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* Increase attempts for recovering RSA (p,q) from (n,e,d)stageWouter Bolsterlee2014-06-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Bump the maximum number of iterations to recover (p,q) given (n,e,d) to increase the chance that the algorithm succeeds. The algorithm used is a probabilistic one with a 1/2 chance of finding the right value in each iteration, so it's likely that only a few iterations are needed. However, in some extreme cases this may still fail. Bumping the maximum number allow the algorithm to correctly find the right values for these cases. This changes bumps the number of iterations from 50 to 500 (the value 'a' is increased by 2 in each step), and hence reduces the chance of failure from 2**-50 to 2**-500. Note that this change does *not* result in a performance degradation.
* Make Cipher.galois module privateLegrandin2014-06-221-4/+4
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* Make GHASH more robust against timing attacks.Legrandin2014-06-221-8/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In order to speed up as much as possible the GHASH, the current implementation expands the 16 byte hash key (H) into a table of 64 KBytes. However, that is sensitive to cache-based timing attacks. If we assume that access to data inside the same cache line is constant-time (likely), fitting a table item into a cache line may help against the attacks. This patch reduce the pre-computed table from 64K to 4K and aligns every item to a 32 byte boundary (since most modern CPUs have cache line of that size or larger). This patch will reduce the overall performance. This patch also reverts commit 965871a727 ("GCM mode: Optimize key setup for GCM mode") since I actually got conflicting benchmark results.
* Add side-channel countermeasures to DSA.Legrandin2014-06-222-5/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch strenghten the DSA signing code against side-channel attacks. The DSA signing formulae: r = (g^{k} mod p) mod q s = k^{-1} * (H(m) + r*x) mod q becomes: b = random in [1..q) r = (g^{k} mod p) mod q s = (b * k)^{-1} * (b*H(m) + r*(b*x)) mod q In this way we avoid that the secret (x) gets multiplied by a random factor (r) which is immediately disclosed to an attacker (which we assume can both collect (r) and also monitor the side-channel produced by the multiplication). See also attack DSA_2 in: "Minimum Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack Resistance of RSA, DSA and Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Implementations", BSI
* Extended fix for the RSA boundary checkLegrandin2014-06-223-1/+17
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* Remove a few custom exception types.Legrandin2014-06-225-90/+84
| | | | | | | | | | | The following custom exceptions are replaced with ValueError: * Crypto.Util.PaddingError * Crypto.PublicKey.KeyFormatError The custom Crypto.Util.asn1.NoDerElementError is now private to the module. Some white spaces have been removed.
* Fix tobytes() broken by previous commit.Dwayne Litzenberger2014-06-221-16/+9
| | | | Python 2.1 str objects don't have a .decode() method.
* Get rid of catch-all exceptions. LP#1178485.Richard Mitchell2014-06-222-3/+3
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* Fix tests when running under "python -OO" (PYTHONOPTIMIZE set to 1 or 2)Dwayne Litzenberger2014-06-224-5/+24
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* Fix BytesWarning when running with "python3 -bb"Dwayne Litzenberger2014-06-221-1/+1
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* Fix handle_fastmath_import_error (broken due to incorrect path in the ↵Dwayne Litzenberger2014-02-221-10/+11
| | | | | | previous commit) Tested on py21-py33 by force-uninstalling libgmp10 after building.
* Refactor 3 places handling fastmath ImportErrorMarc Abramowitz2014-02-224-30/+18
| | | | | so that they call `Crypto.SelfTest.st_common.handle_fastmath_import_error`, thereby eliminiating duplicate code.
* Use different method for getting ext_suffixMarc Abramowitz2014-02-223-3/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | ``` ext_suffix = get_config_var("EXT_SUFFIX") or get_config_var("SO") ``` because `get_config_var("SO")` returns None in Python 3.4.0a4 because the "SO" variable is deprecated and "EXT_SUFFIX" is the new way to get this information (see: http://bugs.python.org/issue19555) This fixes `TypeError: Can't convert 'NoneType' object to str implicitly` errors when running the tests on Python 3.4.0a4.
