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IN C23, thread_local is a reserved keyword and we shall therefore
do nothing to redefine it. glibc has it defined for older standard
version with the right conditions.
v2 by Yu Watanabe:
Move the definition to missing_threads.h like the way we define e.g.
missing syscalls or missing definitions, and include it by the users.
Co-authored-by: Yu Watanabe <watanabe.yu+github@gmail.com>
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/bin/sh as a shell is punishing. There is no good reason to make
the occasional root login unpleasant.
Since /bin/sh is usually /bin/bash in compat mode, i.e. if one is
available, the other will be too, /bin/bash is almost as good as a default.
But to avoid a regression in the situation where /bin/bash (or
DEFAULT_USER_SHELL) is not installed, we check with access() and fall back
to /bin/sh. This should make this change in behaviour less risky.
(FWIW, e.g. Fedora/RHEL use /bin/bash as default for root.)
This is a follow-up of sorts for 53350c7bbade8c5f357aa3d1029ef9b2208ea675,
which added the default-user-shell option, but most likely with the idea
of using /bin/bash less ;)
Fixes #24369.
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This matches the changes pushed to Fedora [1,2].
[1] https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/RenameNobodyUser
[2] https://pagure.io/setup/c/f6fdb5ffc87fc8f1acc211867fef4e3f0856edfc
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This also avoids multiple evaluations in STRV_FOREACH_BACKWARDS()
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log_parse_environment() uses should_parse_proc_cmdline() to determine whether
it should parse settings from the kernel command line. But the checks that
should_parse_proc_cmdline() apply to the whole process, and we could get a positive
answer also when log_parse_environment() was called from one of the nss modules.
In case of nss-modules, we don't want to look at the kernel command line.
log_parse_environment_variables() that only looks at the environment variables
is split out and used in the nss modules.
Fixes #22020.
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log_parse_environment() stopped being a macro in 9fdee66f2d9.
As reported by @bauen1 in https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/22020,
the comment was out of date.
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Follow-up for 1e65eb8f9b7d567462030b2e625998d77677e636.
Fixes #21935.
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This also fixes the pointer assigned to the gr_mem element of struct group.
Fixes a bug introduced by 47fd7fa6c650d7a0ac41bc89747e3b866ffb9534.
Fixes #21935.
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LLVM 13 introduced `-Wunused-but-set-variable` diagnostic flag, which
trips over some intentionally set-but-not-used variables or variables
attached to cleanup handlers with side effects (`_cleanup_umask_`,
`_cleanup_(notify_on_cleanup)`, `_cleanup_(restore_sigsetp)`, etc.):
```
../src/basic/process-util.c:1257:46: error: variable 'saved_ssp' set but not used [-Werror,-Wunused-but-set-variable]
_cleanup_(restore_sigsetp) sigset_t *saved_ssp = NULL;
^
1 error generated.
```
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Jamie Bainbridge found an issue where glib's g_get_user_database_entry()
may crash after doing:
```
error = getpwnam_r (logname, &pwd, buffer, bufsize, &pw);
// ...
pw->pw_name[0] = g_ascii_toupper (pw->pw_name[0]);
```
in order to uppercase the first letter of the user's real name. This is
a glib bug, because there is a different codepath that gets the pwd from
vanilla getpwnam instead of getpwnam_r as shown here. When the pwd
struct is returned by getpwnam, its fields point to static data owned by
glibc/NSS, and so it must not be modified by the caller. After much
debugging, Jamie Bainbridge has fixed this in https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/2244
by making a copy of the data before modifying it, and that resolves all
problems for glib. Yay!
However, glib is crashing even when getpwnam_r is used instead of
getpwnam! According to getpwnam_r(3), the strings in the pwd struct are
supposed to be pointers into the buffer passed by the caller, so glib
should be able to safely edit it directly in this case, so long as it
doesn't try to increase the size of any of the strings.
Problem is various functions throughout nss-systemd.c return synthesized
records declared at the top of the file. These records are returned
directly and so contain pointers to static strings owned by
libsystemd-nss. systemd must instead copy all the strings into the
provided buffer.
This crash is reproducible if nss-systemd is listed first on the passwd
line in /etc/nsswitch.conf, and the application looks up one of the
synthesized user accounts "root" or "nobody", and finally the
application attempts to edit one of the strings in the returned struct.
All our synthesized records for the other struct types have the same
problem, so this commit fixes them all at once.
