summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/common/cli.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorSimon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>2014-04-10 20:01:35 -0600
committerTom Rini <trini@ti.com>2014-05-29 17:52:03 -0400
commitaffb215626f91e717088a27081d24c473895d47d (patch)
tree9ced673b20b48fb9a70253860e5cc6b7d9c79a29 /common/cli.c
parentc1bb2cd0b6a3d1b152be3686601234b3a363772b (diff)
downloadu-boot-affb215626f91e717088a27081d24c473895d47d.tar.gz
main: Make the execution path a little clearer in main.c
bootdelay_process() never returns in some circumstances, whichs makes the control flow confusing. Change it so that the decision about how to execute the boot command is made in the main_loop() code, so it is easier to follow. Move CLI stuff to cli.c. Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'common/cli.c')
-rw-r--r--common/cli.c66
1 files changed, 66 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/common/cli.c b/common/cli.c
index 4ac9b3f017..ea6bfb3165 100644
--- a/common/cli.c
+++ b/common/cli.c
@@ -12,8 +12,11 @@
#include <common.h>
#include <cli.h>
#include <cli_hush.h>
+#include <fdtdec.h>
#include <malloc.h>
+DECLARE_GLOBAL_DATA_PTR;
+
/*
* Run a command using the selected parser.
*
@@ -105,6 +108,69 @@ int do_run(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[])
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_OF_CONTROL
+bool cli_process_fdt(const char **cmdp)
+{
+ /* Allow the fdt to override the boot command */
+ char *env = fdtdec_get_config_string(gd->fdt_blob, "bootcmd");
+ if (env)
+ *cmdp = env;
+ /*
+ * If the bootsecure option was chosen, use secure_boot_cmd().
+ * Always use 'env' in this case, since bootsecure requres that the
+ * bootcmd was specified in the FDT too.
+ */
+ return fdtdec_get_config_int(gd->fdt_blob, "bootsecure", 0) != 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Runs the given boot command securely. Specifically:
+ * - Doesn't run the command with the shell (run_command or parse_string_outer),
+ * since that's a lot of code surface that an attacker might exploit.
+ * Because of this, we don't do any argument parsing--the secure boot command
+ * has to be a full-fledged u-boot command.
+ * - Doesn't check for keypresses before booting, since that could be a
+ * security hole; also disables Ctrl-C.
+ * - Doesn't allow the command to return.
+ *
+ * Upon any failures, this function will drop into an infinite loop after
+ * printing the error message to console.
+ */
+void cli_secure_boot_cmd(const char *cmd)
+{
+ cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!cmd) {
+ printf("## Error: Secure boot command not specified\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable Ctrl-C just in case some command is used that checks it. */
+ disable_ctrlc(1);
+
+ /* Find the command directly. */
+ cmdtp = find_cmd(cmd);
+ if (!cmdtp) {
+ printf("## Error: \"%s\" not defined\n", cmd);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Run the command, forcing no flags and faking argc and argv. */
+ rc = (cmdtp->cmd)(cmdtp, 0, 1, (char **)&cmd);
+
+ /* Shouldn't ever return from boot command. */
+ printf("## Error: \"%s\" returned (code %d)\n", cmd, rc);
+
+err:
+ /*
+ * Not a whole lot to do here. Rebooting won't help much, since we'll
+ * just end up right back here. Just loop.
+ */
+ hang();
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_OF_CONTROL */
+
void cli_loop(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SYS_HUSH_PARSER