* Fixed sentence in CCM exampleLegrandin2014-02-211-2/+3
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* Better example (with nonce) for Counter objectLegrandin2014-02-211-4/+6
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* Throw exception when IV is used with ECB or CTRLegrandin2014-02-211-8/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | The IV parameter is currently ignored when initializing a cipher in ECB or CTR mode. For CTR mode, it is confusing: it takes some time to see that a different parameter is needed (the counter). For ECB mode, it is outright dangerous. This patch forces an exception to be raised.
* Sign the hash in the the PKCS1_PSS doctest, not the keyW. Trevor King2013-12-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | As it stood before this commit, the hash was never used in the signing process. It looks like the bug was introduced by e053629 (Restructure both PKCS#1 signature schemes as objects, 2011-10-16), which changed: - >>> signature = PKCS1_PSS.sign(h, key) + >>> signer = PKCS1_PSS.new(key) + >>> signature = PKCS1_PSS.sign(key)
* Release v2.7a1v2.7a1Dwayne Litzenberger2013-10-211-2/+2
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* Rename S2V -> _S2V until we come up with a real PRF APIDwayne Litzenberger2013-10-203-7/+7
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* hexverify: Fix handling unicode strings on Python 3.2Dwayne Litzenberger2013-10-203-3/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We were getting this error on Python 3.2: ERROR: runTest (Crypto.SelfTest.Hash.common.MACSelfTest) CMAC #17: NIST SP 800 38B D.7 Example 17 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Traceback (most recent call last): File "build/lib.linux-x86_64-3.2/Crypto/SelfTest/Hash/common.py", line 199, in runTest self.assertRaises(ValueError, h.hexverify, "4556") File "/home/dwon/py/pythons/python3.2/lib/python3.2/unittest/case.py", line 557, in assertRaises callableObj(*args, **kwargs) File "build/lib.linux-x86_64-3.2/Crypto/Hash/CMAC.py", line 323, in hexverify self.verify(unhexlify(hex_mac_tag)) TypeError: 'str' does not support the buffer interface
* Make MODE_OPENPGP accept uppercase 'IV' parameter.Dwayne Litzenberger2013-10-201-1/+8
| | | | | | This is for consistency with the rest of PyCrypto. Closes: https://bugs.launchpad.net/pycrypto/+bug/1132550
* More ValueError -> TypeErrorDwayne Litzenberger2013-10-203-8/+8
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* CMAC: raise TypeError instead of ValueError when ciphermod is missing or ↵Dwayne Litzenberger2013-10-201-2/+3
| | | | | | | | unusable This makes the CMAC module behave more like most Python functions do when a required argument is missing, and reserves ValueError for a MAC failure.
* _CBCMAC: Rename ignite() -> _ignite()Dwayne Litzenberger2013-10-201-3/+3
| | | | I don't want to make this a public API just yet.
* Add encrypt_and_digest() and decrypt_and_verify()Legrandin2013-10-202-40/+103
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds encrypt_and_digest() and decrypt_and_verify() methods to a cipher object. In most cases they are just shortcuts to the existing functions. For SIV mode, decrypt_and_verify() replaces decrypt(). [dlitz@dlitz.net: Squashed with bugfix commit:] Bug in encrypt_and_digest() (all AEAD modes) decrypt() was being called instead of encrypt(). Added also a unit test to validate that composition of encrypt_and_digest() and decrypt_and_verify() is the identity function. [dlitz@dlitz.net: Included changes from the following commit from the author's pull request:] - [9c13f9c] Rename 'IV' parameter to 'nonce' for AEAD modes. [dlitz@dlitz.net: Whitespace fixed with "git rebase --whitespace=fix"] [dlitz@dlitz.net: Replaced MacMismatchError with ValueError] [dlitz@dlitz.net: Replaced ApiUsageError with TypeError]
* GCM mode: Optimize key setup for GCM mode.Legrandin2013-10-201-5/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | GCM mode requires GHASH for 2 different operations: one for the data (AD + ciphertext) and one for the IV. Construction of tables to speed-up GHASH is very expensive and it is worth doing only for the data, not for the IV. This patch ensures that the GHASH for the IV does not use tables, with a ~40% faster key setup. [dlitz@dlitz.net: Whitespace fixed with "git rebase --whitespace=fix"]