Fixes #20679
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getpwnam_r() guarantees that the strings in the struct passwd that it
returns are pointers into the buffer allocated by the application and
passed to getpwnam_r(). This means applications may choose to modify the
strings in place, as long as the length of the strings is not increased.
So it's wrong for us to return a static string here, we really do have
to copy it into the application-provided buffer like we do for all the
other strings.
This is only a theoretical problem since it would be very weird for an
application to modify the pw_passwd field, but I spotted this when
investigating a similar crash caused by glib editing a different field.
See also:
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/2244
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This ensures we not only synthesize regular paswd/group records of
userdb records, but shadow records as well. This should make sure that
userdb can be used as comprehensive superset of the classic
passwd/group/shadow/gshadow functionality.
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Setting the flags means we won#t try to read the data from /etc/shadow
when reading a user record, thus slightly making conversion quicker and
reducing the chance of generating MAC faults, because we needlessly
access a privileged resource. Previously, passing the flag didn't
matter, when converting our JSON records to NSS since the flag only had
an effect on whether to use NSS getspnam() and related calls or not. But
given that we turn off NSS anyway as backend for this conversion (since
we want to avoid NSS loops, where we turn NSS data to our JSON user
records, and then to NSS forever and ever) it was unnecessary to pass
it.
This changed in one of the previous commits however, where we added
support for reading user definitions from drop-in files, with separate
drop-in files for the shadow data.
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Let's use "exclude" for flags that really exclude records from our
lookup. Let's use "avoid" referring to concepts that when flag is set
we'll not use but we have a fallback path for that should yield the same
result. Let' use "suppress" for suppressing partial info, even if we
return the record otherwise.
So far we used "avoid" for all these cases, which was confusing.
Whiel we are at it, let's reassign the bits a bit, leaving some space
for bits follow-up commits are going to add.
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When we are queried for membership lists on a system that has exactly
zero, then we'll return ESRCH immediately instead of at EOF. Which is
OK, but we need to handle this in various places, and not get confused
by it.
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/etc/passwd + /etc/shadow
Let's add three defines for the 3 special cases of passwords.
Some of our tools used different values for the "locked"/"invalid" case,
let's settle on using "!*" which means the password is both locked *and*
invalid.
Other tools like to use "!!" for this case, which however is less than
ideal I think, since the this could also be a considered an entry with
an empty password, that can be enabled again by unlocking it twice.
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They both are both short and contain similar parts and various helper will be
shared between both parts of the code so it's easier to use a single file.
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Previously we'd used the existance of a specific AF_UNIX socket in the
abstract namespace as lock for disabling lookup recursions. (for
breaking out of the loop: userdb synthesized from nss → nss synthesized
from userdb → userdb synthesized from nss → …)
I did it like that because it promised to work the same both in static
and in dynmically linked environments and is accessible easily from any
programming language.
However, it has a weakness regarding reuse attacks: the socket is
securely hashed (siphash) from the thread ID in combination with the
AT_RANDOM secret. Thus it should not be guessable from an attacker in
advance. That's only true if a thread takes the lock only once and
keeps it forever. However, if a thread takes and releases it multiple
times an attacker might monitor that and quickly take the lock
after the first iteration for follow-up iterations.
It's not a big issue given that userdb (as the primary user for this)
never released the lock and we never made the concept a public
interface, and it was only included in one release so far, but it's
something that deserves fixing. (moreover it's a local DoS only, only
permitting to disable native userdb lookups)
With this rework the libnss_systemd.so.2 module will now export two
additional symbols. These symbols are not used by glibc, but can be used
by arbitrary programs: one can be used to disable nss-systemd, the other
to check if it is currently disabled.
The lock is per-thread. It's slightly less pretty, since it requires
people to manually link against C code via dlopen()/dlsym(), but it
should work safely without the aforementioned weakness.
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Fixes: #15160
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Fixes #15436.
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don't try to access shadow from logind
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This reworks the user validation infrastructure. There are now two
modes. In regular mode we are strict and test against a strict set of
valid chars. And in "relaxed" mode we just filter out some really
obvious, dangerous stuff. i.e. strict is whitelisting what is OK, but
"relaxed" is blacklisting what is really not OK.
The idea is that we use strict mode whenver we allocate a new user
(i.e. in sysusers.d or homed), while "relaxed" mode is when we process
users registered elsewhere, (i.e. userdb, logind, …)
The requirements on user name validity vary wildly. SSSD thinks its fine
to embedd "@" for example, while the suggested NAME_REGEX field on
Debian does not even allow uppercase chars…
This effectively liberaralizes a lot what we expect from usernames.
