boot semantics, so that the operation is
only aborted if it's not possible to get random bytes from EFI's RNG or
a prior boot stage. With the proper hashing scheme, this should make
boot seeds safe even on secure boot.
There is currently a bug in Linux's EFI stub in which if the EFI stub
manages to generate random bytes on its own using EFI's RNG, it will
ignore what the bootloader passes. That's annoying, but it means that
either way, via systemd-boot or via EFI stub's mechanism, the RNG *does*
get initialized in a good safe way. And this bug is now fixed in the
efi.git tree, and will hopefully be backported to older kernels.
As the kernel recommends, the resultant seeds are 256 bits and are
allocated using pool memory of type EfiACPIReclaimMemory, so that it
gets freed at the right moment in boot.
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With this the concept is now called the same way everywhere except where
historical info is relevant or where the other names are API.
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Allows for links to work both on systemd.io (or forks) and
when viewed on https://github.com/systemd/systemd/tree/main/docs
Note that the markdown links are converted by jekyll-relative-links[1]
to html. This plugin is enabled by default on github pages[2][3].
Due to a bug in jekyll-relative-links – see
https://github.com/benbalter/jekyll-relative-links/issues/61 –
we need to avoid line-wrapped links when using relative markdown links.
[1] https://github.com/benbalter/jekyll-relative-links
[2] https://github.blog/2016-12-05-relative-links-for-github-pages/
[3] https://docs.github.com/en/pages/setting-up-a-github-pages-site-with-jekyll/about-github-pages-and-jekyll#plugins
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/dev/urandom is seeded with RDRAND. Calling genuine_random_bytes(...,
..., 0) will use /dev/urandom as a last resort. Hence, we gain nothing
here by having our own RDRAND wrapper, because /dev/urandom already is
based on RDRAND output, even before /dev/urandom has fully initialized.
Furthermore, RDRAND is not actually fast! And on each successive
generation of new x86 CPUs, from both AMD and Intel, it just gets
slower.
This commit simplifies things by just using /dev/urandom in cases where
we before might use RDRAND, since /dev/urandom will always have RDRAND
mixed in as part of it.
And above where I say "/dev/urandom", what I actually mean is
GRND_INSECURE, which is the same thing but won't generate warnings in
dmesg.
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I have no idea if this is going to cause rendering problems, and it is fairly
hard to check. So let's just merge this, and if it github markdown processor
doesn't like it, revert.
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Fixes: #16245
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Add custom Jekyll theme, logo, webfont and .gitignore
FIXME: the markdown files have some H1 headers which need to be replaced
with H2
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