* GCM mode: Optimize GCM speed with pre-computed tables.Legrandin2013-10-201-4/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Tables take 64KByte per each key. Encryption performance is more than doubled (29 MBps vs 8MBps for AES128). As a drawback, key setup is much slower (1300 key/s on the same machine). [dlitz@dlitz.net: Replaced MacMismatchError with ValueError] [dlitz@dlitz.net: Replaced ApiUsageError with TypeError] [dlitz@dlitz.net: Included changes from the following commits from the author's pull request:] - [9c13f9c] Rename 'IV' parameter to 'nonce' for AEAD modes. - [ca460a7] Made blockalgo.py more PEP-8 compliant; The second parameter of the _GHASH constructor is now the length of the block (block_size) and not the full module. [dlitz@dlitz.net: Whitespace fixed with "git rebase --whitespace=fix"]
* Add support for GCM mode (AES only).Legrandin2013-10-205-158/+537
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The main change done by this commit is adding support for MODE_GCM (NIST SP 800 38D). Test vectors are included. The mode uses a C extension (Crypto.Util.galois._ghash) to compute the GHASH step. The C implementation is the most basic one and it is still significantly (5x times) slower than CTR. Optimizations can be introduced using tables (CPU/memory trade-off) or even AES NI instructions on newer x86 CPUs. This patch also simplifies Crypto.Cipher.blockalgo.py by: * removing duplicated code previously shared by digest() and verify(). * removing duplicated code previously shared by Crypto.Hash.CMAC and Crypto.Cipher.block_algo (management of internal buffers for MACs that can only operate on block aligned data, like CMAC, CBCMAC, and now also GHASH). [dlitz@dlitz.net: Included changes from the following commits from the author's pull request:] - [9c13f9c] Rename 'IV' parameter to 'nonce' for AEAD modes. - [ca460a7] Made blockalgo.py more PEP-8 compliant; The second parameter of the _GHASH constructor is now the length of the block (block_size) and not the full module. [dlitz@dlitz.net: Replaced MacMismatchError with ValueError] [dlitz@dlitz.net: Replaced ApiUsageError with TypeError] [dlitz@dlitz.net: Replaced renamed variable `ht` with original `h`] [dlitz@dlitz.net: Whitespace fixed with "git rebase --whitespace=fix"]
* Add support for SIV (Synthetic IV) modeLegrandin2013-10-206-45/+389
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch add supports for SIV, an AEAD block cipher mode defined in RFC5297. SIV is only valid for AES. The PRF of SIV (S2V) is factored out in the Protocol.KDF module. See the following example to get a feeling of the API (slightly different than other AEAD mode, during decryption). Encryption (Python 2): >>> from Crypto.Cipher import AES >>> key = b'0'*32 >>> siv = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_SIV) >>> ct = siv.encrypt(b'Message') >>> mac = siv.digest() Decryption (Python 2): >>> from Crypto.Cipher import AES, MacMismatchError >>> key = b'0'*32 >>> siv = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_SIV) >>> pt = siv.decrypt(ct + mac) >>> try: >>> siv.verify(mac) >>> print "Plaintext", pt >>> except MacMismatchError: >>> print "Error" This change also fixes the description/design of AEAD API. With SIV (RFC5297), decryption can only start when the MAC is known. The original AEAD API did not support that. For SIV the MAC is now exceptionally passed together with the ciphertext to the decrypt() method. [dlitz@dlitz.net: Included changes from the following commits from the author's pull request:] - [9c13f9c] Rename 'IV' parameter to 'nonce' for AEAD modes. - [d7727fb] Fix description/design of AEAD API. - [fb62fae] ApiUsageError becomes TypeError [whitespace] - [4ec64d8] Removed last references to ApiUsageError [whitespace] - [ee46922] Removed most 'import *' statements - [ca460a7] Made blockalgo.py more PEP-8 compliant; The second parameter of the _GHASH constructor is now the length of the block (block_size) and not the full module. [dlitz@dlitz.net: A conflict that was not resolved in the previous commit was originally resolved here. Moved the resolution to the previous commit.] [dlitz@dlitz.net: Replaced MacMismatchError with ValueError] [dlitz@dlitz.net: Replaced ApiUsageError with TypeError] [dlitz@dlitz.net: Whitespace fixed with "git rebase --whitespace=fix"]
