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| author | Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org> | 2016-09-25 22:38:44 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu> | 2016-09-25 22:38:44 +0200 |
| commit | 61c1039ee23a2d1de712843bed3480654d7ef42e (patch) | |
| tree | 68b14ad812f4ee9cae7b376a0ae736b72b82bcbc | |
| parent | b2406ed9031991b7ddc5b76b308623afc8a590c5 (diff) | |
| download | xorg-lib-libXfixes-61c1039ee23a2d1de712843bed3480654d7ef42e.tar.gz | |
Integer overflow on illegal server response
The 32 bit field "rep.length" is not checked for validity, which allows
an integer overflow on 32 bit systems.
A malicious server could send INT_MAX as length, which gets multiplied
by the size of XRectangle. In that case the client won't read the whole
data from server, getting out of sync.
Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
| -rw-r--r-- | src/Region.c | 15 |
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/src/Region.c b/src/Region.c index cb0cf6e..59bcc1a 100644 --- a/src/Region.c +++ b/src/Region.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H #include <config.h> #endif +#include <limits.h> #include "Xfixesint.h" XserverRegion @@ -333,9 +334,17 @@ XFixesFetchRegionAndBounds (Display *dpy, bounds->y = rep.y; bounds->width = rep.width; bounds->height = rep.height; - nbytes = (long) rep.length << 2; - nrects = rep.length >> 1; - rects = Xmalloc (nrects * sizeof (XRectangle)); + + if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) { + nbytes = (long) rep.length << 2; + nrects = rep.length >> 1; + rects = Xmalloc (nrects * sizeof (XRectangle)); + } else { + nbytes = 0; + nrects = 0; + rects = NULL; + } + if (!rects) { _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length); |