The code that warns about questionnable user names is now optional and
only used at places such as unit file parsing, so that it doesn't show
up on every userdb query, but only when processing configuration files
that know better.
Fixes: #15149 #15090
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v2: separate the declaration from the assignment to appease clang.
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CID#1412415.
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This changes nss-systemd to use the new varlink user/group APIs for
looking up everything.
(This also changes the factory /etc/nsswitch.conf line to use for
hooking up nss-system to use glibc's [SUCCESS=merge] feature so that we
can properly merge group membership lists).
Fixes: #12492
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Some distros install nologin as /usr/sbin/nologin, others as
/sbin/nologin.
Since we can't really on merged-usr everywhere (where the path wouldn't
matter), make the path build time configurable via -Dnologin-path=.
Closes #13028
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This means we need to include many more headers in various files that simply
included util.h before, but it seems cleaner to do it this way.
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Fixes: #11321
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This reverts commit b26c90411343d74b15deb24bd87077848e316dab.
I don't see anythign wrong, but Ubuntu autopkgtest CI started failing fairly
consistently since this was merged. Let's see if reverting fixes things.
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glibc passes in &errno for errnop, which means PROTECT_ERRNO ends up
squashing our intentional changes to *errnop.
Fixes #11321.
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This also adds PROTECT_ERRNO for all nss module functions.
C.f. glibc NSS documents https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/NSS-Modules-Interface.html
and discussion in https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=23410.
Fixes #9585.
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These lines are generally out-of-date, incomplete and unnecessary. With
SPDX and git repository much more accurate and fine grained information
about licensing and authorship is available, hence let's drop the
per-file copyright notice. Of course, removing copyright lines of others
is problematic, hence this commit only removes my own lines and leaves
all others untouched. It might be nicer if sooner or later those could
go away too, making git the only and accurate source of authorship
information.
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This part of the copyright blurb stems from the GPL use recommendations:
https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-howto.en.html
The concept appears to originate in times where version control was per
file, instead of per tree, and was a way to glue the files together.
Ultimately, we nowadays don't live in that world anymore, and this
information is entirely useless anyway, as people are very welcome to
copy these files into any projects they like, and they shouldn't have to
change bits that are part of our copyright header for that.
hence, let's just get rid of this old cruft, and shorten our codebase a
bit.
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Files which are installed as-is (any .service and other unit files, .conf
files, .policy files, etc), are left as is. My assumption is that SPDX
identifiers are not yet that well known, so it's better to retain the
extended header to avoid any doubt.
I also kept any copyright lines. We can probably remove them, but it'd nice to
obtain explicit acks from all involved authors before doing that.
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This adds `setpwent()`, `getpwent_r()`, `endpwent()`, `setgrent()`,
`getgrent_r()`, and `endgrent()` interfaces to nss-systemd library.
Thus, dynamic users can be enumerated by e.g. `getent passwd` command.
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In file included from ../src/basic/fs-util.h:32,
from ../src/nss-systemd/nss-systemd.c:28:
../src/nss-systemd/nss-systemd.c: In function '_nss_systemd_getgrnam_r':
../src/nss-systemd/nss-systemd.c:416:32: warning: argument to 'sizeof' in 'memset' call is the same pointer type 'char *' as the destination; expected 'char' or an explicit length [-Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess]
memzero(buffer, sizeof(char*));
^~~~
../src/basic/util.h:118:39: note: in definition of macro 'memzero'
#define memzero(x,l) (memset((x), 0, (l)))
^
gcc is trying to be helpful, and it's not far from being right. It _looks_ like
sizeof(char*) is an error, but in this case we're really leaving a space empty
for a pointer, and our calculation is correct. Since this is a short file,
let's just use simplest option and turn off the warning above the two functions
that trigger it.
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This is quite ugly, but provides us with an avenue for moving
distributions to define the "nobody" user properly without breaking legacy
systems that us the name for other stuff.
The idea is basically, that the distribution adopts the new definition
of "nobody" (and thus recompiles systemd with it) and then touches
/etc/systemd/dont-synthesize-nobody on legacy systems to turn off
possibly conflicting synthesizing of the nobody name by systemd.
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Let's employ coccinelle to do this for us.
Follow-up for #7625.
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