* Add EAX authenticated encryption modeLegrandin2013-10-209-57/+304
| | | | | | | | | [dlitz@dlitz.net: Included changes from the following commits from the author's pull request:] - [9c13f9c] Rename 'IV' parameter to 'nonce' for AEAD modes. - [ca460a7] Made blockalgo.py more PEP-8 compliant; The second parameter of the _GHASH constructor is now the length of the block (block_size) and not the full module. [dlitz@dlitz.net: Fixed unresolved conflict in lib/Crypto/Cipher/blockalgo.py]
* Add support for CCM mode (AES only).Legrandin2013-10-204-68/+1010
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | [dlitz@dlitz.net: Included changes from the following commits from the author's pull request:] - [5306cf3] Added support for CCM mode (AES cipher only) - [9abe301] Added CCM tests - [f0c1395] Add MacMismatchError and ApiUsageError - [fb62fae] ApiUsageError becomes TypeError - [9c13f9c] Rename 'IV' parameter to 'nonce' for AEAD modes. - [4ec64d8] Removed last references to ApiUsageError - [80bfd35] Corrected AES-CCM examples [dlitz@dlitz.net: Removed unrelated documentation change] [dlitz@dlitz.net: Renamed 'targs' back to 'args'] [dlitz@dlitz.net: Whitespace fixed with "git rebase --whitespace=fix"]
* Add support for CMACLegrandin2013-10-204-1/+529
| | | | | | | This patch adds support for CMAC (RFC4493, NIST SP800-38B). [dlitz@dlitz.net: Replaced MacMismatchError with ValueError] [dlitz@dlitz.net: Whitespace fixed with "git rebase --whitespace=fix"]
* Removed most 'import *' statementsLegrandin2013-10-207-10/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | [dlitz@dlitz.net: Re-ordered commits; so don't import S2V yet] [dlitz@dlitz.net: Included an additional 'import *' change from the following commit:] commit 4ec64d8eaaa4965889eb8e3b801fc77aa84e0a4e Author: Legrandin <helderijs@gmail.com> Date: Tue Sep 10 07:28:08 2013 +0200 Removed last references to ApiUsageError [dlitz@dlitz.net: Removed unrelated whitespace changes]
* Added KDF unit tests to suiteLegrandin2013-10-201-0/+1
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* blockalgo: Fix MODE_OPENPGP commentLegrandin2013-10-201-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | [dlitz@dlitz.net: Extracted from the following commit:] commit 5306cf38ba060a70e5397ec48a5cea00c2bf0203 Author: Legrandin <helderijs@gmail.com> Date: Wed Jan 23 22:37:53 2013 +0100 Added support for CCM mode (AES cipher only)
* MAC unit tests become independent of hashesLegrandin2013-10-202-63/+71
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The MAC unit tests assume that the MAC algorithm is based on hash functions (HMAC). Additionally, a single test vector is quite complex in that it includes result for multiple tests (each performed on the same data, but with different hashes). This patch simplifies the MAC unit test so that it does not depend on hashes and a test vector is simply made up by: * 1 input * 1 result * All parameters to pass to the new() function [dlitz@dlitz.net: Replaced custom MacMismatchError with ValueError.] [dlitz@dlitz.net: Replaced 'import *' with appropriate imports.] [dlitz@dlitz.net: Whitespace fixed with "git rebase --whitespace=fix"]
* Add HMAC.verify() and HMAC.hexverify() with constant-time comparisonLegrandin2013-10-202-3/+65
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In the current implementation, it is left up to the caller to assess if the locally computed MAC matches the MAC associated to the received message. However, the most natural way to do that (use == operator) is also deepy unsecure, see here: http://seb.dbzteam.org/crypto/python-oauth-timing-hmac.pdf With this patch, the new HMAC.verify() method accepts the given MAC and perform the check on behalf of the caller. The method will use constant-time code (still dependent on the length of the MAC, but not on the actual content). [dlitz@dlitz.net: Modified commit message subject line.] [dlitz@dlitz.net: Whitespace fixed with "git rebase --whitespace=fix"]
* Made blockalgo.py more PEP-8 compliant (pre-AEAD)Legrandin2013-10-201-17/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [dlitz@dlitz.net: Original commit was:] commit ca460a79aecdbf6e5973e99f8bdbf3888b6d34d2 Author: Legrandin <helderijs@gmail.com> Date: Sun Aug 4 22:46:06 2013 +0200 Made blockalgo.py more PEP-8 compliant The second parameter of the _GHASH constructor is now the length of the block (block_size) and not the full module. [dlitz@dlitz.net: Included only style-related changes that apply cleanly to the master branch (pre-AEAD)] [dlitz@dlitz.net: Omitted functional changes that were made in the author's original commit.] [dlitz@dlitz.net: Omitted some changes that broke exception messages onto multiple lines.] [dlitz@dlitz.net: Omitted some changes that broke arithmetic expressions onto multiple lines.]
* whitespace changes (pre-AEAD)Legrandin2013-10-2011-27/+28
| | | | | | | [dlitz@dlitz.net: Whitespace changes extracted from the author's pull request:] - [9c13f9c] Rename 'IV' parameter to 'nonce' for AEAD modes. - [4ec64d8] Removed last references to ApiUsageError - [ee46922] Removed most 'import *' statements
* Merge tag 'v2.6.1' (fix CVE-2013-1445)Dwayne Litzenberger2013-10-205-4/+217
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is the PyCrypto 2.6.1 release. Dwayne Litzenberger (4): Random: Make Crypto.Random.atfork() set last_reseed=None (CVE-2013-1445) Fortuna: Add comments for reseed_interval and min_pool_size to FortunaAccumulator Update the ChangeLog Release v2.6.1
| * Release v2.6.1v2.6.1Dwayne Litzenberger2013-10-141-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | This release is identical to PyCrypto v2.6, except it fixes the Crypto.Random race condition (CVE-2013-1445) and adds a few related comments.
| * Fortuna: Add comments for reseed_interval and min_pool_size to ↵Dwayne Litzenberger2013-10-141-2/+19
| | | | | | | | FortunaAccumulator
| * Random: Make Crypto.Random.atfork() set last_reseed=None (CVE-2013-1445)Dwayne Litzenberger2013-10-144-0/+196
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | == Summary == In PyCrypto before v2.6.1, the Crypto.Random pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) exhibits a race condition that may cause it to generate the same 'random' output in multiple processes that are forked from each other. Depending on the application, this could reveal sensitive information or cryptographic keys to remote attackers. An application may be affected if, within 100 milliseconds, it performs the following steps (which may be summarized as "read-fork-read-read"): 1. Read from the Crypto.Random PRNG, causing an internal reseed; 2. Fork the process and invoke Crypto.Random.atfork() in the child; 3. Read from the Crypto.Random PRNG again, in at least two different processes (parent and child, or multiple children). Only applications that invoke Crypto.Random.atfork() and perform the above steps are affected by this issue. Other applications are unaffected. Note: Some PyCrypto functions, such as key generation and PKCS#1-related functions, implicitly read from the Crypto.Random PRNG. == Technical details == Crypto.Random uses Fortuna[1] to generate random numbers. The flow of entropy looks something like this: /dev/urandom -\ +-> "accumulator" --> "generator" --> output other sources -/ (entropy pools) (AES-CTR) - The "accumulator" maintains several pools that collect entropy from the environment. - The "generator" is a deterministic PRNG that is reseeded by the accumulator. Reseeding normally occurs during each request for random numbers, but never more than once every 100 ms (the "minimum reseed interval"). When a process is forked, the parent's state is duplicated in the child. In order to continue using the PRNG, the child process must invoke Crypto.Random.atfork(), which collects new entropy from /dev/urandom and adds it to the accumulator. When new PRNG output is subsequently requested, some of the new entropy in the accumulator is used to reseed the generator, causing the output of the child to diverge from its parent. However, in previous versions of PyCrypto, Crypto.Random.atfork() did not explicitly reset the child's rate-limiter, so if the child requested PRNG output before the minimum reseed interval of 100 ms had elapsed, it would generate its output using state inherited from its parent. This created a race condition between the parent process and its forked children that could cause them to produce identical PRNG output for the duration of the 100 ms minimum reseed interval. == Demonstration == Here is some sample code that illustrates the problem: from binascii import hexlify import multiprocessing, pprint, time import Crypto.Random def task_main(arg): a = Crypto.Random.get_random_bytes(8) time.sleep(0.1) b = Crypto.Random.get_random_bytes(8) rdy, ack = arg rdy.set() ack.wait() return "%s,%s" % (hexlify(a).decode(), hexlify(b).decode()) n_procs = 4 manager = multiprocessing.Manager() rdys = [manager.Event() for i in range(n_procs)] acks = [manager.Event() for i in range(n_procs)] Crypto.Random.get_random_bytes(1) pool = multiprocessing.Pool(processes=n_procs, initializer=Crypto.Random.atfork) res_async = pool.map_async(task_main, zip(rdys, acks)) pool.close() [rdy.wait() for rdy in rdys] [ack.set() for ack in acks] res = res_async.get() pprint.pprint(sorted(res)) pool.join() The output should be random, but it looked like this: ['c607803ae01aa8c0,2e4de6457a304b34', 'c607803ae01aa8c0,af80d08942b4c987', 'c607803ae01aa8c0,b0e4c0853de927c4', 'c607803ae01aa8c0,f0362585b3fceba4'] == Solution == The solution is to upgrade to PyCrypto v2.6.1 or later, which properly resets the rate-limiter when Crypto.Random.atfork() is invoked in the child. == References == [1] N. Ferguson and B. Schneier, _Practical Cryptography_, Indianapolis: Wiley, 2003, pp. 155-184.
* | FIX #1191411: RSA export exampleLegrandin2013-07-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | Closes: https://bugs.launchpad.net/pycrypto/+bug/1191411
* | A set of small changes to documentation.Legrandin2013-07-144-13/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * Add table to Crypto.Util package docs * Clarify that PKCS#1v1.5 encryption only works on byte strings * Clarify that padding is ignored by Cipher classes * Clarify that block encrypt() and decrypt() do not respectively add and remove any padding. * Clarify what the 'overflow' parameter does (that is, nothing) to the Crypto.Util.Counter class.
* | FIX #1093446. Description of allow_wraparound was incorrect.Legrandin2013-07-141-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | In addition to fixing the problem, the patch also improves readibility of other sentences a little. Closes: https://bugs.launchpad.net/pycrypto/+bug/1093446
* | FIX #1177614. Clarify that RSA OAEP only works on byte stringsLegrandin2013-07-141-9/+9
| | | | | | | | Closes: https://bugs.launchpad.net/pycrypto/+bug/1177614
* | Added unit tests for bugfix #1119552Legrandin2013-07-141-0/+27
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* | Bugfix #1119552: PKCS#1v1.5 has to accept signatures without NULL parametersLegrandin2013-07-141-12/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The digest AlgorithmIdentifier has optional (NULL) parameters; the verification function should not reject a signature if they are omitted. With this fix, either case is acceptable (parameters present with value NULL or not present). As an exception, signatures based on old MD2/MD5 must always have NULL parameters. See Appendix B.1 of RFC 3447 and Section 2.1 of RFC 4055. Closes: https://bugs.launchpad.net/pycrypto/+bug/1119552 [dlitz: Rebased and updated to use refactored asn1 API, text OIDs, & to fix Python 2.1.]
* | Fix unhexlify in Python 3.2Dwayne Litzenberger2013-07-142-33/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Under Python 3.2, unhexlify expects to receive a `bytes` object. Passing it a (unicodr) `str` object causes it to raise the following exception: TypeError: 'str' does not support the buffer interface